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5Abstract
This thesis presents four essays in the political economy of elections and
reforms. The first study exploits discontinuities around school entry cut-off
dates to show that early childhood conditions can impact the probability to
become a top-flight politician. It turns out that those politicians who have
been among the oldest in their cohort at school are largely overrepresented in
the US Congress. Nevertheless, relative age does not seem to be correlated
with the quality of elected politicians. The second study makes use of a
natural experiment to provide empirical estimates of the effect of sequential
voting on turnout and bandwagon voting outside the laboratory. Getting to
know exit poll information before voting decreases turnout by about 10 to
15 percentage points and increases bandwagon voting, that is at least some
people seem to have preferences to vote for the likely winner. The third work
describes a novel nonparametric strategy to identify tactical voting patterns
directly from balloting results. Using British election data it is shown that
there seems to be a considerable amount of tactical voting especially between
Labour and Liberal-Democrats. Finally, a study is put forward that examines
the political feasibility of reforms. It is theoretically argued that private
information can prevent the implementation of welfare-enhancing reforms,
depending on the distribution of individual gains and losses. Using as an
example the European agricultural reform of 2005 and gathering data from
German farmers, this distribution is estimated using various methods and
robustness checks.
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This thesis deals with the political economy of elections and reforms. It
tries to contribute to and broaden our understanding of the political process,
political decision making, voting behaviour and the success (or failure) of
political reforms. The document contains four formally separated works that
are presented in four Chapters (Chapters 2 to 5). In this introduction I
am going to briefly introduce each chapter and also describe how they are
on a broader level connected. Nevertheless, all chapters will also contain a
separate, more specific literature review.
The common link that ties these chapters together is the econometric
analysis of political elections and reforms. Moreover, to a lesser extent all
chapters strive to add to the empirical methodology. I try to exploit the
whole range of econometric techniques in order to be able to find reliable
and robust empirical answers to the corresponding research question. This
approach can imply to introduce an otherwise well-known econometric tech-
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22 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
nique to a field where it has not been used before (a regression discontinuity
design in the study of the relative age effect, see section 2) or to use a “nat-
ural experiment” (in the sense of Harrison and List (2004), Meyer (1994)
and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000)) where more traditional approaches are
naturally limited in their ability to identify the causal parameter of interest
(see Chapter 3). It can also mean to use nonparametric techniques when
standard parametric estimation methods seem to suffer from some problems
like omitted variable bias for example or to use structural estimation of a
response model in order to alleviate problems that might come along with
survey data (Chapter 5). It is my opinion that there are a number of other
more important questions that are of great interest to the fields of political
science and political economy which are underexplored because it turned out
that it is difficult to find a convincing empirical design. I am convinced that it
is therefore necessary to take advantage of the whole empirical toolkit. This
can imply to increasingly look for natural experiments but also to conduct
structural estimations whenever this seems more suited.1
In the next chapter, the study “Political Selection and the Relative Age
Effect” is presented.2 It deals with the question of what traits and charac-
teristics make it more likely for politicians to win an election. While this
question seems important at first sight, the present study is the first to em-
pirically identify one factor: relative age. Relative age is in general defined as
the distance of one’s birthday to the corresponding school entry cut-off date.
This arbitrary cut-off date leads to within-cohort age difference among stu-
dents of up to 20% in the first year at school. It is well-known that these age
1Naturally, every empirical technique comes with different (dis-) advantages; not all
questions can be analyzed using natural experiments for instance.
2This is co-authored work with Lionel Page (2013).
1.1. OVERVIEW 23
differences have important consequences for scholastic performance, partic-
ularly at primary school, and in amateur and professional sports. Studying
this phenomenon in this setting yields important insights about the selection
process of political decision makers. Economist are typically interested in
efficiency aspects of certain policy issues, even more so when it comes to the
selection process of these important leaders. The general public potentially
has a great interest in knowing how their representatives are selected and to
identify channels through which this mechanism operates. I provide the first
empirical evidence that this “relative age effect” also seems to have longer
lasting consequences until adulthood by showing that top-flight US politi-
cians are distinctly more likely to belonged to the oldest in their cohort at
school. I also provide some evidence regarding the efficiency of the selection
process and find that relative age does not seem to correlate with the quality
of a politician (although it is arguably quite difficult to define or measure
‘quality’). Focussing on US politicians seems to be a natural start, as they
are arguably among the most powerful and important figures in the world.
I also provide empirical evidence that shows that this effect is unlikely to
be driven by seasonal patterns, academic redshirting, endogenous sorting of
births or measurement error. At the limit, I estimate that US Congressmen
and -women are up to 50% more likely to be among the oldest in their cohort
at school, which is an astoundingly large effect. One potential explanation
for this effect is that superior physical strength and maturity help to gain
leadership positions early on (at high school clubs, in sports teams and so on)
which in turn help to acquire ‘leadership skills’ that are reinforced over time
in a multiplier process of human capital. Besides, I also investigate potential
policy implications that might arise from this finding and try to empirically
distinguish three different hypotheses regarding the efficiency of this special
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kind of political selection. The study concludes that selection on relative age
does not correlate with some common measures of quality of politicians. On
a methodological level, this chapter makes the case that it is preferable to
work with more precise birth- and cut-off data (for example daily data as
opposed to quarterly data) in order to gain more precise estimates. These
data also allow me to employ a regression-discontinuity type of strategy with
all its well-known advantages. I moreover show how to use the latest research
on optimal bandwidth and binsize estimators in this context.
Chapter 3 brings forward a study titled “Exit Polls, Turnout, and Band-
wagon Voting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment”.3 The work included
here tries to answer empirically the question how exit poll knowledge affects
voter’s turnout decision and bandwagon voting (the preference to vote for a
party or a candidate just because he or she is likely to win). This issue is
highly debated in political science and of vast general importance in a time
where TV and internet deliver more and more precise election forecasts even
during election day (but also since some countries span several time zones
such as the US, Canada and Russia) and as a consequence might increasingly
affect elections. Apart from different time zones and exit poll information,
there are also a range of elections that are sequential in nature like primaries
in the US or certain parliamentary elections. Although this topic has been
studied in theory and in laboratory experiments, the question how exit poll
information affects election outcomes remains empirically obscure. The main
reason for this gap has in my opinion been the lack of a credible identification
strategy that might yield evidence on this question. I am convinced that this
chapter delivers such a reliable design and hence is able to give some advice
if and how sequential voting affects turnout and election outcomes.
3This is co-authored with Rebecca Morton, Lionel Page and Benno Torgler (2013).
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To be more precise, I examine a natural experiment that took place in
France in 2005 which offers an interesting setting to study important ques-
tions regarding the effect of exit polls on turnout and voter behaviour. Be-
fore 2005 the voters of the French DOM-TOMs (“de´partements et territoires
d’outre-mer”), which are the French Overseas territories, voted four to twelve
hours after the mainland had voted, which gave them precise information on
the likely election outcome. In 2007 these voters have for the first time be-
gun to vote one day before mainland France. This change was implemented
to avoid them knowing the results from the mainland. Since the mainland
accounts for approximately 96% of the total French population, knowing the
results there amounts to almost certainly knowing the final result of the elec-
tions. The great advantage using this experiment relative to the study of the
so-called American “West coast effect” (the fact that voters on the American
West coast vote three hours after the East coast) is, first of all, that the
time differences are much larger (French territory basically spans all over the
globe). Second, the experiment actually allows estimating the counterfactual
voting outcome (‘what would have happened in the absence of the shift of the
election day in some overseas territories?’), which is not possible for US states
without making strong empirical assumptions. This experiment allows me to
estimate the effects of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon vot-
ing using only mild identification assumptions.4 In fact, I estimate sizeable
effects of this information: turnout decreases by about 10 - 15 percentage
points. Also I provide the first ‘real world’ evidence of bandwagon voting:
at least some voters seem to have a preference to vote for the winner.5
4An extensive discussion of these assumptions can be found in Chapter 3.
5Of course, there have been other empirical studies before, but, so I argue, these studies
suffer from some obvious drawbacks. Most importantly, in all these studies dealing with
the West coast effect, it is unclear what the counterfactual would be, that is how voting
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Given the difficulties of social scientists to carry out controlled random-
ized experiments, like natural scientists do, ‘natural experiments’ provide
means for researchers to observe outcomes for both the treatment and con-
trol group in a (hopefully) randomized framework. Such an experiment is
often induced by government randomization mechanisms such as law changes.
Hence, in a natural experiment the source of variation in the impact vari-
able is typically well understood and can be exploited to estimate treatment
effects. Natural experiments became quite popular in recent years in eco-
nomics, but are in my opinion not yet as prominent in political science. In
any case the experiment at hand is well suited to empirically answer ques-
tions like those studied here. In this thesis I also try to make the point that
these natural experiments are vastly underused in political science until now.
The work presented in this Chapter also opens up new questions, for ex-
ample why voters turnout at all when they know with certainty that they will
not impact the results. The findings reported here also seem to reject Downs
(1957b) theory of voting as rational choice and other purely instrumental
voting motives since we observe people voting even when their probability
of being pivotal is exactly zero in the context of the French natural experi-
ment.6 Besides, maybe even more intriguingly, it also remains unclear what
exactly drives people to switch their vote from their preferred candidate to
the winner and whether this behavior should be seen as a ‘behavioural bias’
or as stemming from the maximization of a well-behaved utility function. I
will provide a more detailed discussion of these questions in Section 1.3.
behaviour would have looked like in the absence of voting on the East coast. See the
separate literature review in the corresponding chapter for more details.
6At least as long as we assume away other sources of utility from voting except those
from the expected value of being pivotal. Hence, if there is no expressive or other ‘non-
instrumental’ utility from voting rational individuals should not turnout.
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Chapter 4 of this thesis adds to the literature on the measurement of
tactical voting and presents a work titled “Tactical Voting and Voter’s So-
phistication in British Elections”.7 Tactical or strategic voting denotes a
situation when voters do not vote according to their sincere preferences with
the intention to influence the election result in a preferred way. While this
phenomenon similarly attracted a great deal of attention among political sci-
entists and economists, it turned out to be fairly hard to measure empirically,
mainly because it is hard (if not impossible) to measure voter’s “true pref-
erences”. Generally speaking, there have been two different prevailing main
approaches in the measurement of tactical voting, a direct and an indirect
one. The latter relies on modelling voting choices via observable variables
such as ideology, including a variable that is supposed to measure the per-
ceived desirability of tactical voting. The former, direct approach employs
pre- and post-election survey data, asking individuals about their preferred
option and how they actually casted their vote. While the indirect approach
assumes that it is possible to consistently estimate voting choices, the direct
approach starts from the premise that people answer truthfully in an inter-
view and that the sample from which the data is collected is representative.
Both assumptions seem, at least sometimes, hard to justify. The study pre-
sented here introduces a third approach to identify tactical voting, a simple
nonparametric approach, which does not use any of these identification as-
sumptions. The approach however works on a new identifying assumption
and moreover comes at the cost that it is more difficult to actually assess
the magnitude of tactical voting. I nevertheless strongly believe that this
method makes a useful contribution to the literature on tactical voting and
that it should be regarded as complement to the existing methods rather
7This is co-authored work with Stephane Dupraz and Lionel Page (2013).
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than as a replacement. I present results using this new approach from the
British elections of 2010 and show that tactical voting seemed to have played
a significant role. The method also allows to study related phenomena such
as how parties target campaign spending and how sophisticated voters are
when they form their expectations about the election outcome. I find that
voters seem to be “somewhat sophisticated” in the sense that they seem to
form their expectations about where to find close election results based on a
national vote swing as opposed to newspapers guides or perfect predictions.
The last Chapter of this thesis deals with the political economy of re-
forms and seeks to enhance our understanding why sometimes societal wel-
fare enhancing reforms are not implemented. This finding has puzzled many
economists as they argue that it should be theoretically possible to redis-
tribute gains from reforms such that everybody is at least not worse off than
before and some are strictly better-off. Hence every reform that increases the
total sum of payoffs should theoretically be implementable. Typical examples
of areas where a majority of economists sees a need for policy changes are the
labor market, the pension system and the health care sector. In “Measuring
Political Information Rents: Evidence from the European Agricultural Re-
form”8 I argue that private information about personal losses or gains may be
a reason why such compensations might sometimes not be empirically feasi-
ble. If a policy maker plans to redistribute welfare gains equally to all voters,
but gains and losses are distributed unequally in the population, resulting
‘information rents’ might be an obstacle for such compensation. Informa-
tion rents are defined as the difference between the potential compensation
and the true loss (so rents can be positive or negative). Positive information
rents might lead to situations in which welfare improving reforms are not
8This is co-authored with Hans Peter Gru¨ner (2013).
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feasible anymore. The shape of the distribution of losses is then determining
whether this will buy the support of a majority. The key contribution of
this chapter is to empirically estimate the distribution of information rents
using the European Agricultural reform of 2005 - a reform that was, so I
argue later, welfare enhancing and successfully implemented. This reform
eliminated agricultural subsidies that are tied to the quantity produced and
replaced them with fixed payments paid proportional to the size of the area
cultivated. This fixed payment can be seen as a compensation payment in
order to accept the reform. It moreover seems obvious that this reform is
welfare enhancing as incentives for overproduction are minimized.
I conducted a large survey among farmers in the German state of Lower-
Saxony which explicitly asked them in two different questions ex-post about
their willingness to accept (WTA) the reform9 and a battery of other factors
that might potentially be related to the size of losses (or gains). It turns
out that about half of the farmers were reform winners and half were reform
losers. While I realize that this method would not be incentive compatible
if it was used to inform policy makers about future reforms as survey re-
spondents might face incentives to alleviate potential gains (exaggerate their
losses), I argue that the ex-post view in this work drastically mitigates these
problems.10 Moreover, in order to tackle this issue I develop a simple sur-
vey response model in which respondent’s trade-off utility from stating a
higher WTA and disutility from lying. This model also incorporates asym-
metric response behavior between reform winners and losers as it is present
in the dataset collected (reform winners are far more reluctant to reveal their
9That is, the monetary payment they would require in order to be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the reform.
10This ex-post approach might be regarded as a version of “cheap talk scheme solution”
(Cummings and Taylor, 1999) to the hypothetical bias.
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WTA). I structurally estimate this model and find that information rents are
in the order of 15% of total compensation paid (out of approximately 60 bil-
lion euros yearly). This result also survives a number of robustness checks,
where I employ different parametric form assumptions and a weighted non-
parametric regression. Moreover, I show that observable factors do not seem
to be related with the stated gain or loss. This finding might be interesting
when policy makers want to design ‘compensation packages’ for reform losers
in order to buy their support. Then those observables correlated with the
WTA might be used to condition compensation packages on these variables.
Hence, it could - theoretically - be possible to spend less money on these
compensations. Nevertheless, it turns out that this would not have been
possible in the reform under study.
Before I proceed with the presentation of these studies, I first attempt
to put all chapters in a more general framework in order to highlight the
connections between them (section 1.2 and 1.3). I do so taking two different
perspectives. First, I elucidate the connections to the latest developments in
applied (micro–) econometrics, the so–called ‘credibility revolution’ in eco-
nomics. Second, I elaborate on the different perspectives one can take on
voting in general and, more specifically, on the prominent ‘paradox of (not)
voting’ and its connection to this thesis.
1.2 Putting the Thesis into Context: Applied
Econometrics
Almost exactly thirty years ago in an influential article, Ed Leamer wrote:
“Hardly anyone takes data analysis seriously. Or perhaps more
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accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data analysis seri-
ously.” (Leamer, 1983)
For many economists, this statement summarizes the status quo of ap-
plied economics at this time fairly well. Empirical work at this time was
characterized by a “distressing lack of robustness to changes in key assump-
tions” (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).
Most of the challenges when doing applied work in social sciences can be
traced back to the lack of randomized data. In some sense the whole field of
econometrics can be understood as the branch of economics that deals with
solving problems that go along with non-random assignment of the treat-
ment variable. As Zvi Griliches noted “If the data were perfect, collected
from well-designed randomized experiments, there would hardly be room for
a separate field of econometrics” (Griliches, 1986, p. 1466). Angrist and Pis-
chke (2010) pointed out that much of the discussion in applied work at this
time was centered around “distractions” such as discussions about functional
form assumptions, choice of the sample period, log-transformations and het-
eroscedasticity. In short, discussions that present-day researchers consider to
be of minor importance to say the least.
Thirty years later the situation in economics has fundamentally changed
for the better.11 At the core of modern applied work these days is a discussion
of potential omitted variable bias, endogeneity of right-hand-side variables
and exogeneity of instrumental variables while the empirical robustness12 of
linear least squares is intuitively understood by applied researchers and hence
hardly at the center anymore. The discussions about these factors mentioned
11This is not only my personal opinion but also that of many other researchers, see for
example Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Imbens (2010).
12And theoretical robustness, see Angrist and Pischke (2008) .
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before are typically grounded in and motivated by economic theory as most of
these assumptions made are not statistically testable, but have to be justified
by the use of economic theory.
This development for the better is partly driven by progress in modern
computing power and access to better data and statistical software packages.
However, the main factor, in my opinion, seems to be that researchers to-
day spend much more time and care in choosing their research design and
providing clear discussions of their identification assumptions. It is also now
hard to find an empirical paper without a robustness section. Questions
like ‘what is your exogenous source of variation in your variable of inter-
est?’ or ‘what is your identification strategy?’ are now standard in applied
economics seminars. Econometric techniques that are currently routinely
used are difference-in-difference models, instrumental variable strategies and
regression discontinuity designs. I mentioned before that researchers also
increasingly turn to natural experiments where nature provides a random
assignment of some treatment variable of interest in a quasi-experimental
design. As Angrist and Pischke (2010) argue this development ‘takes the
con out of econometrics’ and they hence see a “credibility revolution” in
economics. As a consequence, applied studies in economics are nowadays
in general considered to deliver credible empirical answers, unlike what was
state of the art when Leamer wrote down his concerns.
It is my opinion that much beneficial progress has been made in applied
economics and I also consider this credibility revolution to be extraordinarily
important for the standing of the economics profession as such. Moreover, I
believe that all of the essays included in this thesis are in the spirit of and
inspired by this ‘credibility revolution’ and would certainly not have been
possible without it. All chapters share the overlapping idea to bring (what
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I believe are) better econometric techniques and empirical designs to the
study of important questions in political economy and political science. This
can mean to bring a regression discontinuity design to the literature about
relative age affects and political selection or to exploit a natural experiment
and nonparametric methods in situations where alternative approaches suffer
from some drawbacks. In some sense the questions in this thesis are old
questions that have attracted much scholarly attention before but have in
my opinion not yet received the credible empirical answer they deserve. The
question if and how turnout changes in sequential elections for example and
whether there is bandwagon voting has been studied at least since the early
1980s (see the separate literature review). However, it seems fair to say that
findings have been mixed at best to this day.
1.3 Putting the Thesis into Context: Voting
1.3.1 Why do people vote?
One longstanding question that has intrigued generations of (political) economists
and political scientists is the question why people vote. The basic puzzle
comes from the fact that we empirically observe relatively high turnout rates
in western countries whereas it is clear that voters face a minuscule chance
of changing the election outcome and on the other hand have positive costs
of voting. The literature on this “paradox of voting” is voluminous and this
review is by no means comprehensive, but rather tries to give a structured in-
troduction to the topic.13 Readers interested in further readings are referred
to Mueller (2003) and Feddersen (2004) for a more comprehensive overview.
13This review draws on Geys (2006).
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While academic interest continues to be high, this topic is certainly also of
great practical importance. As Morton and Tyran (2012) for instance note
“This question is not an esoteric one about a quirk of political
behaviour, but has important implications for our understanding
of the positive properties of majority rule.”
Generally speaking, attempts to solve the paradox of voting can be cate-
gorized by using one out of the three assumptions that are at odds with (the
strict version) of the calculus of voting (Morton and Tyran, 2012).
• Voters miscalculate the probability of being pivotal.
• They receive additional benefits from the act of voting apart from
purely outcome related, instrumental ones.
• Voters do not act purely selfishly but also care about others.
Down’s Model
Ever since Anthony Downs’ (1957a) seminal work “An Economic Theory of
Democracy” it is clear that rational choice theory faces some problems in
explaining empirically observed high voter turnout.14 Rational choice theory
would predict that in the presence of (potentially very small) costs of voting,
turnout is zero, since the probability of being decisive is approximately zero in
large elections. This phenomena is called “the paradox of (not) voting” and
stimulated a lively discussion among political scientist and rational choice
14At least in the ‘pure’ version of rational choice theory where individuals are assumed to
be selfish rational utility maximizers. Nevertheless, in some sense all approaches discussed
here are rational choice approaches as it is always assumed that individuals maximize a
well-defined utility function and are in that sense also rational.
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theorists. The rational choice approach to voter turnout explicitly assumes
some kind of expected utility calculations which the individuals undertake.
That means they will vote if their expected utility from doing so (through a
potential pivotal influence on the policy platform) is higher than the costs of
voting (costs might arise through queuing up, walking to the polling station,
registration costs, opportunity costs for the time spent at the polling booth,
“shoe leather costs”, or more extreme, violent physical threats and so on).
Vice versa, a rational agent abstains if the expected costs are higher than
the expected utility.15 To put it more formal, rational choice theory assumes
that people vote if their expected utility is higher than the costs:
E[U ] = pB − C, (1.1)
where p denotes the probability of being pivotal, B represents the benefits
from having the preferred candidate in office minus the utility the agent has
when the other candidate is elected and C the costs of voting. Then an
individual will vote if pB > C.
Consumption Benefits of Voting and Expressive Voting
In a first attempt to circumvent the voting paradox Downs (1957a) (and later
Aldrich (1993)) argued that the costs C of voting are close to zero. However,
this seems highly unlikely, since there are, as mentioned above, multiple
sources of costs when voting. A second line of work aimed at the “B” term,
the benefits of voting. For example Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argued that
15Whereas it is intuitively clear that the probability of being pivotal is tiny, a common
misunderstanding is that it is simply equal to one divided by the number of voters. It is in
fact not as simple as that. Gelman, King, and Boscardin (1998), Gelman, Silver, and Edlin
(2009) and Gelman (2010) for instance estimate this probability to be not smaller than
1:10 million for close elections on average equal 1:60 million for the latest US elections.
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individuals enjoy consumption benefits from voting, which means they derive
benefits from the pure act of voting additional to the prospect of changing
the policy platform. In this case equation (1.1) becomes
E[U ] = pB − C +D. (1.2)
The individual now votes if pB+D > C. This extra benefit D could, ac-
cording to the proponents of that argument, be interpreted as deriving utility
from helping to increase the chance of the survival of democracy for instance.
This change in the benefits could indeed render the expected benefit side now
larger than the cost side. Note that D is independent from the probability
of being pivotal. It is rather a “warm glow” utility from participating in
what is perceived as a higher good. So, the voter feels committed to vote
and conceives voting as a civic duty. D can also be interpreted as the util-
ity derived from “expressing oneself”. In this case people vote because they
want to express their support or aversion towards the candidates (Brennan
and Buchanan, 1984). This is then called “expressive voting”.
While this certainly constitutes a way of tackling the paradox of voting,
it is still largely considered to be unsatisfying, since it was virtually solved by
assumption. And because D is unobservable the model loses all its predictive
power. Thus the expressive voter or consumption benefit hypothesis is mainly
a tautology (Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
Minimax Regret
The minimax regret solution to the problem of (not) voting tackles the prob-
lem by assuming that voters choose their actions such that they feel minimal
regret in a worst-case scenario (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974). The worst-case
for the individual here would be the scenario where he or she does not vote
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and then later on finds out that his or her vote would have changed the win-
ner candidate to the preferred one. This hypothesis is indeed another valid
solution to the paradox and would predict a higher turnout than Downs’
model. However it also suffers from two major drawbacks. Firstly, it is
unable to predict differences in turnout over different elections, which can
be empirically observed (for example national elections usually draw more
attention than local ones). Secondly, this hypothesis implicitly assumes an
infinitely high degree of risk aversion, since individuals only care about the
worst alternative. This seems to be highly unlikely and thus the minimax
regret hypothesis has never gained bigger popularity among researchers.
The Game Theoretic Approach
The game theoretic approach to voter turnout tries to endogenize p. The
reasoning is as follows: starting from equation (1.1), it is clear that the
expected benefits from voting are small and thus, the agent will not vote.
However, if all agents are rational, nobody will vote, thus the probability
of being pivotal is one. A rational agent who realizes this will vote and
this in turn will make everybody vote, the probability of being pivotal will
again decrease and so on. Taken together, this reasoning implies that the
probability is not fixed, but a function of the strategies the agents play.
Then there are also potentially multiple mixed strategy equilibria where some
people vote and others not. Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)
have been among the first to come up with this approach. Although their
argument seems reasonable, it also has severe problems to explain relatively
high turnout in large elections. Moreover, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) show
that high-turnout equilibria are eliminated when uncertainty about the other
voters is introduced. This makes the game theory solution to the paradox of
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voting most likely an unrealistic one.
Asymmetric Information Models
Matsusaka (1995a) was the first who approached the voting paradox by as-
suming asymmetric information between voters and politicians about the
policy the latter are going to implement once they are in office. Given that
people have a natural inclination to vote (or analogously, the costs of vot-
ing are zero), people may even then choose to abstain when they feel they
do not have enough information to decide which candidate is the right one.
Formally speaking, the “benefits” part in equation (1.1) is increasing with
the level of information the potential voter has. Now it is also obvious that
in the model of Matsusaka (1995a) more informed people are more likely to
vote.
In a series of papers by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999a)
take a similar line as Matsusaka (1995a): given incomplete information about
some policy state-variable that affects the voters, it might be optimal for
uninformed voters to abstain, even when voting is costless. Although this
class of models is certainly useful in explaining differences in voter turnout
between individuals and elections, they are strictly speaking unable to explain
positive turnout itself. This is so because a propensity to vote is merely
assumed, rather than explained. Nevertheless these works are useful as they
add a new argument to the literature and shed an interesting light on the
role information play in elections.
Group Models
Group-based models start out with the idea that voting might not be ra-
tional for an individual but for the group as a whole. Groups are likely to
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enjoy larger benefits from voting, for example through better lobbying op-
portunities. It might be possible for politicians to pass along benefits to the
whole group to win its support, for instance in the form of tax reductions or
subsidies. It is also evident that the larger the group gets, the more powerful
it is in influencing the policy platform (thus the benefit B might increase).
Pioneering studies in that area are Morton (1987), Morton (1991) and Filer,
Kenny, and Morton (1993).
While these models certainly have attractive features, it is not obvi-
ous how group members should be prevented from free riding. In Morton
(1991) elites provide incentives to vote, however the exact mechanism re-
mains unclear. Another possible solution might be social pressure. Funk
(2010) presents empirical support for that hypothesis. She finds that social
pressure is likely to account for at least part of the observed turnout. Empir-
ical support also comes from Hill and Leighley (1996), who find that efforts
by political parties can indeed influence political participation. Nevertheless,
it seems unlikely that peer pressure alone can help to avert free riding, es-
pecially in large groups. Thus, it seems, these models are unlikely to be the
single solution to the paradox of voting.
Ethical Voters
Starting with Goodin and Roberts (1975) researchers have begun to incor-
porate ethical behavior into rational choice models of voting. Ethical agents
judge different actions based on the comparison of the social welfare implica-
tions of the outcomes arising from those actions if everybody were to act the
same. This reasoning also implies that while voting, agents also incorporate
the utility of others in their own utility function, possibly with a discount fac-
tor. This is supported by substantial evidence that voters are at least partly
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guided by a sense of civic duty when voting (Blais, 2000). Most prominently,
Harsanyi (1977, 1980, 1985) argued that the introduction of rule-utilitarian
agents is able to dissipate the paradox of voting. A rule-utilitarian is some-
body who derives utility from obeying a rule, which, if followed by everybody,
would maximize social welfare. He demonstrates by means of some simple
examples, how this assumption is able to tackle the paradox.
Based on these insights Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) build a two-
candidate election model where a certain fraction of ethical (rule-utilitarian)
voters. Their model is broadly consistent with the empirical observations on
turnout and shows that turnout will be even in large elections strictly posi-
tive. Coate and Conlin (2004) structurally estimate a similar model and find
that it not only solves the paradox, but also produces realistic predictions
for other stylized empirical facts.
Basically this class of models boils down to derive and justify the existence
of the D term in equation (1.2). For an ethical voter, this extra benefit D
just comes from following the rule that maximizes total social welfare. Hence
the models provide an elegant way of solving the paradox of voting without
abandoning the rational agent assumption, supported by empirical evidence.
To summarize, models introducing ethical voters provide an interesting way
to escape the paradox. Nevertheless, it appears to me that research is just
in the early stages and that more work is needed here. It is also my opinion
that to this day no model is fully able to explain observed turnout patterns
in democratic societies. Moreover, it seems likely that we will never have
such a theory because there is most likely significant heterogeneity of voter
preferences and the models are not mutually exclusive. While I believe that
there is clear need for new theoretical approaches to answer this question,
I also believe that we need to initiate research that tries to combine these
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models and study closely their interaction.
Connection to this Thesis
What can the studies presented in this thesis contribute to the discussion
about the paradox of voting? It is, I believe, interesting to look at the
findings from the natural experiment in France and what they can tell us
about the different theories of voting presented above. The first observation
is that people react to pivotality. I observe an economically and statistically
significant lower turnout when people know for sure that they cannot be
pivotal in the election. On the one hand, this evidence might be taken
as support for the strict rational choice hypothesis as it is mainly p, the
probability of being pivotal, which determines voters benefit of voting. Hence
the theory predicts that people react to changes in this probability, which
is exactly what I find. On the other hand, one could object first of all that
the reaction of voters was too strong in order to be in line with rational
choice theory as the law change most likely raised the probability p only
marginally above zero for voters in the western overseas territories. But in
fact I observe a sizeable change in turnout of around 10-12 percentage points
from an average base level of around 50%. Second, still around 50% of the
voting population turnout in the west (before the law change) although their
probability of being pivotal is not approximately but exactly zero. Thus this
study can be seen as documenting a clear violation of the narrow rational
choice theory based on Downs (1957a) for about half of the voting population.
What can be said about other theories mentioned above? Strictly speak-
ing, the theories of ethical voting are also not able to explain this phenomena
as in these models the benefits of voting decisively depend on p, both in Fed-
dersen and Sandroni (2006) and in Coate and Conlin (2004). If p is zero,
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turnout is also predicted to be zero.16 A similar reasoning holds for game
theoretic approaches to the paradox of voting and the minimax regret the-
ory. Hence approaches that assume additional benefits independent of p are
called for. As mentioned before it might be that voters receive some sort of
‘warm glow’ benefits of voting or expressive utility of voting. In that sense,
the evidence presented in this thesis can be seen as providing strong sup-
port that the behavior of a significant fraction of voters can be explained by
expressive or warm glow theories of turnout.
1.3.2 The Role of Elections in a Society
Elections serve at least three distinct purposes in society.17 First, they pro-
vide a mechanism to aggregate information dispersed among individuals.
Second, they help to resolve conflict in the population about different policies
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1999b). Third, voting over different candidates
can serve as screening mechanism and as a device to hold politicians account-
able. I will elaborate in more details on the first two points below. Since
I deal with the quality of politicians more closely in section 2, I will ignore
the third argument here for now and come back to it later.18 Additionally,
16However, it seems arguably straightforward to modify the underlying assumptions in
order to arrive at positive turnout predictions with ethical voters, for example when utility
from following the welfare maximizing rule enters additively and not multiplicatively in
the utility function.
17Again, I do not attempt to provide a complete literature review at this point as both
the theoretical and empirical literature is enormous as well as growing fast.
18Besley (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozzi and
Merlo (2007b), Ferraz and Finan (2009), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), Ju´lio and Tavares
(2010), Galasso and Nannicini (2011) and Pinotti (2012) are examples of interesting recent
research on the connection of elections, the optimal pay and the quality of politicians.
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in some sense the work by Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman (2010) can be
seen as another justification for holding elections. They argue that demo-
cratic ballots have a direct positive effect on the implemented policies (that
is, an effect that not operates through the election of different candidates
relative to an autocracy or dictatorship, but a direct impact on policies). I
will discuss this work briefly in what follows.
The first function of elections even plays a role when there is no disagree-
ment or conflict among individuals about the optimal policy but uncertainty
about the correct state of the world (the canonical example being the jury
in a criminal trial). The idea that elections might be a superior way to
reach a decision by helping to aggregate information efficiently was arguably
introduced by Condorcet (1785) in his famous Jury theorems.19 The basic
argument goes as follows. Assume voters have to decide between two policy
proposals, the first proposal is beneficial for all voters with probability q,
the second one is beneficial with probability 1− q, depending on the ex-ante
unknown state of the world. Each voter receives an imperfect (and uncor-
related) private signal about the true state which is correct with probability
1
2
< p < 1. Now it is easy to see that the (expected) quality of the deci-
sion increases with the number of voters in a majority decision (first jury
theorem) and moreover that the probability of a correct decision goes to one
as the number of voters goes to infinity (second jury theorem). To give an
example, let us compare the situation with one and three decision makers
Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) constitute early examples of the ‘accountability view’
of elections. Fearon (1999), Ashworth (2005) and Ashworth and De Mesquita (2008) view
democratic elections as device to screen politicians.
19A summary of the literature can for example be found in Miller (1986). Gerling et
al. (2005) provide a more recent survey on the theoretical and experimental literature on
committee decision making, a strand of research that is also based on Condorcets work.
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respectively. In the first case, the single decision maker votes his signal and
is then correct with probability p. In the case of three decision makers where
all of them vote their signal under a majority rule, the probability that a
majority of voters (that is, two or three voters) receives a correct signal is
p3 + 3p2(1− p) = 3p2 − 2p3 = p2(3− 2p). The three voters will hence face a
higher probability to make the correct decision iff
p2(3− 2p) > p ⇐⇒
3p2 − 2p3 − p > 0 ⇐⇒
(2p− 1)(1− p)p > 0 ⇐⇒
(2p− 1) > 0 and (1− p) > 0
which is true if p ∈ (1
2
, 1).
This argument is compelling in its simplicity and provides a strong the-
oretical foundation for the use of elections as a device to make decisions. As
Piketty (1999) writes:
“This informational efficiency result about majority–rule voting
should be given the same status in political theory as the Arrow
Debreu efficiency result about the price system in economic the-
ory: it provides us with the most basic (and most fundamental)
rationale for the most basic political institution.”
He moreover argues that it is also necessary to extend this information–
aggregation approach beyond elections to other political institutions, like
political parties for example.
Nevertheless, some researchers have casted doubt on the main assertion
of the jury theorems for different reasons. The first line of critique is based
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on the implicit underlying assumption that all voters vote sincerely as there
might be in certain settings incentives for strategic abstention, see Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996). This problem seems especially relevant under una-
nimity rule. As a matter of fact, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show
that assuming strategic instead of sincere voting under the unanimity rule
implies much higher probabilities of convicting innocent in criminal trials,
which might be somewhat counterintuitive. The logic of the Feddersen/ Pe-
sendorfer argument is as follows. Imagine a member of a jury receives a
private signal about the probability that the defendant is guilty. This signal
tells him that the defendant is innocent with probability q > 1
2
. The jury
will convict the defendant if and only if all members of the jury vote ‘guilty’.
Since the juror is rational he knows it only makes sense to worry about situ-
ations where his vote is pivotal. The only case this can happen is – since the
decision is made under unanimity – when he votes ‘not guilty’ but everybody
else voted ‘guilty’. In this case it is highly likely that his signal was wrong.
Hence he votes ‘guilty’, against his signal. The other judges face exactly
the same situation and hence an innocent will be convicted. This example
demonstrates dramatically what difference it can make to relax the assump-
tion of sincere voting in a Condorcet jury setting. Moreover, there seem to
be subtle interactions between the voting rule and the incentives to share
information, rendering the basic predictions from Condorcets work partly
incorrect (Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2009). On the other hand, despite
these negative results mentioned before, some studies found that strategic
behaviour actually increases the quality of a decision, see McLennan (1998)
and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
The second type of problem arises if the costs of information acquisition
are positive. In this case information acquisition can become a public good
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and an increase in the number of voters can actually lead to a decrease of the
expected quality of the decision. Moreover, if some voters are less informed
than others this might lead to the perverse result that a large share of voters
abstains even if all voters strictly prefer one option over the other. This
idea is the key behind the “Swing Voters Curse” paper by Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1996).20
In sum, the question under which circumstances elections provide an effi-
cient information aggregation mechanism remains hotly debated in the the-
oretical as well as experimental literature and no final conclusion has been
drawn to this day.
The idea that elections serve as an information aggregation device, as
discussed above, is important even when interests of voters are aligned. The
second function of elections on the other hand considers voting as mechanism
to (peacefully) resolve conflicts. This strand of the literature focuses on
situations where voters have conflicting interests in the political process and
parties (or politicians) react to these incentives. It is typically assumed that
voters as well as politicians are purely driven by selfish motives. Moreover,
there are usually no information asymmetries as in the setting described
above but instead all agents have full information. Researchers have then
studied for example party competition in direct and indirect democracies.21
The starting point for thinking about political competition and conflict
of interest in a democracy is arguably the well–known median voter theorem
(MVT). The formal model goes back to Hotelling (1929) and was then later
20Although in their model voting is costless. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2010) and
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008) find strong support in that lab for this prediction.
They nevertheless also show that elections (without partisan bias) aggregate information
efficiently.
21See Gru¨ner (2008) for an example for an introduction.
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applied to the political sphere by Downs (1957b). This model has – in a
similar manner as the Condorcet jury theorems with regards to the informa-
tion aggregation literature – become the workhorse model for the study of
party competition in a democracy. In its basic version the model assumes
that the policy platform offered by parties can be classified on a left–right
scale (that is they can be allocated a number on the real line). Additionally,
it is assumed that voters have single–peaked preferences which implies the
existence of a unique ideal point on the two–dimensional policy space and
that voters utility decreases the further the implemented policy is away from
the ideal point (independent of the sign of this deviation). The prediction
of the MVT is then that, in the two party case, the preferred policy of the
median voter is implemented as the median platform is a Nash equilibrium
for both parties.22
The great advantage of the MVT model is its simplicity and its ability to
form clear predictions. It nevertheless suffers from a number of drawbacks on
the other hand, as it is not robust to simple modifications of its assumptions,
for instance the number of parties that are in the competition. It is easy to
see that there is no stable Nash equilibrium anymore when the policy space
has more than two dimensions, a problem which has posed a great challenge
to theorists. One propounded solution is the so–called probabilistic voting
model which assumes that (from the point of view of politicians) there is
some uncertainty about voters preferences, see for example Coughlin and
Nitzan (1981), Coughlin (1982), Coughlin (1992) and Burden (1997). While
22Apart from the theoretical work, there is also a large and relatively old experimental
literature which overwhelmingly supports the predictions of the median voter theorem
even in settings where politicians (or voters) do not have complete information about
the distribution of policy preferences (or proposed policy platforms), see McKelvey and
Ordeshook (1990) for a survey.
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these models provide an elegant solution to the problem of the theoretical
instability of political competition, they require relatively strong assumptions
regarding the stochastic variables and the shape of the utility function.
The final merit of elections I want to discuss here is derived from the
recent findings that there might be a direct effect of elections on economic
policy. Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman (2010) present experimental evidence
that democratically elected policies are more effective than non–democratic
ones. The authors conduct an experiment where subjects play a prisoners
dilemma game and can vote for a policy that could enhance cooperation. It
turns out that cooperation is higher when this policy was endogenously cho-
sen as opposed to the case where it was exogenously imposed on subjects.23
This research might prove to be the starting point for a whole new research
agenda which incorporates findings from laboratory experiments into the
study of effects of democratic elections and institutions.
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Abstract1
We present substantial evidence for the existence of a bias in the
distribution of births of leading US politicians in favor of those
who were the eldest in their cohort at school. The result is robust
to both parametric and nonparametric tests and is not driven
by measurement error, redshirting or a sorting effect of highly
educated parents. The magnitude of the effect we estimate is
larger than what other studies on ‘relative age effects’ find for
broader populations, but is in general consistent with research
that looks at professional sportsmen. We also test three different
hypotheses regarding efficiency aspects of this selection process
and find that relative age does not seem to correlate with the
quality of elected politicians.
1This is co-authored work with Lionel Page.
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Research in political economy usually focuses on the incentives people face,
either once they are in office or, more fundamentally, in becoming a politi-
cian at all (Besley and Coate, 1997; Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo, 2005).
On the other hand, only a few studies investigate in detail who the winning
politicians are. It is only recently that economists have expressed interest in
whether the political process selects politicians with specific desirable char-
acteristics such as ability or trustworthiness. Besley (2005) argues that the
proper selection of politicians is of crucial concern for a functioning govern-
ment and that it is therefore essential to understand what factors make it
more likely for people to successfully run for office. A better understanding
of the selection mechanism may also contribute to our knowledge of how
political institutions work in practice. The importance of selecting qualified
politicians has been recognized by several other studies, such as Mattozzi
and Merlo (2007a), Mattozzi and Merlo (2007b), Ferraz and Finan (2009),
Acemoglu et al. (2010), Brollo et al. (2010), De Paola and Scoppa (2011),
Galasso and Nannicini (2011) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013).
It is obvious that professional politicians are a subpopulation with spe-
cific traits and are, at least in some dimensions, different from the average
population. One may naturally think, for example, of wealth, gender, eth-
nicity or education (Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol, 2011), as factors
that give an advantage in the race to top-flight political positions or lead-
ership tasks in general. It is also evident that successful politicians have
specific talents such as leadership skills or charisma that help them lead and
motivate their group of partisan supporters and voters. Previous research
has demonstrated that individual characteristics of leaders can have real im-
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pacts. Jones and Olken (2005) present evidence that political leaders have a
significant influence on economic growth. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show
that certain CEO-specific characteristics can lead to significant company pol-
icy distortions. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that a company’s policy is
significantly influenced by its managers. Gehlbach et al. (2010) show that
businessmen are more likely to run for a political office if institutions are
weak.
In the present paper we provide evidence that the selection of politicians
is distinctly influenced by their former relative position among their peers
at school. We present evidence of a significant bias in the distribution of
births of leading US politicians in favor of those who were the eldest in their
cohort. In line with previous research, we conjecture that older children tend
to benefit from their advantageous position in their cohort to learn the skills
required for leadership early; see for example Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008).
These learned abilities seem to play a critical role in helping politicians to be
more competitive and to win political elections. This is consistent with the
latest research on skill and human capital development over the life cycle;
see Cunha et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) for example. These
studies argue that skills acquired during childhood are of eminent importance
for development in later life through a multiplier effect. A given stock of skills
facilitates the adoption of more skills – self-productivity – and increases the
returns to later investments – complementarity of skills. As a result, relative
age might have a long-lasting effect on people and their vocational success;
see also Dawid and Muehlheusser (2012).
Our estimates show that US Senators and Representatives with a higher
relative age are indeed largely overrepresented compared with the average
American population, as well as to a uniform distribution. The results in-
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dicate that top US politicians are up to 50% more likely to be among the
eldest in their cohort than the average population. The effect size is similar
to what other studies find in high-competition environments (professional
sports). This suggests that the impact of the date of birth may, in some
cases, have a much longer lasting influence than previously thought. This
paper constitutes the first clean documentation of a relative age effect among
an adult population outside of professional sports.
We employ a parametric maximum likelihood test and a nonparametric
test to study the existence of a relative age effect in this specific population.
The parametric test we use is a frequentist version of the Bayesian “Sawtooth
test”.2 This test jointly estimates a single break and the slope of a density
function, which yields the characteristic “sawtooth” pattern (at least when
the null is unlikely, that is the break is estimated to be unequal to zero).
Whereas this test is based on the null hypothesis of a uniform distribution
we also demonstrate in this paper how to generalize this setting to other
distributions and apply it using the actual American birth distribution as
null hypothesis. Our nonparametric approach is based on a regression dis-
continuity (RD) type of strategy where we estimate the size of a jump in the
density of births around the cut-off date using local polynomial regression.3
However, the setting in this paper is somewhat different from standard RD
strategies as we estimate the discontinuity in the unconditional density of
relative age. We carry out a two step estimation procedure: we “bin” the
data and the estimate the density nonparametrically. This is the approach
suggested by McCrary (2008).
2See the presentation by Barnett and Dobson (2009).
3See Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001); Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee
and Lemieux (2010).
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This test seems to be empirically fairly robust towards different parameter
specifications (the histogram binsize and the bandwidth in the local polyno-
mial regression).4 However, applied work may still benefit from automated
parameter selection procedures. We therefore propose to select the binsize of
the first stage histogram using the asymptotic mean integrated squared error
optimal binsize as guidance. To do so we rely on estimates of the first deriva-
tive of the density function from the Sawtooth test.5 For the second stage
nonparametric regression we make use of the optimal bandwidth selection
procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) which specifically accounts
for the peculiarities that go along with the RD design - the fact that one
is only interested in estimating two endpoints, and not the whole density.
Hence, standard bandwidth selection procedure tend to miss the point as
they typically rely on an objective function which minimizes some sort of
(asymptotic) error over the whole density. Due to this two step estimation
procedure, ‘non-standard’ standard errors have to be taken into account.
Given the robustness of the test to different values of the smoothing param-
eters our suggested approach should not been seen as a strict guidance but
rather as an uncontroversial starting point for the applied researcher.
One innovation in this paper is that we are able to use between states
variations in cut-off dates to eliminate unobserved seasonal factors as a pos-
sible confounding explanation. Moreover, we measure all variables (cut-offs
and birthdays) in days and not months or even quarters of births. This not
only improves the precision of the estimates, it also allows us to use the RD
approach estimating for a break in density just around the cut-off dates. This
4We thank Justin McCrary for helpful discussions on this point.
5We moreover argue that this suggestion constitutes a logical upper-bound on the
interval of reasonable binsize values. And we consequently additionally apply a large
range of smaller values.
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again ensures that the results are not driven by unobserved seasonal factors.6
Every empirical study that uses birthdays and school entry cut-off dates
reaching back more than, say, 30 years, inevitably faces imperfect data. In
our case politicians are mostly born before the 1970s. To minimize these
concerns, we also conduct a large battery of robustness checks and show
that our results are unlikely to be driven by measurement error, academic
redshirting or endogenous sorting of births.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents
a brief review of the literature on the relative age effect, Section 2.3 describes
the data we use in more detail, Section 2.4 presents our empirical strategy
and the main results. Section 2.5 displays some robustness checks, Section 2.6
presents evidence on how this selection might influence quality of politicians
and Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 The Relative Age Effect
School entry cut-off dates arbitrarily divide students into different cohorts.
As a consequence, although attending the same class, those born directly
after the cut-off are almost one year older than those born directly before.
The fact that relative age within a class affects students along many different
dimensions is supported by a large body of literature. For example, relatively
young students tend to notably underperform at school (Bedard and Dhuey,
2006) and are less likely to enroll at a university (Mu¨hlenweg and Puhani,
2010). The effect on school performance, although declining for teenage
students, is found to be persist until the end of secondary education.
6Many studies have used quarters of birth data which do not allow to observe whether
there is indeed a break around the cut-off date as predicted by the relative age effect.
60 CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL SELECTION
Beyond educational performance at school, few studies have found a long-
term effect of relative age in school on labor market outcomes. These studies
are, however, less frequent and the effects identified relatively small. Fredriks-
son and O¨ckert (2005) find that being older at school entry slightly increases
earnings in later life. Most recently, Grenet (2009) confirms these conclu-
sions, looking at French data. He detects, similarly to other studies before,
a significant gap in school test scores for younger students, which narrows
down the older students get. He also finds that being relatively younger
slightly increases the probability of repeating one year. In terms of labor
market outcomes, Grenet finds only small differences in wages between rel-
atively old and young, mainly due to lower qualifications acquired by the
latter. The results from Dobkin and Ferreira (2010) are in line with this.
They do not find any evidence for long-term labor market consequences for
a broader population of the day of birth.
Besides the modest evidence found for labor market outcomes, other stud-
ies have found significant long-term effects of relative age in very special pop-
ulations. A sizable body of literature has identified a birthday effect of large
magnitude in the population of professional sports players in several different
forms of sport.7 Relatively older athletes seem to enjoy a significant com-
petitive advantage compared with their younger peers. It has been shown
that this effect is independent of seasonal and climatic conditions and socio-
cultural circumstances. Musch and Hay (1999), for example, substantiate
the existence of a relative age effect in professional soccer in four countries
with different climatic conditions at the cut-off date. The effect even remains
stable after a within-country change in the cut-off date.8
7See Musch and Grondin (2001) for a summary of the relative age effect in sports.
8Consult Sykes, Bell, and Rodeiro (2009) for a recent survey on the relative age effect.
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Although there is, at this point, no generally accepted theory, several
explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon. One part of the
story might be that lower physical strength and height compared with peers
might be a source of frustration and feelings of inferiority. In line with
this, studies find that students who are younger within their cohort have a
higher suicide probability and face a higher rate of psychological disorders;
see Thompson, Barnsley, and Dyck (1999), and Goodman, Gledhill, and Ford
(2003). Evans, Morrill, and Parente (2010) show that those who are young
compared with their peers are more likely to receive an ADHD diagnosis.
Additionally to the human capital formation model by Cunha and Heckman
(2007), Dawid and Muehlheusser (2012) provide a theoretical foundation to
study the channels through which this effect operates. In their model, ability
is imperfectly observed and hence partly confounded with maturity (that is,
relative age). Costly training is then overproportionally allocated to those
judged to have more ability which in turn leads to path-dependency (as more
training increases skills) and hence to a relative age effect.
The existing explanations for the relative age effect suggest that we could
observe a similar effect in other domains where self-confidence and social skills
are critical for success. In the labor market, leadership positions typically
require such qualities and the wage premium associated with these activities
is well known (Kuhn and Weinberger, 2005). Just recently, economists have
started to look at the impact relative age has on the ability of individuals
to reach leadership positions. The results in Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008)
suggest that relatively older students are more likely to become leaders of
high school clubs.
In an interesting study, Du, Gao, and Levi (2012) find evidence that first-
rate American company executives (CEOs from S&P 500 companies) seem
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to have a smaller chance of being born in summer which is compatible with
the existence of a relative age effect. This result deserves attention both
with regards to the population considered and the fact that it is one of the
rare pieces of evidence of a relative age effect in professional achievements.
Unfortunately, the limitation of the data from this study makes this finding
only suggestive. CEOs come from a wide range of states where actual cut-off
dates may vary greatly. Given this difficulty, the authors rely on the fact that
current cut-off dates are often in September to suggest that the lowest success
of summer born as could be due to a relative age effect. This lack of variations
in the cut-off dates does not allow to eliminate other seasonal explanations
such as a sample selection with couples with specific characteristics giving
birth in the summer.9
Taken together, the existing empirical literature on the long-term effect of
relative age at school yields an interesting pattern: studies that deal with the
outcomes of a broader population after school often find small to insignificant
age effects, whereas studies that deal with successful sport professionals typ-
ically find a strong and significant effect (Musch and Hay, 1999). One may
wonder whether the relative age effect may have long lasting consequences in
professional environments characterized as being very competitive. Studies
that deal with the labor market outcomes may fail to find such an effect be-
cause they deal with a broader population where the relative age effect is not
as pronounced as in environments with a more intense competition. It may
be the case that in order to reach the upper tail of the distribution of success
9Note also that it is only recently that September has become the month where most
cut-off dates lie in. For example in 1975 only nine states have cut-off dates in September
and in our sample of politicians we assign a September cut-off date in less than 50% of
the cases, see http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/93/61/9361.pdf.
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in a competitive environment, every detail counts and every ingredient needs
to be right. In such extreme cases, the relative age effect may matter for
exactly that reason.10
2.3 The Data
We use a dataset that includes birthdays and state of birth of most US
American Senators and members of the House of Representatives on a daily
base, as of June 2011. The information on the state of birth is relevant
because cut-off dates are typically different for different states. Since all
Representatives and Senators have their own websites, these data are publicly
available online and we collected all this information in our dataset from the
corresponding official websites. We dropped those observations where we
were not able to determine the state where politicians went to kindergarten
and primary school respectively. For example, a few politicians were born
outside the US, some moved during their childhood beyond state borders
and for some the information provided on their websites was simply not
enough to identify this information. Moreover we dropped those born in
states without statewide school entry cut-off dates. Nevertheless, we are still
able to employ more than 80% of the total number of all current Congressmen
and Congresswomen (443 out of 535).11
To be able to calculate the relative age of the Congressmen and Con-
10In fact, by looking at US politicians, we find an effect of similar size as in the studies
of professional sports found before.
11For the sample selection to be a potential concern, there needs to be a correlation
between the likelihood of being born outside the US (or moving interstate during childhood,
being born in a US state without a state-wide cut-off date or outside the US) and the day
of birth. This seems highly unlikely.
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gresswomen, we use school entry cut-off data for all 50 US states from the
US Education Commission of the States. From our communication with staff
members of the Education Commission, we know that the same cut-off dates
for kindergarten and schools apply in each state. Unfortunately, these dates
only go back to 1975 and most politicians were born before then.12 Therefore
we also employ cut-off dates collected by Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008) for the
period preceding 1975. Table 1 in their paper depicts state cut-off dates for
kindergarten entrance for 1947–1949, 1959, and 1967–1969. We assign each
politician to one of the four cut-off dates that is closest to his or her birthday.
In order to control for potential seasonality in childbearing behavior,
which could be a confounding factor for the birthday effect, we also make use
of monthly birth frequency data for a period from 1990 to 2008 from the US
Department of Health and Human Services. We take monthly averages over
the whole period of 19 years to approximate the real underlying birth distri-
bution over the year. Interestingly, these data can also be combined with the
educational background of the mother, available from the same source. This
allows us to test not only against a deviation from the uniform distribution
but also against the general empirical birth distribution and, moreover, to
test for endogenous sorting of births by educated parents; see section 2.5.1.
2.4 Methods and Results
2.4.1 Sawtooth Test against Uniform Distribution
The idea behind the testing procedures we use is simple. If being old as
compared with one’s peers at kindergarten and school increases one’s chance
12See http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/93/61/9361.pdf.
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to reach a top political position, we would expect to observe more politicians
born just after the cut-off date than just before, creating a discontinuity
in the distribution of births around the cut-off date. To test this hypothe-
sis we implement a parametric maximum likelihood version of the Bayesian
“Sawtooth test” from Barnett and Dobson (2009).
First, we define relative age as the distance of person i′s birthday from
the relevant cut-off date. Let coi be the cut-off date person i is exposed to
and let xi be i
′s birthday, both normalized such that coi, xi ∈ [0, 1).13 We
then define relative age yi as
yi =

(xi − coi) + 1 if (xi − coi) < −12 ,
(xi − coi) if −12 ≤ (xi − coi) ≤ 12 ,
(xi − coi)− 1 if 12 < (xi − coi) .
(2.1)
Thus yi ∈ [−12 , 12), whereas the hypothesized cut-off – the date that sep-
arates the oldest from the youngest – is at y = 0. The relatively old can
accordingly be found in the area to the right of zero and the young politi-
cians to the left of zero. The interval is chosen in this way to facilitate
visual interpretation of the results. Hence, this test is based on a linearity
assumption of the underlying data and is able to test for one break in the
data at a prespecified point. In that case, estimation via MLE will deliver
a consistent test of the null hypothesis of no break around the hypothesized
cut-off date. This assumption seems reasonable in settings where the natural
distribution of the underlying data is normal as it is the case for birth data
around the year. When this is not the case the linearity assumption can only
be considered an approximation.
13For example, if i is born on January 1, then xi = 0. If the relevant cut-off date for i
is June 29, then coi =
1
2 .


















Figure 2.1: Sawtooth density estimate and histogram of the raw relative age
distribution, where d is the break estimate and p the corresponding p-value.
The cut-off is at y = 0. N = 443.
The test is implemented as follows: we write the density of yi, the relative
age of person i, as
f(yi) = 1− dyi − d
2
+ d 1[yi≥0]. (2.2)
Since yi is normalized to a unit interval, d is not only the height of the
break but also the (negative) slope of the density function. The coefficient d











with respect to d, where N is the sample size.
It is clear that, if politicians have a higher likelihood of being born directly
after the cut-off date, there is a break in the density around the cut-off and
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we would expect d to be larger than zero. Figure 2.1 depicts the Sawtooth
density estimate and the underlying raw data. The estimated d-coefficient is
equal to 0.42, the corresponding p-value is 0.01 and thus clearly significant
at the 5% level. This implies that, at the limit, politicians have a 50% higher
likelihood of being born directly after the cut-off date than before.14 These
results provide strong support for the existence of a relative age effect among
US politicians.
This effect size is large and is approximately in the same range as those
found in studies on professional athletes. Barnett (2010), for example, finds
an effect of 78% for AFL players around the cut-off date. Musch and Hay
(1999) find an effect not smaller than 66% and up to more than 200% for
professional soccer players in Japan, Australia, Germany, and Brazil (they
use quarters of birth). Helsen, Van Winckel, and Williams (2005) estimate
the effect size to be larger than 370% for a sample of more than 2, 100 soc-
cer players in national youth selection teams across Europe. Edgar and
O’Donoghue (2005) find an effect of the order of 80% by looking at profes-
sional tennis players (they also use quarters).15 Thus, our point estimate,
although large, is not outstanding compared with the literature on relative
age effect in professional sport. One explanation of this large effect size might
be a multiplier process of human capital accumulation, as argued by Cunha
and Heckman (2007). In this multiplier process differences increase exponen-
tially over time and as a consequence relative age effects are larger for older
populations. Second, it might be that in very competitive environments like
that of politicians, “little things” make a large differences because all agents
14At the limit we estimate a difference of 1.21−0.790.79 ≈ 50%, where 0.79 is the density
estimate from the left and 1.21 is the density estimate from the right given a coefficient of
d = 0.42.
15All effect sizes are compared with a uniform distribution.
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(politicians) involved already perfectly maximize over all dimensions they
have control of (like competence and eloquence). Hence external factors over
which there is no control might play a crucial role (like looks and relative
age).
As a robustness check we run “pseudo-tests”, where we switch the as-
sumed breakpoint by the equivalent of one month in each step; see Figure
2.2.16 The upper left graph shows the already known result at the “true”
cut-off. The other eleven graphs in Figure 2.2 show the results for these tests.
The pseudo-tests show no break significant at the 5% level and all estimated
pseudo-coefficients are considerably smaller than 0.42. This is strong evi-
dence that a discontinuity occurs around the cut-off but not at other points.
2.4.2 Generalized Sawtooth Test
Although we find a large break in the density, a problem with that analysis
might be that we test implicitly against the null hypothesis of a uniform
distribution of yi. However, the data-generating process underlying birth
frequencies is not exactly uniform due to, for example, seasonal patterns
in childbearing behavior. To control for this possibility, we generalize the
Sawtooth test from section 2.4.1 as follows:
Let h(xi) be null hypothesis density of observing a birth at date x for
politician i. Then the density of yi becomes:
f(yi) = h(xi)− dyi − d
2
+ d 1[yi≥0]. (2.4)
We approximate the null hypothesis density h(xi) by the monthly birth
frequency data from the US Department of Health and Human Services av-
16Since the variables are normalized to a unit interval, a plus one month move corre-
sponds to a shift of 112 in our case.



























































































































































d= 0.17; p= 0.32
Cut−off Month+11
Sawtooth Test Against Uniform Distribution
Figure 2.2: The estimated break height and the slope are given by d, p is
the corresponding p-value. The upper left graph stands for the test at the
hypothesized cut-off. The other eleven graphs depict pseudo-tests where the
potential break point is shifted by the equivalent of one month in each step.
N = 443.
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Birth Frequencies in the US
Figure 2.3: Monthly birth frequencies in the US. Aggregated data for the
period of 1990 to 2008.
eraged over all 50 states and over the whole period from 1990 to 2008 (see
section 2.3) and then rerun the Sawtooth test. All politicians are born be-
fore 1990, we therefore rely on the identification assumption that the birth
distribution is sufficiently stable over time to get a reasonable approxima-
tion.17 Figure 2.3 depicts the monthly birth frequencies for 1990–2008.18
The interpretation of the Sawtooth coefficient remains essentially the same.
The result strongly supports our conclusion from section 2.4.1: the co-
17Arguably we are unable to measure the exact birth distribution during the period
of the birth of the Congressmen and Congresswomen. We tested for the stability of the
seasonal pattern by comparing monthly frequencies of different subsamples of the 1990-
2008 series and we found that the frequencies remained literally unchanged.
18Practically, we have birth frequency data on a monthly base, whereas we need data
on a daily base. We computed the average birth frequency of each day as the frequency
of the month, divided by 30.
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efficient estimate slightly reduces to d = 0.4, but is still very high, and the
p-value of 0.015 is clearly significant at the 5% level. The stability of the
point estimates alleviates concerns that our results are driven by an incor-
rect distributional assumption.
2.4.3 A Nonparametric Test
A two-step Regression Discontinuity Approach
The results presented in section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 draw an interesting picture
of the impact relative age has among US politicians. However, an implicit
assumption underlying this test is that the influence of relative age on the
probability of becoming a successful politician is linearly changing by the
distance of one’s birthday from the relevant cut-off date. This might not
always be a justifiable assumption, and it is not a necessary condition for the
existence of a relative age effect.19 To address this issue, we also implement
Justin McCrary’s (2008) nonparametric continuous density test.
This test was initially designed to validate the continuity assumption of
the assignment variable, which is a sufficient condition for identification in a
regression discontinuity design (RDD). The idea is to test for a jump in the
density of the variable around the relevant cut-off point. In that respect, this
test is also well suited to our setting. To identify this jump nonparametrically,
the limit value of the density on both sides at the cut-off point needs to be
estimated. It is known that standard kernel density estimators suffer from a
strong boundary bias. For this reason they are not well suited to situations
19It could be that this effect only shows up for those born four weeks after and four
weeks before the cut-off date for example. These circumstances could render the Sawtooth
Test insignificant, when in fact there is an effect.
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where the interest lies in the boundary itself.
McCrary’s test tackles this problem in a two-step procedure: first the data
are “binned” – that is, a histogram of the variable of interest is calculated,
with no bin overlapping the suspected point of discontinuity. In the second
step, nonparametric methods are used to estimate the density endpoints from
both sides, as proposed by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001). Fol-
lowing McCrary, we estimate the boundary points using local polynomial re-
gression of order one, combined with a triangle kernel K(z) = (1−|z|)1[|z|≤1].
This relies on theoretical results from Cheng, Fan, and Marron (1997), and
Fan and Gijbels (1992), proving that these choices are optimal for estimating
points at the boundary. Besides, Fan and Gijbels (1996) illustrate that in
general polynomials with odd order have better Mean Squared Error prop-
erties than ones with even order, and more recently Porter (2003) was able
to prove that local linear estimators are rate optimal. The standard errors
need to take into account that the estimation is on macro-observations gen-
erated by binning the raw data.20 Under standard nonparametric regularity
conditions, this estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal.
Note that the estimated coefficient θˆ stands now for the log difference of














where fˆ(.) is the estimated density.
20Details on their calculation are depicted in the web appendix on McCrary’s homepage.
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Binsize and Bandwidth Choices
This nonparametric procedure has the advantage that no functional form
assumption about the underlying density is necessary. However it has the
drawback that the researcher has to choose parameters, which can be crucial
for the outcome. This test requires even two: the binsize b for the histogram
and the bandwidth h in the local polynomial regression. McCrary himself
recommends visual inspection of the first and second step diagrams guided
by some automatic procedure, like cross-validation (Stone, 1974), to reach
optimal estimates.
McCrary demonstrates that the estimate is asymptotically robust to dif-
ferent choices of the binsize, as long as h
b
is sufficiently large, and thus there
does not seem to be an explicit need for thorough selection. We use the
Asymptotic Mean Integrated Squared error optimal (A-MISE) binsize as
guidance to start with. The A-MISE binsize estimator typically requires
estimation of the density’s first derivative. We solve this by using the slope es-
timate from part 2.4.1. This procedure yields a starting binsize of b = 0.44.21
However, the second parameter, the bandwidth, is more important for
appropriate results. Since we aim to implement parameter choices as theory
driven as possible, we make use of the recent results by Imbens and Kalya-
naraman (2012) (IK henceforth). They present an optimal bandwidth for
the estimation around boundary points in an RDD setting.22 IK are able to
21Note that the A-MISE optimal binsize estimate solely serves as a starting point in order
to avoid hand picking. Please consult the appendix for details on the A-MISE derivation.
There we also argue that this logically provides an upper bound and we consequently try
several smaller binsizes.
22Their suggestion is based on the observation that the (A-)MISE is not necessarily the
relevant criterion in settings where the interest does not lie in the whole function but only
in the boundary points – a notion that goes at least back to Ludwig and Miller (2005).
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show that their bandwidth is asymptotically optimal and outperforms the
only other bandwidth selection procedure especially designed for regression
discontinuity design suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2005), which is based
on cross-validation. For this reason, we use IK’s bandwidth selection method
as a benchmark in the following. We stress again that the McCrary test only
requires h
b
→∞ asymptotically, that is, the binsize should to be small rela-
tive to the bandwidth. Empirically, this seems to hold true in our case; see
Table 2.1.
Results
Using IK’s optimal bandwidth estimator for the second step, we try a range
of different histogram binsizes guided by the A-MISE optimal one. The first
column in Table 2.1 depicts the results with different binsizes and the cor-
responding IK optimal bandwidth. We start out with the A-MISE optimal
binsize, b = 0.44 and reduce it successively in 0.05 steps down to a binsize
which is by a factor of ten smaller than the first suggestion. As mentioned




). However, the opti-
mal bandwidths are sometimes larger than 0.5, especially for large binsizes,
which means that observations outside that interval are in general taken into
account. Since our data is by nature circular, we estimate densities over
y ∈ [−1, 1). That also means we have the same observations to the left





). In cases where the bandwidth is larger than one, the estimates
simply tend toward an OLS estimate (Fan and Gijbels, 1996).
IK’s basic idea is to use a criterion function that minimizes the expected squared difference
between the RDD estimator and the true parameter value itself instead of minimizing the
MSE over the whole support.





















Figure 2.4: McCrary density estimate and confidence interval of relative age
of US politicians. The binsize is 0.04 and the bandwidth is 0.72 and the
resulting break is θˆ = 0.36.
Table 2.1 depicts the results.23 The point estimate using the optimal
binsize and bandwidth is 0.48 and significant at the 1% level. It is depicted
in the first row of Table 2.1. The point estimates are largely in line with the
parametric test since the estimated Sawtooth coefficient is given by ln(1.2)−
ln(0.8) ≈ 0.41.
The estimated coefficients always have the expected sign and are always
significant at the 10% level.24 Our findings also support McCrary’s (2008)
conclusion about the robustness of his estimator toward different binsizes.
In all cases, the nonparametrically estimated curve looks quite similar to
23We thank McCrary, Imbens and Kalyanaraman for providing us with the code of their
tests.
24Strictly speaking, since we stated a clear hypothesis, we are facing a one-sided test.
Thus significance at the 10% level is sufficient here.
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limy→0− fˆ(y) limy→0+ fˆ(y) Break Estimate θˆ Binsize IK Bandwidth
0.72 1.16 0.48*** 0.44 2.72
0.80 1.24 0.44*** 0.40 2.54
0.83 1.15 0.33*** 0.35 2.20
0.81 1.14 0.34*** 0.30 1.78
0.83 1.14 0.31** 0.25 1.06
0.82 1.23 0.41* 0.20 0.49
0.79 1.13 0.36** 0.15 0.95
0.55 1.03 0.63* 0.10 0.26
0.57 1.00 0.56* 0.05 0.27
0.78 1.12 0.36** 0.04 0.72
Table 2.1: McCrary (2008) test for break in relative age distribution for
different binsizes. The bandwidth is calculated according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and the 1% level respectively. θˆ is the estimated log difference of the density
from the left and from the right, estimated using local linear regression with
a triangle kernel. N = 443.
2.5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 77
the plotted Sawtooth graph from sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, and graphical
analysis suggests that there is indeed a clear deviation from the uniform
distribution, with the estimated density giving noticeably more probability
mass to observations on the right of the cut-off date. Figure 2.4 depicts the
estimated density for b = 0.04 and h = 0.72.
2.5 Robustness Tests
2.5.1 Strategic Childbearing Behavior
A concern with the previous analysis might be that parents could be aware
of the positive effects for their children of being relatively older, and then
endogenously “sort” the births of their children right after the cut-off date, in
order to give them a natural advantage. This might give rise to concerns that
the significant break we estimate in the relative age distribution of politicians
is simply an artefact of discontinuities in the state distributions of births
around the school cut-off dates. In each state, parents could have a tendency
to adjust their expected day of delivery in order for their children to be born
after the school cut-off date.
Our general Sawtooth test in section 2.4.2 only controlled for seasonal-
ity using birth data for the USA as a whole. In order to further test if a
discontinuity exists around state cut-off dates, we use monthly state birth
frequency distributions over the period 1990 – 2008.25 We center these state
distributions around their corresponding cut-off. This gives us a “relative





interval. If there is a tendency for parents to choose for their children
25We have to drop seven states that do not have a state wide cut-off date.
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to be born right after the cut-off date, we should observe a discontinuity in
zero.
Obviously we need to conduct this test with the current cut-off dates –
practically, we use the official 2005 state-level cut-off dates. Therefore, we
cannot test for the existence of such strategic behavior over the time period of
the birth of the US politicians in our sample. However, if such a behavior was
existing in earlier times, it is unlikely to have decreased since then given that
the evidence on the effect of cut-off dates has grown over time. If anything,
a test on the recent period is more demanding as strategic behavior is more
likely to be stronger today.
Arguably, such strategic behavior could be more likely in families with
more education. We therefore look not only at the general population, but
also consider the subpopulation of mothers with higher education (whereas
we define “high education” as having at least one year of college educa-
tion). Given that we have monthly frequencies by states, we estimate the
constrained regression model:
f(µm,s) = 1− dµm,s − d
2







represents the month of the year m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 12}
centered and normalized for the state s, and f(µm,s) the observed frequency
of births in state s for the month µm,s.
26 The error term um represents
seasonal patterns which can be expected across all states for given months.
The coefficient d represents, as in section 2.4.1 the Sawtooth pattern (the
slope and the break at the cut-off date).
26In order to be able to directly compare the coefficient d estimated here with the one
from the Sawtooth tests estimations, we rescale the observed frequencies by multiplying
them by 12. This has no effect on the significance of the statistical tests.
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Sample of mothers All High. educ.
d -0.002 -0.014
(0.25) (1.86)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes
N 516 516
Table 2.2: Robustness check: discontinuity in birth distribution around
school cut-off dates. Clustered robust t statistics in brackets.
Table 2.2 presents the result of this estimation over the different popu-
lations of parents. There is no indication of strategic attempts to give birth
after the cut-off date. On the contrary, for both population the slope is neg-
ative suggesting if anything a tendency to give birth before the cut-off dates
rather than after. This pattern is stronger for educated mothers, but fails
to be significant at the 5% level. These variations around cut-off dates are
in any case one order of magnitude smaller than the variations observed, in
the other direction, in the population of politicians, where the discontinuity
was around 0.4. There is therefore no evidence that strategic childbearing
behavior could be an explanation for the discontinuity in the distribution of
politicians’ births.
2.5.2 Excluding Older Age Groups
It could be possible for the data from Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008) not to
be as reliable as the official cut-off dates from 1975. Hence, we exclude
politicians who were born before 1960 and assign to the remaining ones the
1975 cut-off dates. The rationale is to include only individuals who went to
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school in the ten-year window around 1975 (assuming that school enrollment
is at age five) and to use only the official Education Commission data. This
reduces the sample size to 125.
We perform the Sawtooth test and the nonparametric test developed
before on this reduced sample. The findings are such that the coefficient
increases to d = 0.6 with a p-value close to 5% when conducting the Sawtooth
test.27 We also perform the McCrary test on this reduced sample. As binsize
we use the A-MISE optimal and one half of this value. The bandwidth for
the second step is calculated each time according to IK. Table 5.2 presents
the results in column one. Both tests display a large and significant break in
the density.28
2.5.3 Excluding ‘Precarious’ States
We want to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by specific
states where the cut-off dates may be wrongly recorded. As mentioned be-
fore, we rely on cut-off dates for four points in time. We conjecture that
the observation of a state whose cut-off date changes several times over the
period may indicate some measurement error. In order to assess the con-
cerns associated with this, we exclude all observations from states that had
27We also performed robustness checks in the way that we narrowed down the window
around 1975 even further. The result is that the estimated coefficient remains stable
between 0.5 and 0.7 whereas the p-value increases with the sample size going to zero.
28We conducted the nonparametric test with a similar grid of binsizes than in the section
before, we neverthless here only display the results for the A-MISE binsize and half of it.
The results for the other tests are in line with our hypothesis and are available from the
authors upon request. Also note that the A-MISE optimal binsize here is b = 0.51, which
is slightly too large to get two “bins” for the second step histogram one both sides of the
cut-off. We therefore implement this test using b = 0.5.
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“too many” changes in cut-off dates over time. We say that a state has “too
many” different cut-off dates when we are confronted with more than two
different cut-off dates for the four points in time.29 In doing that, the sample
size reduces to N = 340.30
At the same time, the estimated coefficient goes up to d = 0.50 with
significance at the 1% level. The Sawtooth test against the general empirical
distribution yields very similar and clearly significant results. The same
holds true for the nonparametric test. Using the A-MISE optimal binsize,
the break estimate is significant at the 1% level. As before, we run another
test with a lower binsize. Using half of this binsize, the test tightly fails to
be significant, but the coefficient still has a similar magnitude. All in all it
seems the point estimates increase rather than decrease when excluding more
uncertain observations.
2.5.4 Measurement Error and Redshirting
The previous sections reveal that removing observations that seemed to be
more prone to measurement error increases rather than decreases the signif-
icance of the results. But still, there can be measurement error left. This
will in fact tend to bias the slope estimate towards zero, since the source of
29If we had excluded all states with more than one change, we would have to delete
almost every observation; if we had used at least three changes as a reference point,
we would have excluded almost no observations. That is why two changes are, in our
opinion, the right compromise. We see this kind of problem in 13 different states and we
consequently exclude 103 observations.
30Of course, we are aware that states sometimes altered cut-off dates and consequently
a change does not necessarily mean an error was made. We only claim that if a cut-off
date was wrongly recored, it is more likely to be in those states that changed the dates
several times.
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Excluding Older Excluding Precarious States
Sawtooth against 0.60* 0.50***
uniform distribution (0.052) (0.007)
Sawtooth against 0.52* 0.49***
empirical distribution (0.09) (0.008)
McCrary A-MISE optimal 0.75*** 0.57***
binsize (0.00) (0.00)
McCrary half of A-MISE optimal 0.55** 0.44
binsize (0.019) (0.10)
N 125 340
Table 2.3: Sawtooth and McCrary tests for a break. McCrary’s test displays
the log difference. The p values are given in brackets below. The bandwidth
is calculated according to IK. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and the 1% level respectively.
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errors is in the cut-off date that is part of the “right-hand side variable” in
the nonparametric regressions of the McCrary test. Thus, the estimates are
significant despite measurement error and not because of it.
In that regard, another issue is also worth noting. In our analysis we
implicitly assumed that all Congressmen and -women entered school at the
designated age. In that sense, we are only working with “assigned relative
age” as defined by Bedard and Dhuey (2006).31 But what if this is not
the case? For example, some politicians in the sample might have been
“redshirted”. This term denotes the fact that parents sometimes decide to
postpone the school entry of their children by one year. Bedard and Dhuey
(2006) state that about 5% of children in the US enter kindergarten one year
later. Among these children, those born into high-status families and born
in the last quarter before the cut-off are overrepresented. Redshirting will de
facto dampen the estimated effect toward zero in the case where children who
are relatively young in their cohort are redshirted with a higher probability.
If students are redshirted regardless of the day of birth, it will not have any
effect. Beyond that, there are no indications that the opposite behavior, to
send children one year earlier, is a common practice.
A similar reasoning applies to children who have to repeat a class: since
relatively young students perform arguably worse at school, they also face a
higher probability of repeating one year. If this has occurred in our sample,
the estimates will again be biased downwards. Taken together, we expect
the real effect to be even higher than what we estimated in the preceding
sections.
31They define “assigned relative age” in the same manner as we define “relative age” –
as the distance of an individual’s birthday relative to the state-wide school entry cut-off,
ignoring any kind of redshirting behavior.
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To sum up, these robustness tests support the previous results and show
that they are neither driven by a subgroup of states that appear to have
unreasonable cut-off dates nor by measurement error in the hand-collected
cut-off dates from Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008). In fact, just the opposite
appears to be true: the point estimates increase even more when we exclude
observations that have a higher probability of being badly measured. This
enhances the credibility of the initial estimates. Table 5.2 summarizes the
results of both robustness sections. Moreover, we argue that measurement
error and academic redshirting are not driving our results, but, in fact, make
our estimates more conservative.
2.6 How are Relative Age and Quality Re-
lated?
Although the reported empirical findings are remarkable taken by themselves,
they also raise more questions. Most importantly, does selection based on
relative age lead to an outcome where the best possible candidates are in of-
fice or, put differently, are politicians selected efficiently? In this section we
try to address this question empirically. An interesting theoretical contribu-
tion is the afore-mentioned paper by Dawid and Muehlheusser (2012). They
theoretically study optimal selection when individuals differ with respect to
(partly unobserved) abilities and relative age, which is partly confounded
with ability.32 They find a nonlinear relationship between relative age and
the resulting selection quality: if the effect is either strong or weak, the qual-
ity of the selection process will be superior compared to the case where the
32Assuming that ability and date of birth are uncorrelated.
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age effect is neither strong nor weak but medium. Interestingly, they also
find that the mere existence of a relative age effect does not allow to conclude
that selection is suboptimal.
There are three potential hypotheses with respect to the welfare aspects
of a relative age effect in this specific population. First, if the skill set ac-
quired through a higher relative age enhances the quality and productivity
of a politician (superior motivation and guidance of employees; improved
abilities to efficiently lead a political discussion and so on), then selection
into top-flight political offices can be efficient. This process could for in-
stance be triggered by rational voters who are successfully able to interpret
higher relative age as a signal for higher quality, ceteris paribus. Second, this
conclusion changes if the abilities gained through a higher relative age are
purely non-productive (for example, charisma, presentation, and persuasion
skills that increase election probabilities but are unrelated to expert knowl-
edge). In this case two distinct outcomes might potentially arise. If there
is a trade-off between these nonproductive and other relevant skills (for ex-
ample through time constraints), then this selection we observe will most
likely be inefficient. Otherwise it will be neutral with respect to the overall
social welfare. Moreover, inefficiencies might also arise if “leadership skills”
are not only nonproductive but even harmful for important politician specific
characteristics.
There is one empirical studies that might be interpreted as evidence for
the “efficiency-loss” hypothesis. Billari and Pellizzari (2008) show that those
university students who are young compared with their peers do better at
university. This finding can be rationalized by a selection favoring the rel-
atively older whereby relative age seems to be negatively correlated with
productivity. Hence, those who are relatively younger than their peers seem
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to perform slightly better. Whether this is directly applicable to politics
however remains unclear.
In order study the accuracy of these three hypotheses and the general
welfare implications empirically, we examine the correlation between relative
age and two proxies for quality of a politician: a politicians education and age
when he or she came into office. Education could, in theory, be a proxy for
the ability to make informed decisions. Hence this measure is probably also
the most common one, see for example Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013)
and Ferraz and Finan (2009). On the other hand, winning an office at a
young age might also signal a high quality since young candidates have to
compensate for a lack of experience with other factors, maybe leadership
skills, to win an election. Admittedly, all of the measures are imperfect, in
the end quality of a politician remains unobservable.33
We collect information about the age when entering Congress and the
highest educational achievement for all Congressmen and -women in our sam-
ple.34 This information is again collected online from the official homepages
of the Representatives and Senators. Table 2.4 depicts results from OLS re-
gression of relative on both quality measures.35 As it can be seen, in both
regressions the coefficient on relative age is clearly not significant as the stan-
dard error distinctly exceeds the point estimate in both cases (the p-value
is larger than 60% both times). Hence there does not seem to be any corre-
33Another common measure of a politician’s quality is time in office. In our case this
measure is not well-suited however. The data would be censored since all observations are
holding an office at the time of observation.
34We coded an ordinal variable “education”, ranging from 1 to 7 with 1: below high
school; 2: high school; 3: attended college/ uni; 4: bachelor degree; 5: JD; 6: master
degree or medical doctorates (MD, DDS, DVM, etc.) and 7: holding a PhD.
35Relative Age is now measured from zero to one.
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Coefficient on relative age




Table 2.4: OLS regression of relative age ∈ [0, 1] on two quality indicators,
a constant is included in all cases. ‘Age in Congress’ is the age at which the
politician won a seat in the Congress, ‘education’ ∈ {1, 2, .., 7} is an ordinal
variable indicating the highest educational attainment. Standard errors in
parenthesis below.
lation between relative age and the quality of a politician. We take this as
empirical evidence supporting the “neutrality hypothesis” - selection based
on relative age is neither positive nor negative for the quality of politicians.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The population of Congressmen and Congresswomen studied here represents
the small proportion of professional politicians with, in the words of Robert
A. Dahl (1961), the “greatest direct influence over all important choices”
bearing on the life of US society. They are “closer to the stage where con-
crete alternatives are initiated or vetoed in an explicit and immediate way”
(Dahl, 1961, p. 89). For this reason, the understanding of the mechanisms
leading to their selection and how these mechanisms can affect their personal
characteristics is of primary importance. Nevertheless, little is known about
how people choose to become politicians and what traits are necessary or
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at least beneficial in gaining such a position of leadership. This study has
systematically identified the significant effect that date of birth has on the
probability of being selected into a top-flight political position. Competition
is a necessary condition for the existence of a relative age effect. The polit-
ical competition for a seat in the US Senate or House of Representatives is
arguably fierce; consequently, it might not be surprising to discover such an
effect here.
We showed that this result is robust to parametric and nonparametric
estimation approaches, independent of the choice of the underlying birth
distribution and that it is also not driven by measurement error, redshirting
or a sorting effect of highly educated parents. We also presented a general
statistical framework to study the birth date effect, which is, in our opinion,
a significant improvement to the existing literature. We apply a parametric
density break test and an empirical strategy which relies on a regression
discontinuity (RDD) type of approach, where the two points around the
cut-off are estimated and compared. In this context we apply the latest
optimal bandwidth estimator and we also demonstrate how optimal binsize
selection procedures might be a useful guidance for applied research that
uses McCrary’s test (2008). We argue that using cut-offs and birthdays
on a daily scale increases the reliability and power of the analyses as it
avoids aggregating statistical information. This method also allows for more
precise effect size estimates (the jump in density around the cut-off). It is
thus preferable to approaches that rely on coarse classifications in months
or quarters of birth and which do not account for time- and state-varying
cut-off dates. Also, other nonparametric functional form tests, like χ2 for
example, are typically not well suited to detect small effect sizes since they
suffer from low power.
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What is more, the evidence presented in this paper adds to the small
but growing literature on the impact relative age has beyond school age. It
is known that professional athletes enjoy an advantage if they are relatively
older, but evidence for other areas outside of sports has been less clear-cut.
The magnitude of the effect we find is larger than in most other studies on the
relative age effect for a broader (adult) population, but is generally in line
with research that looks at populations in high-competition environments
such as professional sports. We conjecture that the impact of relative age
in general may be too small to play an important role for the larger adult
population, but may lead to noticeable effects in competitive settings where
small early advantages can have critical effects in the long term. This paper
presents the first clean study of a relative age effect for adults outside of
professional sportsmen.
A possible explanation of the effect of relative age at an early age on suc-
cess as a politician is that being relatively older among peers during youth
could help people to develop leadership skills and possibly learn how to take
initiative. Small initial differences could accumulate, as those successful at
taking the lead among their peers may grow in confidence about their ability
to do so. This is in line with a multiplier effect of human capital acquisition,
as proposed by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006) and Cunha
and Heckman (2007). They argue that skills attained at one stage in life
are self-productive in the sense that they facilitate further accumulation of
human capital. This phenomenon may be especially pronounced for leader-
ship skills which could be more easily learned by those in leading position
at a young age (for example high school clubs and so on). As a consequence
early differences in the formation of human capital in terms of leadership
skills would reinforces itself in a multiplier process. This could lead to path
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dependency later on with children who were relatively old in their cohort
being significantly better prepared to hold leadership positions than others.
We take the above analysis one step further by examining three different
hypotheses regarding the political consequences of the selection process (pos-
itive, neutral or negative consequences for the quality of selected politicians).
After presenting some empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis of an
“efficiency–neutral” selection, we conclude that it is most likely that selection
into top political jobs is not a concern with regards to the potential effects
it could have on the average quality of politicians.
The identification of the causal factors that make it more likely for politi-
cians to be selected into office has been largely overlooked until recently.
As Besley (2005) argues, this is a key question for understanding how our
democratic institutions work. The present study provides a first step in this
direction by showing that relative age is one important factor shaping polit-
ical selection.
Chapter 3
Exit Polls, Turnout, and
Bandwagon Voting: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment
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Abstract1
We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal ef-
fect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting.
Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French over-
seas territories voted after the election result had already been
made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We
estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter
turnout by about 12 percentage points. Our study is the first
clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate
the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we
find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon
voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to
vote for the expected winner.
1This is co-authored work with Rebecca B. Morton, Lionel Page and Benno Torgler.
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“A Californian plans to vote after work in what she believes to
be a close presidential election. (She has little interest in the race
for congressman for her district, although it is closer.) The day
is rainy and as she approaches the polling place she sees a long
line. On the radio she hears that one presidential candidate has
a substantial lead in other states. She says why bother and turns
her car around and drives home.”
Sudman (1986, p. 332)
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3.1 Introduction
In August, 2009, exit poll results for key regional elections in Germany were
leaked on Twitter before voting ended. These polls showed that Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s conservative party had much less support than in previous
elections. Wolfgang Bosbach, deputy parliamentary head of Merkel’s Chris-
tian Union bloc, said that the leaked results “damaged democracy” and a
spokesman for the pro-business Free Democrats, Merkel’s preferred coalition
partner, commented that the leaks were “unacceptable.” In addition, such
reporting is against the German law with a fine of up to 50,000 euros, so Ger-
man election officials immediately began to investigate whether the Twitter
messages violated the law.2 The German case is not unusual: a survey of
66 countries worldwide finds that of the 59 that permit exit polls during
an election, 41 prohibit publication of the results until after all voting has
concluded (see Spangenberg (2003)).
Yet in recent 21st century elections, incidents similar to the 2009 Twit-
ter controversy in Germany abound. In 2007, the websites of several Swiss
and Belgium newspapers crashed when French citizens attempted to access
exit poll results during an election and in the 2012 French presidential elec-
tion, results were also available online while voting was still in progress.3
Countries with multiple time zones like France, the United States, Canada
or Russia, in which voting takes place at different times in different regions
face particular difficulties.4 The notorious reporting on Floridian exit poll
2See Carter (2009).
3See Sayare (2012).
4The United States does not prohibit the reporting of exit poll results, so elections are
often publicly decided before voters in Alaska and Hawaii have voted, and sometimes while
voting in California and other western states is still ongoing. In Canada polls close at the
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results in the 2000 United States presidential election occurred while voters
in the western part of the state and the rest of the nation were still voting. In
2004 leaked US presidential exit poll results were commonly discussed among
voters while east coast voters were still going to the ballot booths.5 With
the proliferation of Twitter, Facebook, and other social media worldwide,
the ability of governments to control and limit leaked exit polls both inside
and outside their countries is becoming increasingly difficult.
Despite the growing tendency for voters to learn exit polls results while
an election is still ongoing, observational data-based research on the effects of
such information on voting behavior is limited and inconclusive. One possible
natural setting for exploring this issue is the so-called West Coast effect in the
U.S.; that is, the release of early East Coast election returns before the polls
close on the West Coast due to the fact that the presidential election takes
place in three different continental time zones. The debate over this effect
emerged in the early 1960s after the introduction of sophisticated computer
models, improved survey techniques for predicting election results, and rapid
access to media information. The first set of related studies, however, which
explored the 1964 presidential election, showed barely any West Coast effect
(see for example McAllister and Studlar (1991)).
A second set of major studies focused on the 1980 election,6 in which
pre-election polls indicated a close election between Reagan and Carter, but
same time across the country to reduce the potential of leaked results. In India, although
the country is not subject to the same time zone issues, voting is conducted at different
times in different regions for security reasons and reporting early results is illegal.
5See Best and Krueger (2012) for a review.
6It should be noted that other elections between 1964 and 1980 have also been explicitly
analyzed. For example, Tuchman and Coffin (1971) explore the influence of election night
television broadcasts on the close 1968 election but find no evidence that it affected voting.
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Carter conceded defeat even before the polls closed in the west.7 However,
although these researchers used a richer set of data (aggregated data on vari-
ous elections, regional, data or congressional districts, or better survey data),
they produced mixed results. For example, Jackson (1983), using a pool of
1981 persons interviewed before and after the election, found some evidence
that media coverage of exit polls in the 1980 U.S. presidential election did
lead to a reduction in turnout. However, the survey data used in his and a
number of similar studies of the 2000 election have been strongly criticized
as unreliable (see the review in Frankovic (2001)8).
Despite this lack of conclusive observational evidence on exit polls’ effects
on subsequent voter choices, however, a few laboratory studies, do suggest
that information about early voting can have significant effects on voter be-
havior. These studies indicate that later voters’ choices appear to be in-
fluenced by information about early voting. More specifically, later voters
with the same preferences who have learned early voter choices make differ-
7NBC was also strongly criticized for declaring Ronald Reagan the President of the
United States at 8:15PM eastern standard time based on its own computer projections:
“Articles, reports, and letters were written describing how voting lines outside polling
places disappeared, how turnout decreased over prior years, and how voters stayed home
after it became apparent that their favored candidates had already won or lost” (Leonardo
(1983, p. 297)). Criticism also emerged that national voter turnout decreased to 53.95%
(the rate since 1948, see Dubois (1983)). All this criticism led to a congressional hearing,
journalistic commentary, private studies, and a task force report, as well as the proposition
of remedial bills to regulate either poll closing times or the timing of network election
predictions, but no action was taken once interest began disappearing (Leonardo (1983),
Carpini (1984)).
8Frankovic, Kathleen, “Part Three: Historical Perspective,” in Linda Mason, Kathleen
Frankovic, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, CBS News Coverage of Election Night 2000:
Investigation, Analysis, Recommendations, January 2001.
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ent turnout decisions (see Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007)) or vote
for different candidates (see Hung and Plott (2001), Morton and Williams
(1999) and Morton and Williams (2001)) than they would have done without
that information.
If, as the experimental evidence suggests, later voters are indeed so in-
fluenced by early voting results, then the advent of increasing social media
reports of election results through exit polls can lead to fundamental changes
in the way voters behave. It may thus have important consequences for how
democracy works in many countries. Most obviously, candidates and polit-
ical parties may have incentives to manipulate the reported results in order
to seek advantages. But even if the results are accurately reported, other
serious effects might occur. For example, if later voters are less likely to
participate or have a tendency to engage in bandwagon voting, then the can-
didates preferred by earlier voters may be more likely to win elections. To the
extent that the timing of the voter participation decision is exogenous and
depends on voter characteristics such as income, ethnicity or other factors
that arguably affect voter preferences, then voters may be unequally repre-
sented even though their votes are theoretically equal. At the same time,
to the extent that the timing of voting is endogenous, candidates and politi-
cal parties will have an incentive to engage in strategic manipulation of the
factors that influence when individuals choose to participate, much like the
strategic manipulation in the timing of presidential primaries in the United
States.9 Hence, given that the election process is fundamentally changing
with social media reporting of exit poll results, whether later voters’ choices
are influenced is an important empirical question for many countries in which
9See Morton and Williams (1999) for a discussion of these manipulations.
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such information has historically not been available.10
In this paper, we make use of a unique natural experiment to address the
question whether later voters behavior is affected by exit poll information
about earlier voter choices. Specifically, we exploit a 2005 voting reform in
France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and
bandwagon (or underdog) voting. Before the change in legislation, individ-
uals in French western overseas territories voted after the mainland election
results were already known via exit polls. This reform creates an exogenous
variation in information for a well identified group of voters and provides
therefore the setting for a natural experiment to study the effect of exit poll
information on voters behavior. Such an approach has two advantages. First,
relative to existing studies on the West Coast effect, our natural experimen-
tal setting allows us to eliminate lots of the possible caveats in the analysis
of the causal effect of information by providing a counterfactual situation
(same constituencies with and without exit poll information). Second, our
study does not suffer from the possible concern about the ecological validity
of the results, a criticism often raised about laboratory experiments.
Using this voting reform to study the effect of exit poll information, we
find evidence that the public knowledge about such polls not only decreases
turnout by about 12 percentage points, but also increases bandwagon voting.
We therefore conclude that exit polls can indeed have consequential effects
on voter behavior and that the advent of social media reporting on exit
poll information may fundamentally change the democratic process in many
countries where such information was previously unavailable.
In the next section, we review the relevant theoretical literature on infor-
10Thompson (2004) presents additional normative and philosophical arguments against
the revelation of such information to later voters.
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mation and voting behavior. Section 3.3 then outlines our empirical research
design and the natural experiment, Section 3.4 presents our results regarding
the effect on turnout, Section 3.5 addresses robustness concerns and Section
3.6 presents the results on the Bandwagon effect. We conclude and discuss
the implications of our analysis in Section 3.7.
3.2 The Role of Exit Poll Information in Vot-
ing Choices: Theory and Experimental
Evidence
When individuals know the results from earlier voting as in leaked exit polls,
voting becomes sequential in nature. In the case of complete information
about the choices before voters but incomplete information about other par-
ticipants’ preferences, learning the results of earlier decisions simply provides
later participants with information about the likelihood that their vote may
be pivotal. It is thus straightforward to show that if voting is costly (even
if the costs are minimal), learning that one’s own decision will not affect
the outcome implies that a rational individual should abstain. If however, a
voter learns instead that the election is extremely close and the probability
of being pivotal is high, then later voters may actually participate at greater
rates than they would if voting were simultaneous and they had less precise
information about other voter’s choices.
If voters have private information about the choices before them in an
election, then early voting results not only reveal the extent to which indi-
vidual choice may be pivotal but may also provide later voters with insights
into the information held by early voters about the choices. As shown by
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Battaglini (2005), when voting is costly the set of equilibria in sequential
private information voting games are disjoint from those in which voting is
simultaneous. That is, later voters’ choices will be influenced by the results
of early voting. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007) also find support
for these qualitative theoretical predictions in laboratory elections using a
three-voter game; in particular, they find significant evidence of strategic
abstention by later voters. Other results, however, are at variance with the-
ory – they find that early voters tend to participate more than theoretically
predicted, whereas later voters abstain more, sometimes even when their
votes could be pivotal. They conclude that, as predicted, although sequen-
tial voting tends to be more informationally and economically efficient than
simultaneous voting, later voters benefit at the expense of early voters, so
there is a cost in terms of equity. Nevertheless, they find no evidence of
later voters ignoring their private information and engaging in bandwagon
or underdog voting.
Callander (2007) considers the comparison of simultaneous and sequen-
tial voting under asymmetric information when voters receive utility from
conforming to the majority (voting for the winner) independent of the utility
they derive from whether the winner is their own best choice. Specifically,
he derives an equilibrium under sequential voting in which voters engage
in bandwagon voting (voting for the leading candidate) even though their
private information may suggest that the leading candidate is not their own
best choice. He finds that such bandwagon voting may occur even when later
voters’ choices are not pivotal and the outcome is already decided (because
of the additional utility voters receive from the act of voting for the winning
candidate). This argument is supported by earlier work by Hung and Plott
(2001), which provides experimental evidence of conformity voting when sub-
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jects are rewarded for doing so. Presumably, if voters similarly receive utility
from voting for an underdog candidate (or are rewarded for doing so in an
experiment), then later voters may also engage in underdog voting even when
they previously believed the leading candidate to be their own best choice.
Hence, both theory and the experimental evidence suggests that if the
act of voting is costly, when later voters learn from exit poll information that
their decision is unlikely to be pivotal, they are more likely to abstain. If,
however, they receive utility from the act of voting for either the winner or
the underdog (independent of whether the winner is their own best choice),
then such exit poll information may lead them to engage in either bandwagon
or underdog voting, respectively.
Our natural experiment allows us to evaluate the extent to which exit
poll information affects the turnout of later voters and whether later voters
are more likely to engage in either bandwagon or underdog voting.
3.3 The Natural Experiment: Institutional
Background and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 The French Electoral System
France has a semi-presidential system.11 The French president is directly
elected by the citizens via a two-round runoff system. In the first round a
11The French system has been called “semi-presidential” in political science since Du-
verger (1970). The motivation for such a label was that in situations where the President’s
party does not lead the majority coalition in the Parliament, the Prime Minister has de
facto the leadership over all domestic policies.
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large number of candidates can participate.12 If one candidate receives more
than 50% of the votes in the first round he or she is declared the winner. Such
an immediate victory, however, has only happened once since the beginning
of the Fifth Republic, in 1958.13 Usually, the two candidates that receive the
most votes participate in a second round to determine the winner.
This two-round runoff system model is also used in most other elec-
tions in France with some variation. The French parliamentary elections
differ slightly in the sense that the two-round runoff elections within each
constituency allow more than two candidates to participate in the second
round.14 In practice, however, although a few second rounds are disputed by
three candidates, most involve only two.
Balloting traditionally takes place on a Sunday. French electoral law
prohibits exit poll publication until the close of voting in mainland France
(Bale 2002) and bans publication, broadcasting and commenting on opinion
polls for the day before and the day of the election (Saturday and Sunday).
The electoral law also stipulates that the official campaign has to stop for
these last two days.15
12To be eligible to run, a candidate must gather 500 signatures from local politicians
such as town councilors.
13This presidential election was the first one of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle had
overseen the design of the new constitution and was seen as having saved France from
a potential military coup by the many army generals opposed to the process of Algerian
independence. In these dramatic circumstances, De Gaulle won the election with more
than 78% of the votes.
14In order to participate in the second round, candidates must gather a minimum pro-
portion of registered voters in the constituency, currently 12.5%. In presidential elections,
however, there are always exactly two candidates in the second round.
15The law was initially voted in in 1977. At that time, the publication and broadcasting
of opinion polls were banned for one week before each of the two rounds of voting. It was
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When a French presidential election is held, it is always the only contest
on the ballot, which stands in contrast to, for example, U.S. elections, in
which ballots include local, congressional and senatorial posts, and even local
propositions and initiatives. The French case thus allows us to measure
turnout for presidential elections only, meaning that the turnout measured
is not confounded by effects from other elections.
During the day of the election, the release of exit polls is therefore not
allowed until after the closure of the last polling booth in mainland France,
on Sunday at 8:00PM CET.16 At exactly 8:00PM, TV channels release highly
precise early estimations of the final results. These are based on large exit
polls and on the first results from the majority of polling booths, which close
at 6:00PM.17
To demonstrate the quality of these early estimates, we collected the
8:00PM CET forecasts for each candidate from the main public channel
(France 2) at every election in our sample. Table 3.1 lists these forecasts,
together with the actual results and the differences between the two. In the
second round of the 1981 election, for example, the difference between the fi-
nal result and the 8:00PM predictions is the same for both the first candidate
and the runner-up at 0.06 percentage points, with the forecasted difference
between the two candidates at 3.4% and the actual difference at 3.52%. As
changed in 2002 to limit this interdiction to the last two days before the results.
16Central European time (CET) is used in most parts of the European Union and is one
hour ahead of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Polling booths in main urban areas
close at 8:00PM while most polling booths in the countryside close at 6:00PM.
17Given that all votes are aggregated at the national level, the law of large numbers
helps these estimations to be precise. Unlike the case in the UK or U.S., the result does
not depend on some swing constituencies/states from which the final result can take time
to emerge. In fact, the final difference between early estimations and the final official
results is typically less than 0.3 percentage points for any given candidate, see Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 clearly shows, exit poll forecasts are extremely accurate, the final
ranking is always the one predicted by the forecast and the vote shares are
most often similar to a few decimal points.
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3.3.2 The 2005 Electoral Reform
Figure 3.1 provides a map of France and its overseas territories (hereafter
OST or DOM-TOM), which are spread across the globe with time differences
ranging from +12 hours UTC18 (Wallis and Futuna) to −10 hours UTC
(French Polynesia). People living in the OST are fully fledged citizens of the
French Republic and therefore participate in the French presidential election
in the same way as French citizens on the mainland.19
Before 2005, French elections were held on Sundays in every territory
(mainland and OSTs), meaning that they began in the most eastern parts,
New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and then moved progressively across
the more westerly territories as the opening time for polling booths arrived
(typically between 8:00AM and 9:00AM). As a result, the territories located
to the west of the French mainland (e.g. the Caribbean, Guiana) and in
the Pacific (French Polynesia) voted partially or completely after mainland
France.
Because the mainland accounts for approximately 96% of the total French
population,20 in national ballots like presidential elections, the result on the
mainland almost certainly determines the overall election result. This setting
18Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) is the international time standard. It closely
resembles the “Greenwich Mean Time” with the latter being outdated.
19The OST are divided in two categories: overseas departments (DOM) whose laws are
identical to mainland France, and overseas territories (TOM) which are granted sufficient
autonomy for local laws to differ from mainland France. French OST status and its
relationship with mainland France changes from time to time. For example, New Caledonia
is an overseas territory that is expected to vote on an independence referendum over the
next few years. Conversely, Mayotte, an island in the Comoros archipelagos, recently
voted by referendum to abandon TOM status and become a DOM, making it a new
French department with the same laws and regulations as mainland France.
202.7 million citizens in the OST versus 63.1 million in mainland France.
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Figure 3.1: France and its overseas territories (Hoshie c).
is therefore different from that of the U.S., where the number of electoral
votes determined by California can empirically decide the outcome of a close
contest.
Table 3.1 shows that in most cases the result is fully determined once the
mainland results are known. Voters in overseas territories west of mainland
France only represent around 1.5% of the French electorate. The predicted
difference between the two “pivotal candidates” (the first versus the runner-
up in the second round and the second versus the third candidate in the first
round) given by exit polls is almost always above 1.5%.
To illustrate this point further, Table 3.2 shows the number of votes by
which the runner-up was ahead of the third candidate in mainland France in
the first round and the voting edge of the first versus the second candidate in
the second round, respectively. It also gives the number of registered voters
in the western OSTs and the corresponding difference between both measures
for each election in our sample. As is apparent, in only two elections would
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it have been mathematically possible for the western OST to make a differ-
ence: the first rounds of 1995 and 2002. In 1995, the difference is so large
that changing the result would have required at least 95% of the registered
voters in the west to vote for the third candidate and the remaining 5% not
to vote for the second candidate. Such a scenario seems extremely unlikely.
Moreover, in this election, both candidates were moderate conservatives, giv-
ing limited incentives for voters to try and change the outcome. The case is
somewhat different, however, for the first round of 2002. Here if the difference
between the second and third candidates in OST voting was approximately
33% of registered voters, then the outcome of the election would be affected
by choices made in the OST. Although such a figure still seems quite unlikely,
it is at least not completely impossible with evident consequences for voter
turnout. In Section 3.5, therefore, we conduct robustness checks to show that
our estimates remain unchanged by this event.
As a result of this geographical distribution, before 2005 voters in the
territories to the west of mainland France had access to information about
the presidential election results while voting booths were still open, while
French Polynesia and the territories off the American continent had precise
information on election results by 9:00AM and 2:00PM, respectively. Hence,
most voters probably knew who would win the election before voting. In
fact, in 2002, the defeated presidential candidate Lionel Jospin resigned from
his office before people in the western OST had even voted.
In 2002 the Constitutional Council suggested to change the voting order
for Western OST citizens’ in order for the balloting to take place before the
results in mainland France were made known. The Constitutional Council
is the highest constitutional authority in France and its role is to ensure
that the principles of the constitution are respected by the laws. In March
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Year Round Voting Edge on the Registered Voters in the Difference
mainland Western OST
1981 1 2,293 470 1,822
2 1, 247 470 776
1988 1 995 556 439
2 2, 405 556 1, 849
1995 1 644 675 −30
2 1, 486 675 810
2002 1 254 756 −502
2 19, 605 754 18, 851
2007 1 2, 520 826 1, 694
2 2, 200 826 1, 374
2012 1 3, 232 869 2, 363
2 1, 027 870 157
Table 3.2: Vote differences between the two pivotal candidates (2nd versus
3rd in first round, 1st versus 2nd in second round) on the mainland and in
the east compared to the number of registered voters in the western OST.
Numbers are in 1, 000 votes.
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2003, the government enacted a constitutional law (2003-276) that changed
the French Constitution by removing the word “Sunday” in the article 7
of the Constitution relative to elections. This change allowed the Western
territories to switch their election day to Saturday. Answering to a question
in the Senate about the day of elections in Western overseas territories, the
Overseas Ministry indicated that this change in constitutional law intended to
remedy the fact that OST voters had access to the mainland results and that
this situation was likely to “lead to higher level of abstention and possibly
influence the sincerity of the voting choices”.21 Following this law, in 2003
the voting day was changed to Saturday in all territories to the West of
mainland France: French Polynesia, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Guadeloupe,
French Guiana and Martinique.
3.3.3 Other Reforms and Relevant Events
Any analysis of the effect of a policy change over a given period needs to en-
sure that the observed changes in the variable of interest cannot be explained
by other policy changes or events happening during the same period. In our
case, four potentially relevant events happened over the period studied that
warrant discussion. First, in 2002, the duration of the presidential mandate
was reduced from seven to five years, which may have affected the overall
turnout at the national level. There seems to be no reason, however, why it
should affect turnout differently in the OST relative to the mainland, and it
is a priori even less likely that it would affect turnout differently in the OST
to the west and east of mainland France.
Second, 2002 saw the first candidate from an OST (Guiana) participating
21Re´sponse du Ministe`re de l’outre-mer a` la Question e´crite no 04510 de M. Emmanuel
Hamel, Journal Officiel Se´nat, 24/04/2003, p.1421.
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in the first round of the presidential election, which could have led to a higher
turnout in Guiana in this specific election. We control for this concern by
including a dummy variable indicating Guiana in the first round of 2002 in
the estimations (see Section 3.5.1).
Third, 2002 was also the first year in which a candidate from the far-right
reached the second round, an unexpected event that created a political shock
in the country. As the majority of the population in the overseas territories
are not ethnically white, they are likely to be averse to this party’s political
objectives. We address this concern more closely in Section 3.5.2; we find no
empirical evidence that this event affects our conclusions.
Finally, the last decade has seen the growth of the Internet, making access
to information easier. Hence, in practice, early estimations of the election
results are produced by polling companies as early as 5:00PM CET on the day
of the election. In the 1980s, the laws preventing publication of early polls
were easy to uphold because the only media able to report such early results
would be punished severely for doing so. More recently, however, Belgian and
Swiss newspapers have begun posting early estimations on their websites
during election day but as they are based outside of France, even though
French speaking, they are not bound to respect French electoral law. Unlike
the early 2000s when access to the Internet was limited, by the 2007 and
2012 elections the spread of online election result information after 5:00PM
had grown substantially, leading to a debate about the usefulness of a law
which could be barely enforced. We allow for different time trends in our
estimations to control for such changes over time.
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3.3.4 Data
Our primary data set comprises French presidential election results, espe-
cially turnout for first and second election rounds from 1981 onwards (1981,
1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2012).22 Although we organize the data at the
departmental level to make group sizes as comparable as possible, the popu-
lation sizes still vary from around 4, 000 in St. Pierre and Miquelon to about
1.8 million in the Nord department. The OST each serve as one subdivision
in the analysis.23 There are four OST subdivisions in the east and five in
the west, which in addition to the 96 departments on the mainland com-
prise a total of 105 such subdivisions in France. The subdivisions we refer to
as “treated” are French Polynesia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Guadeloupe,
French Guiana, and Martinique.24
In order to conduct robustness checks, we use similar data from French
parliamentary elections, taken directly from the French Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs, which are also arranged on the departmental level and span a
period from 1997 to 2012. In parliamentary elections - unlike presidential
elections - voters elect representatives in their local constituencies, indepen-
22The data were collected from the French ministry of Internal Affairs and from the
www.politiquemania.com website, which provides easily accessible information about
French elections at the local level. Given the large amount of information to be retrieved,
it was impossible to make use of official French ministry data that are not downloadable.
We did, however, compare random samples from the data we received with the official
numbers and found that in every case they were exactly the same.
23For simplicity, we consider both TOMs and DOMs to be geographical units similar to
French departments even if, formally, only DOMs are “departments”.
24Saint Martin and Saint Barthelemy split from Guadeloupe in 2007 to become separate
OST. We nevertheless count their results and population in the 2012 elections jointly with
Guadeloupe to be consistent over the whole sample. The population of these two territories
combined represents 8.5% of the Guadeloupe population.
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dent from the results of mainland voting. Although the overall outcome of
the parliamentary elections is in most cases decided on mainland France, the
uncertainty about the identity of the local MP has not yet been resolved
when voters in the OST vote. Hence, if the 2005 reform has a causal effect
on voting behavior in the OST to the west of mainland France, this effect
should be primarily evident in presidential elections and less so in parlia-
mentary elections. In fact we do not find any significant effect on turnout in
parliamentary elections, which increases confidence that we actually identify
the causal parameter of interest (see Section 3.5).
3.3.5 Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of knowing the election outcome on voter turnout, we
estimate equations of the following form
Yst = α + ηt+ δ1[t≥2005] + λ1[s∈TG] + β1[t≥2005]1[s∈TG] + γXst + εst , (3.1)
where TG indicates the treated OST (i.e. the OST to the west of main-
land France) and Yst the turnout by subdivision s in year t. 1[.] represents
the indicator function and X a vector of controls; β, the coefficient on the
interaction of the treatment group and the time dummy, is the difference-in-
difference estimator (DID) of the causal effect of interest. As controls we use
time trends, a dummy indicating second round elections and a dummy for
OST.
This empirical design has the advantage that all territory-specific fixed-
effects that might influence turnout are canceled out, for example different
political attitudes in the different territories, differences in political knowl-
edge and costs of voting (distance to the next voting booth, climatic con-
ditions etc.). Also, including different time trends allows us to exclude the
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possibility that our estimated treatment effect is confounded by the fact that
different territories might have embarked on separate turnout trajectories
unrelated to the law change. Moreover, as we are also able to use the East-
ern OSTs as a control group, we are more explicitly able to control for OST
specific characteristics, like specific political attitudes towards the political
candidates and towards the mainland in general.
Although splitting up the French mainland into departments helps to mit-
igate concerns about the differing sizes of the underlying voting populations
for each observation, these differences might still be an issue in our analysis.
To tackle this concern, we apply weighted least squares to equation (3.1) us-
ing the number of registered voters in each department as weights. Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) also show that standard errors in DID frame-
works that rely on long time series are susceptible to autocorrelation, which
might lead to overconfidence in the precision of the point estimates. To assess
the reliability of our standard error estimates, therefore, we also implement
two procedures suggested to work well in this situation. First, we block boot-
strap standard errors on the department level and second, we collapse the
sample into a pre- and post-period.
Finally, we estimate specifications that allow for different trends in turnout
in different geographical areas of France. Specifically, we define three geo-
graphical areas: mainland France and the eastern and western OST, which
we denote by g ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We estimate separate linear and quadratic time
trends for each of these territories, which is sometimes labeled as a “random
trend model” (Wooldridge (2001, p. 315)) and basically boils down to a
difference-in-difference-in-difference model where previous periods are used
as pre-program tests. Empirically, this approach implies that we replace ηt
in equation (3.1) by ηgt and ηgt
2. Allowing the different territories to be on
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different time trends over the whole sample period is an effective tool for
examining whether the treatment effect we estimate in fact only captures
different trajectories of turnout for the three territories. As it turns out the
results are very similar to the simple DID–model.
3.4 Results
Figure 3.2 illustrates the evolution of presidential election turnout averaged
by year for all three territories – the mainland and the western and eastern
OST.25 Here, turnout trends seem to be reasonably parallel before the leg-
islative change, and the increase in turnout is visibly larger in the treated
OST between the 2002 and 2007 elections. In 2007, however, there is a dis-
tinct increase in turnout in all parts of France, after which, the time trends
again seem to follow a parallel path. Figure 3.3, which plots the same data
for each western OST individually, supports these conclusions. This graph
also shows that the results are not driven by some outliers, but confirms the
consistent pattern for all western OSTs.
Two factors could potentially have contributed to this surge. First, the
2002 election was marked by the unexpected first-round elimination of the
moderate left candidate in favor of the candidate from the far right party
(Section 3.3.3 for a discussion). This outcome led to intense public discus-
sion on the importance of voting by those who feared the far right could
do as well again. Second, the 2007 election saw two polarizing candidates:
Segolene Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, which could also have driven up turnout.
Besides showing a jump in 2007 for all three territories, Figure 3.2 also clearly
shows that turnout in the western OST increased more relative to the other
25Hence turnout is also averaged over the two rounds by territory g, and year.
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Figure 3.2: Average turnout by geographical area and year. The vertical line
indicates the year in which the law change occurred.
Figure 3.3: Average turnout in each treated OST versus the turnout in the
mainland plus the eastern OSTs. The vertical line indicates the year in which
the law change occurred.
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territories in the west.
Table 3.3 displays the results of the baseline DID estimates and the ran-
dom trend model (in columns (6)-(9)). In the baseline DID regressions, the
point estimate is stable around 6.3 percentage points and significantly dif-
ferent from zero across all specifications and the standard errors are almost
unaffected by clustering (columns (3) to (9)), implying that knowing the elec-
tion results decreases turnout by about 6 percentage points. In columns (6)
and (7) we estimate the basic random trend models and find that the point
estimates increase somewhat to 9 and 11 percentage points respectively. In
columns (8) and (9) we estimate the same territory-specific trend model
using the size of the population in the departments as weights. Doing so
again results in slight increases in the treatment coefficient to about 12 to 14
percentage points. Our preferred specification is column (9) which includes
territory specific linear and quadratic time trends, a dummy indicating the
election round and weighting. Here we estimate a treatment effect of almost
12 percentage points with a robust standard error of 1.7 percentage points.
Table 3.4 reports additional results, including the weighted baseline DID
model and some efforts to assess the reliability of our standard error esti-
mates. After we introduce weighting into the baseline DID, the point es-
timates indicate that not knowing the election result increases turnout by
about 10 percentage points (see columns (1)–(3) in Table 3.4). Additionally,
in columns (4) and (5) we block-bootstrap standard errors on the depart-
ment level and note that they increase from slightly below 2 to about 2.7
percentage points. In the remaining columns we calculate the DID esti-
mates on a sample that is collapsed into a pre- and post-treatment period,
which produces similar point estimates of about 7 to 10 percentage points,
depending on whether we weight the regression (see Bertrand, Duflo, and
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Mullainathan (2004)). The (clustered) standard errors are similar to the
block-bootstrapped ones. In all specifications the effect is significantly dif-
ferent from zero.26
In sum, in all specifications, the point estimate remains remarkably stable
and quite precisely estimated. For our preferred specification, we report an
increase in turnout from not knowing the election result of 12 percentage
points. Moreover, concerns about autocorrelation and different population
sizes underlying each observation do not seem to matter.
26We also implemented Papke and Wooldridge’s 1996 quasi-maximum likelihood esti-
mator in order to account for the fact that the dependent variable is naturally restricted to
the unit interval. In this approach the conditional mean of the dependent variable is spec-
ified as a logit function and the log likelihood as Bernoulli distributed. Since the Bernoulli
likelihood is part of the linear exponential function family, a quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator is consistent even when the Bernoulli distribution is misspecified. This result
goes back to Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984). We cluster the standard errors in
all cases on the department level and find that the results are very much in line with earlier
findings: not knowing the election results has a significant positive impact on turnout.
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3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Pseudo-estimates and the Candidate from French
Guiana
In order to check for robustness, we first calculate pseudo DID estimates us-
ing 1994 as the year in which reform was implemented (excluding post–2005
observations)27 and secondly (falsely) using the eastern OST as a treatment
group (on the full sample). In neither case do we find any significant coeffi-
cient estimate (the results are not reported here).
The first-time appearance in the first round of the 2002 election of a
candidate from French Guiana might have led to an overly increased turnout
in this subdivision. As a consequence, our estimates might be biased since
Guiana is one of the treated territories. As the 2002 election is before the
2005 reform, this bias would create a downward bias on the estimated effect
of the reform on the change in turnout. Given that we observe an increase
in turnout following the reform, the existence of a Guiana candidate in 2002
can only make our estimate conservative (meaning that the effect of exit
poll information can only be higher than the one estimated and not lower).
In any case, we control for a possible bias due to this event by including a
dummy indicating Guiana in the first round of 2002. As expected, we find
a positive and significant coefficient on this dummy. Nevertheless, all results
from Table 3.3 remain literally unchanged (and are thus not reported here),
27We prefer not to conduct this test on a sample that overlaps with 2005 since in this
case the treatment effect might potentially affect the pseudo-estimate. On the other hand,
we only observe four elections at two time points after the law changed. Hence it seems
reasonable to split the pre-treatment period into half and run this same test on that
sample.
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indicating that this event has no impact on our estimates.
3.5.2 “Le Pen Elections”
In Section 3.3.3, we expressed concern that the anomalous result in the first
round of 2002 - in which right-wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen surprisingly
made it into the second round - might have impacted our results. First, we
argue that this event is likely to downward bias our estimates, meaning that
we are presumably estimating lower bounds of the actual effect of knowing
the exit polls on turnout. Such is the case because the closeness of the
election is likely to increase turnout more in the west, which on average has
better information when voting, than in the eastern parts of France. As a
result, the DID estimates tend to be smaller than in the counterfactual case
without this highly polarizing candidate. Second, we replicate the regressions
from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 excluding the first round of 2002 (see Tables 3.5 and
3.6). Reassuringly, these estimates are very much in line with those using the
entire sample. In the baseline specifications, we find an increase in turnout
of around 6%, and as before, most controls seem to have no large effect on
the results.
Once we allow for common linear and quadratic time trends, however,
the effect on turnout increases slightly to about 10% (columns (6) and (7)
in Table 3.5), and it increases even more, to about 14%, when we run the
regressions weighted by the number of registered voters in each department
(columns (8) and (9) in the same table). The precision of our estimates
also seems mostly unaffected by the smaller sample size and whether we use
OLS, clustered (at the department level) or block-bootstrapped (columns (4)
and (5) in Table 3.6) standard errors. In columns (6) to (9) of Table 3.6, we
again use a sample that is collapsed into pre- and post- treatment periods and
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find similar point estimates - between 6% and 10%, respectively – depending
on whether or not we use weighting. Taken together, these findings strongly
suggest that the results reported earlier are reliable and not biased by unusual
events such as the Le Pen election.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 127
3.5.3 Testing for Territory Specific Shocks on Turnout
A threat to the validity of our difference-in-difference estimates is differing
time paths for turnout in the territories versus the mainland in the absence of
treatment. We can credibly test for this concern by allowing for different lin-
ear and quadratic time trends for the three territories (see Table 3.3). In our
case, it is even possible to go one step further by using turnout data on par-
liamentary elections in France to re-estimate the same difference-in-difference
models as in Section 3.3.5. Although these elections are national we would
expect a smaller or even no treatment effect because in each subdivision vot-
ers choose between different candidates who are seeking the position as their
local representative. Therefore, the result on the mainland does not influ-
ence who will represent an OST district in the national parliament.28 We
can therefore test for territory-specific turnout shocks that could potentially
confound our estimates because such shocks, if they exist, are likely to also
affect other elections. While directly testing for these concerns is essentially
infeasible in DID models, our unique setting allows for this possibility.
Table 3.7, which summarizes the results using the parliamentary data,
shows similar standard errors but much smaller coefficient estimates. Hence,
given that no estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at
the 10% level and all are also much lower in absolute terms, OST-specific
shocks do not seem to be a concern. This finding assures us that we are
indeed identifying the causal effect of interest and not other time-variant
shocks. As in Section 3.3.5, we also introduce weighting but again find no
28It might be the case that voters in the OST care whether their local representative is
a member of a party of influence in the parliament and in that case results in the mainland
may affect their voting behavior. We assume that these concerns, if they exist, are not
large.
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No Common Time Trends Linear and Quadratic Time Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
OST dummy No No Yes No Yes Yes
Round Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighting No No No No No Yes
SEs OLS Clustered Clustered OLS Clustered Clustered
N 838 838 838 838 838 838
Table 3.7: Pseudo difference-in-difference estimates analogous to earlier ta-
bles before with parliamentary election turnout as the dependent variable.
Standard errors are given in brackets below. The sample includes parliamen-
tary elections from 1997 to 2012. *,** and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
significant point estimates. Figure 3.4 summarizes the turnout trends at
these parliamentary elections by territory.
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Figure 3.4: Average turnout by territory and year for the parliamentary
elections. The vertical line indicates the year in which the law changed. No
over-proportional increase in turnout is apparent in the western OST.
3.6 Estimating Potential Bandwagon Effects
In political science, the “bandwagon effect” refers to the phenomena where
people might vote for a candidate just because he or she is likely to win the
election.29 It is important to note that observing an apparent bandwagon
29For a discussion of the psychological aspects of a bandwagon effect or impersonal
influence, see, for example Kenney and Rice (1994) or Mutz (1997). Information can also
affect on confidence in a voting decision (Matsusaka (1995b)). An electoral momentum
has also been found in early presidential primaries (candidates performing well in Iowa
or New Hampshire receive a future primary voter boost, as discussed in Morton and
Williams (1999) and Morton and Williams (2001)). As reviewed previously, Callander
(2007) provides a formal model of bandwagon voting. See also the experimental evidence of
bandwagon voting in Hung and Plott (2001). Schmitt-Beck (1996) also refers to consensus
heuristic. If a multitude of voters are behind one of the candidates, people take the choice
of others as an indicator of political quality of the candidate.
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effect from exit polls is not inconsistent with the observed lower turnout from
such knowledge and does not necessarily require that voters are switching
their votes to the likely winner. That is, if individuals receive higher utility
from voting for a likely winner than a likely loser, ceteris paribus, then finding
out the likely outcome of the election may lead to a stronger decline in
turnout among those supporting the likely loser than those supporting the
likely winner, resulting in an apparent bandwagon effect. Another reason
why we might observe this effect, is that voters might want to vote for the
winner for strategic reasons, if it is expected that the winning candidate will
‘reward’ districts which gave him or her a large support (for example in the
form of subsidies, increased local public spending, or official visits).
Although this effect attracted lots of attention among scholars, it turned
out to be quite difficult to provide empirical evidence. An opposite effect, the
“underdog” effect, where voters tend to favor the disadvantaged candidate,
has also been discussed as a possibility.30
The French natural experiment, however, provides a unique setting for
examining such effects in that prior to the 2005 reform, voters in the west-
ern OST knew the winner when they went to the polls. Our identification
strategy thus relies on estimating the impact of the leading presidential can-
didate’s voting edge, as compared to that of the runner-up on the mainland
(and in the eastern OST), on the vote difference in the western OST. To
30West (1991, p.153) discusses the case of Walter Mondale and Gary Hart in the 1984
US presidential nominating process to illustrate the underdog effect. Mondale had a lead
over Hart. Hart then applied the strategy of “do not let the powerbrokers tell you the
race is over.” This strategy helped Hart to attract substantial amount of voter support,
losing at the end but performing much better than anticipated.
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determine this impact, we estimate the following equation
∆s,t = α + β∆mainland,t + γ1[t>2005] + δ∆mainland,t ∗ 1[t>2005] + εs,t, (3.2)
where ∆mainland,t ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized difference of votes between the
candidate with the most votes and the runner–up at time t on the mainland
(and in the eastern OST) and ∆s,t ∈ [−1, 1] is the same difference in the
western departments at time t. We use only the vote difference in the west-
ern OST as the left-hand variable in this estimation since the non-treated
departments contribute to ∆mainland,t. Our approach minimizes endogeneity
concerns because the regressors are predetermined. 1[.] once again denotes
the indicator function. Essentially, equation (3.2) estimates a pre- and post-
2005 slope, in which the parameter of interest, δ, indicates the difference
between both coefficients. This approach allows us to test for a bandwagon
effect using simple t-tests on δ. If such an effect exists, we would expect δ to
be significantly different from zero. A negative δ would indicate that the re-
sults in west OSTs are less correlated with mainland results after the reform
(without exit poll information) than before the reform (with exit poll infor-
mation). Thus a negative parameter indicates a bandwagon effect, where
voters in western OST tended to follow the announced mainland results be-
fore the reform. On the contrary, a positive δ indicates an underdog effect
with western OST voters voting less for the mainland favourite before the
reform than after.
Our estimates are summarized in Table 3.8. We estimate equation (3.2)
via OLS and find a pre-treatment slope coefficient of 1.17, which is statis-
tically significant different from zero at the 1% level. We also find a large
negative slope coefficient of −4.05 for the post-2005 period. The difference
δ between both coefficients is therefore negative (−5.22) and statistically
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significant at the 10% level using ordinary clustered, and bootstrapped stan-
dard error estimates (middle of Table 3.8) in the t-test. We also conduct a
test of the equality of the pre- and post-2005 slope coefficients (bottom of
Table 3.8), which rejects equality at the 1% level. Both coefficients, when
taken alone, are statistically different from zero, indicating that the positive
relation when voters know who will win turns negative after the law changes.
We also estimate the same equation excluding observations where the vote
edge from the mainland was larger than 20 percentage points (first round of
1988 and second round of 2002). Visual inspection of the raw data suggests
that these observations could be driving our estimates. Nevertheless, the last
column of Table 3.8 shows that such outlier observations are not a problem.
The point estimates and standard errors increase somewhat but all estimates
are still significant in all cases. Figure 3.5, which plots the fitted and raw
∆treated,st versus ∆mainland,t relation separately before and after 2005, confirms
this conclusion graphically.
Overall, these results clearly suggest that election results in western OSTs
were more positively correlated with the mainland results before the reform
when western OST voters could find out the winner in mainland results
before voting. In practice, the candidate ahead in mainland France was more
likely to win in western OSTs before the reform (when voters had access to
information on the identity of the leader on the mainland) than after the
reform (when voters no longer had access to such information).31 To our
knowledge, the evidence we have provided is the best from the field so far
31As we indicate above, this effect might be partially driven by voters who have a
preference for the losing candidate but who, after discovering the exit poll results, decide
not to turn out. The apparent bandwagon effect may be a consequence of a greater effect
of exit polls on turnout of those who support the likely loser than those who support the
likely winner.
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Full Sample Excluding Outliers
Pre-2005 slope estimate 1.18∗∗∗ 7.45
(0.29) (4.71)
Post-2005 slope estimate −4.04∗ −4.04
(2.89) (3.07)
Difference δ −5.22 -11.49
Corresponding standard errors:
OLS (2.91)∗ (5.62)∗∗
Clustered by department (2.04)∗ (3.78)∗∗
Bootstrapped (1.23)∗∗∗ (5.76)∗∗
Block bootstrapped by department (1.73)∗∗∗ (3.31)∗∗∗
χ2 test of equality χ2 = 16.57∗∗∗ χ2 = 3.74∗
P value < 0.01 0.053
N 60 50
Table 3.8: Estimating equation (3.2) with ∆treated,st as the dependent vari-
able. Several standard error estimates are given for the t-test of H0 : the
difference in pre- and post-2005 slopes is zero. *,** and *** indicate signifi-
cance for this t-test at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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which demonstrates the existence of a bandwagon effect.
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Figure 3.5: Plot of ∆mainland versus ∆treated, separately before and after 2005
for the sample without outliers. The former exhibits a clear positive trend
and the latter a distinct negative one indicating, that, ceteris paribus, the
leading candidate on the mainland loses votes when these voters have no exit
poll information from the mainland.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
The advent and proliferation of new electronic information sources and social
media has had profound impacts on many aspects of politics across the globe.
Increasingly, individuals are able to us the web to coordinate protests against
governments and other groups, acquire secret and classified information, and
to monitor exit poll results while an election is still in process. In this paper
we investigate the possible effects of the last development on political behav-
ior. Previous research using naturally occurring elections has suffered from a
number of methodological problems in identifying whether such information
can have a causal effect on voting behavior.
We take advantage of a unique natural experiment from 2005, in which
French citizens from overseas territories to the west of mainland France be-
gan for the first time to vote without knowing the choices made by mainland
voters. We find that knowing the outcome of early voting decreases turnout
by about 12 percentage points in our preferred specification. We also find
empirical support for bandwagon voting in which later voters, if they partic-
ipate, are more likely to vote for the expected winner.
Our results suggest that when voters can access exit poll results during
an election voting behavior is significantly affected. These effects on voting
behavior (lower participation and a bandwagon effect) provide advantages to
candidates and political parties favored by early voters, which do not exist
in the absence of the information. If later voters differ from early voters in
terms of demographics and ideological preferences, then we would also expect
such information to have an effect on the types of public policies chosen by
elected officials as well. Candidates and political parties, moreover, have an
incentive to manipulate the timing of voting and the type and accuracy of
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information revealed through exit polls. Concerns about the effects of exit
polls on elections as expressed by many government officials, candidates, and
party leaders and calls for restrictions on such information are thus strongly
supported by our results.
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Abstract1
Although tactical voting attracts a great deal of attention, it is
very hard to measure as it requires knowledge of both individuals’
voting choices as well as their unobserved preferences. In this pa-
per, we present a simple empirical strategy to nonparametrically
identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results.
This approach allows us to study the magnitude and direction
of strategic voting as well as to verify which information voters
and parties take into account to determine marginal constituen-
cies under a different set of identification assumptions than those
commonly used. We show that tactical voting played a signifi-
cant role in the 2010 election, mainly for Liberal-Democratic vot-
ers supporting Labour. Moreover, our results suggest that voters
seem to form their expectations based on a national swing in vote
shares rather than newspaper guides published in the main me-
dia outlets or previous election outcomes. We also present some
evidence that suggests that campaign spending is not driving tac-
tical voting.
1This is co-authored work with Ste´phane Dupraz and Lionel Page.
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“All this talk of tactical voting upsets me though – no-one
should EVER have to even think about voting tactically – you
should be able to vote for the party you want”.
Andrew Whickey, a Liberal Democrats blogger, 2010
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4.1 Introduction
Elections are at the very core of democracies. They are means to give power
to the people by allowing for the expression of their preferences. It has
been argued that for a democracy to function properly, voters should face
incentives to truthfully reveal their preferences. Tactical or strategic voting
on the other hand refers to a situation when voters do not vote according to
their sincere preferences, typically with the intention to influence the outcome
in a preferred way. This difficulty underlies the debate on tactical voting and
is what has upset Andrew Whickey, the blogger quoted at the beginning.
Consequentially, tactical voting has long been debated in the political science
literature, see for example Galbraith and Nicol (1989), Johnston and Pattie
(1991) and Fieldhouse, Pattie, and Johnston (1996). It is typically defined
as a situation where it is in a voter’s best interest to vote for a less preferred
candidate, or as Fisher (2004) put it, “a tactical voter is someone who votes
for a party they believe is more likely to win than their preferred party, to
best influence who wins in the constituency” (Fisher, 2004, p. 157).2
With very close results predicted by the pre–election polls, the issue of
tactical voting in the British elections of 2010 was a more hotly debated topic
than ever before. Key figures in the Labour Party – including Alan Johnson
(Home Secretary), Ed Balls (Children’s Secretary) and Peter Hain (Wales
Secretary) – called for backing the best Liberal/Labour candidate to beat the
Conservative candidates in marginal (that is, close) constituencies. Compass,
a Union organization, supported tactical voting and designed a voting guide
for tactical voting in marginals. Numerous left-leaning newspapers advised
2It has become common to refer to this phenomena as ‘tactical voting’ in the context
of British election and as ‘strategic voting’ in US elections. Here we do not make this
distinction and use the terms interchangeably.
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voters to vote tactically and many proposed voting guides, for example the
Daily Mirror, Guardian, Independent and New Statesman. Given this specific
situation, in particular the calls from some well-known politicians in the
Labour Party itself, one may expect tactical voting to have been significantly
higher than in precedent elections.
Reducing incentives to tactical voting was also a key argument in the
debate surrounding the referendum in 2011 to change the voting system in
the United Kingdom from First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) to Alternative Voting
(AV). One of the major criticisms made by the opponents of the traditional
voting system used in Britain is that it fosters tactical voting to the benefit of
the two main parties and hence potentially hinders representation according
to the true preferences (Electoral Reform Society, 2010).
Besides the large attention tactical voting has received from experts, lay-
man and the media, there are considerable difficulties when estimating strate-
gic behavior in elections. These difficulties mainly arise from the fact that in
order to study this phenomena, knowledge of the political preferences as well
as of the actual vote cast is necessary. Using survey data might be a natu-
ral approach but is obviously plagued with several difficulties like recall bias
(respondents typically have flawed memories about their past behavior) and
social desirability bias (tactical voting might be seen as socially undesirable
and hence it is concealed). A more indirect way used to identify strategic
voting is to model individual (or constituency) characteristics in order to esti-
mate counterfactual vote choices (or election outcomes) with and without the
possibility to vote tactically. This approach typically employs discrete choice
models like probits. A problem with this approach is that one needs to make
the strong assumption that conditional on observables there are no omitted
factors influencing vote choices (or trends in party shares respectively). This
4.1. INTRODUCTION 145
supposition seems sometimes hard to justify in reality.
In this paper, we propose a novel nonparametric strategy to analyze elec-
toral data, which allows us to study tactical voting patterns in the latest
British election. This approach relies on visual inspection of nonparametric
fit of the change in party shares in 2005 versus the 2010 elections as a func-
tion of the Labour – Conservative, Liberal Democrats – Conservatives vote
share differences respectively. While this approach avoids the caveats of the
afore–mentioned strategies it comes at the cost that the magnitude of tacti-
cal voting has to be ‘eye-balled’ from the plotted data, that is the approach
does not deliver precise statistical estimates of the size of tactical voting.
Nevertheless, it allows us to examine the importance of the phenomena and
additionally we are able to study several questions related to this phenom-
ena. It seems that tactical voting played a significant role in the last UK
general election. According to our estimates mainly former Liberal Demo-
cratic voters supported Labour in constituencies where a close race between
Labour and the Conservatives was expected.3
Moreover, this approach allows us to make three further contributions to
the tactical voting literature. First, we study the information sets voters use
to form expectations about election outcomes, using the 2010 general election
as an example. We find some evidence that voters seem to be more sophis-
ticated than voting guides compiled by British newspapers and based their
expectations on a nationwide uniform swing assumption (which performed
better in predicting election outcomes). Second, we discuss the relevance of
campaign spending in this context and present some evidence that it does
not seem to have a major influence on voter’s choices. Third, we test the
prediction that the propensity to vote tactically increases with the winning
3We will discuss later on in more detail how these expectations can be formed.
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margin once the (expected) distance of the third party in the race is con-
trolled for, which is what some theoretical evidence is suggesting (Myatt,
2007). We test this prediction using a general additive model and, in con-
trast to this prediction, we find that tactical voting seems to be highest in
close races even after controlling for the distance from contention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets
our paper in relation to the strategic voting literature, Section 4.3 shows
that tactical voting patterns suggest voters used uniform swing models to
determine marginal constituencies. Section 4.4 looks at the party spending
patterns and their influence on vote shares. In Section 4.5 we show that
the distance of the third party does not seem to influence voting behavior.
Section 4.6 discusses the results and concludes.
4.2 Relation to Literature on Tactical Voting
Although the well–known Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975)) shows that the search for strategy–proof voting
systems is doomed to fail, the FPTP system seems to be particularly prone to
strategic considerations by the voters.4 A voting rule is said to be strategy–
proof if, given all other votes, the vote for an elector’s favorite candidate
does not increase the chance of a less desired candidate to be elected. The
theorem states that if the number of candidates is greater than two, there
is no strategy–proof, non–dictatorial voting rule. Contrary to what this
4But it is certainly not the only system where strategic voting can be expected. For
example Meffert and Gschwend (2010) and McCuen and Morton (2010) find empirical
evidence of tactical coalition voting in a proportional representation system, that is voters
might try to vote such that they maximize the winning probability of their preferred
coalition.
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negative result might suggest, it nevertheless seems worthwhile to examine
the susceptibility of different systems to strategic considerations.
The propensity of the FPTP system to foster tactical voting has long
been suggested (Duverger, 1966). What was initially a conjecture is now
known as “Duverger’s law”, see also Riker (1982). Palfrey (1989) proposed
a mathematical proof of this “law”, showing that in a model with rational
voters and three parties, only two parties end up having positive vote shares.
In this setting, non–Duvergean equilibria can appear in rare occasions when
two parties are tied for second place. The electoral reality sometimes departs
from this prediction though. Whilst the political history of the UK has
shown that the FPTP system is clearly associated with a two-party system
(Labour and Conservatives), there is usually a third minor party, the Liberal
Democrats, who have experienced significant growth over the recent years.
To explain such a discrepancy, Myatt (2007) has proposed a model where,
contrary to Palfrey’s hypothesis, voters have imperfect information on the
preferences of other voters, which prevents full coordination of tactical voters
on their best contender. For instance, in a situation with two left-wing
candidates and one right-wing candidate, some potential left-wing (tactical)
voters may fail to identify their best strategic option. Cox (1997) provides a
comprehensive investigation of this topic.
Besides theoretical attempts to explain the observed patterns of tactical
voting, there have been numerous empirical studies trying to quantify tactical
voting patterns. Naturally most studies look at the British general elections,
see for example Niemi, Written, and Franklin (1992), Johnston and Pattie
(1991), Lanoue and Bowler (1992), Alvarez and Nagler (2000) and Fisher
(2000). Nevertheless, there are also studies that look at US primaries, see for
instance Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde (1992). In general, there
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are three approaches to estimate tactical voting.5
The indirect approach relies on modeling counterfactual voting choices
(that is, with and without the opportunity to vote tactically) using observable
constituency (or individual) characteristics. Studies which use this approach
typically attempt to estimate the impact of perceived closeness of the parties
in each district on voting choices and then include explanatory variables
that are supposed the measure exactly this. For example Blais, Young, and
Turcotte (2005) use a probit model to determine how a vote is cast and
include the perceived probability of a candidate winning in this model, which
is, they argue, indicative for tactical voting. Using Canadian elections as
an example, they find that around 4% of the voters seem to have voted
insincerely. Cain (1978) suggests that tactical voting is higher in those seats
marked as marginals based on the results of the previous elections. He also
employs a logit model approach and finds some indications for tactical voting.
Alvarez and Nagler (2000) (and similarly, Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler
(2006)) estimate a multinomial probit model of voter choices based on survey
data and include a measure of expected closeness of the parties in each district
as explanatory variable.6 They interpret this measure as the likelihood that a
vote is wasted and hence as the potential for strategic voting. They find that
around 8% of voters voted strategically, which is roughly in line with other
estimates. See also Lanoue and Bowler (1998), Blais and Nadeau (1996),
Kim and Fording (2001) and Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2001) for
studies using the indirect approach of measuring tactical voting.
5Blais, Young, and Turcotte (2005) provide a comparison of the two main approaches
– the direct and the indirect one.
6Interestingly, and related to the paper at hand, they assume that expectations are
formed based on the previous election result. This is assumption is strong and is, as we
will show later on, empirically most likely not accurate, see section 4.3.
4.2. RELATION TO LITERATURE ON TACTICAL VOTING 149
However, this approach relies on the assumptions that voting decisions are
completely determined by observables and on the accurateness of the answers
when survey data are exploited. Both suppositions seem to be rather unlikely
to be fulfilled in reality. Also, they typically rely on a measure of closeness
of the electoral race in a constituency, it is however unclear how voters form
expectations. Our paper contributes to this problem, as it allows us to make
statements how sophisticated voters form their expectations. We find some
evidence that they are not purely backward–looking, but more sophisticated.
The direct approach exploits survey data, mainly the British Election
Study, which provides pre- and post-election survey data, including questions
on the effective vote, the first choice party, or the reason for voting (and
whether it was explicitly cast for tactical purposes). Studies using the British
Election Survey typically find that around 5% to 10% of voters cast their
ballot strategically. Fisher (2000) for example estimates that around 5%
in 1987, 7.7% in 1992 and 8.5% in 1997 voted insincerely. These numbers
also suggest that tactical voting has slightly increased in the last decades.
See also Duch and Palmer (2002), Heath and Evans (1994), Niemi, Written,
and Franklin (1992) and Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin (1993) for studies
using the direct approach. However, survey studies face numerous difficulties,
which may be particularly problematic in the study of tactical voting. First,
answers to questions on tactical voting may be affected by the well-known
recall bias in political surveys, which systematically advantages the winning
parties, see Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale (1978) and Eubank and
Gow (1983). In a situation with two major parties, this bias could exaggerate
the number of tactical voters in their favor. Second, survey questions on
tactical voting may be affected by a social desirability bias. There is extensive
evidence that tactical voting is seen as socially undesirable (or even unethical)
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by some voters. Hence there may be incentives to conceal a tactical vote, see
Galbraith and Nicol (1989). Finally, if voters cast their vote strategically,
they can also be strategic in their answers to political surveys. Meirowitz
(2005) shows that tactical considerations can also lead to misdeclaration of
preferences in polls. If respondents perceive political surveys in a similar way
as polls, they may well choose to answer tactically. They could, for example,
hide that they voted tactically to prop up the proportion of voters for their
first-choice party. These problems cast doubt on the validity of surveys that
ask voters to truthfully reveal their intentions.7
The third approach infers patterns of strategic voting from aggregate level
electoral data. Particularly it involves estimating vote swings on a district
level, for example using “flow of vote matrices”, from which tactical voting
patterns are deduced. See for instance McCarthy and Ryan (1977) and Up-
ton (1978) for early transition probability estimates (although they do not
consider tactical voting in particular). Johnston and Pattie (1992) estimate
“flow of the vote matrices” for the British elections of 1983 and 1987. The
find some evidence for tactical voting and that it was strongest in marginal
constituencies. See also Fieldhouse, Pattie, and Johnston (1996) and John-
ston, Pattie, MacAllister, Rossiter, Dorling, and Tunstall (1997). Galbraith
and Nicol (1989) uses electoral results and demographic information on the
constituencies to check whether similar electorates voted differently depend-
ing on the relative position of the contenders at the last election. They also
conclude that there are empirical indications for strategic voting. However,
7See also Wright (1990), Wright (1992) and Atkeson (1999) regarding vote misreporting
issues and Alvarez and Nagler (2000) who provide more detailed critique of the empiri-
cal tactical voting literature. Blais, Young, and Turcotte (2005) discuss advantages and
disadvantages of both approaches in more detail.
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this approach naturally runs into the “ecological inference problem” (King,
1997), which refers to the problem of deducing micro–level behavior from
macro–level data. In general the usefulness of aggregate level data for indi-
vidual level inference is at least questionable.
This paper is different from other papers in that it cannot be classified
under one of the three categories mentioned above. We do not rely on survey
data but solely on actual vote choices. Moreover our approach does neither
build on modeling vote choices accurately using available observable charac-
teristics nor on ecological regressions. Instead we nonparametrically estimate
the change in vote shares between two parties as a function of the previous
election result using constituency level data. This technique allows us to
avoid all detriments of the common three main approaches for measuring
tactical voting.8 We see our approach as complimentary and not as a re-
placement for others. It allows us to study expectation formation of British
voters since we are able to compare the plotted estimates under different
expectation formation assumptions.
Although it has been widely recognized that people’s expectations about
election outcomes play a vital role in determining strategic behavior, it has
not been studied more closely until now. Research in this area usually takes
past election results as best guess for future results in order to determine
marginal constituencies in the upcoming election.9 It is however doubtful
whether this is in fact the best description of the average voter’s behavior.
We will discuss that issue in more detail in the next section. One of the
few studies that looks more closely into this is Lago (2008). He uses survey
8As mentioned before, our approach needs a distinct identification assumption and
comes at the cost of not allowing for point estimates. We will go more into detail in the
next section.
9See Alvarez and Nagler (2000) for example.
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data from Spain to retrieve information on political knowledge and concludes
that people mainly form their expectations about political outcomes using
heuristics. Hence voters do not seem to be completely sophisticated and
forward–looking. Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato (1994) provide a study of ex-
pectation formation among British voters. Among other things, they find
that voters do not seem to be fully sophisticated when forming their expec-
tation. Looking at 1988 Canadian election, Blais and Bodet (2006) conclude
that voters form their expectations based on “on the basis of both ‘objec-
tive’ contextual information and their own personal preferences” (Blais and
Bodet, 2006, p.488). Lastly, Meffert, Huber, Gschwend, and Pappi (2011)
look at multiparty systems in Germany and Austria to investigate which fac-
tors determine the quality and precision of the expectation of the electorate.
4.3 A New Approach to Identify Tactical Vot-
ing
4.3.1 Empirical Strategy and Voters’ Subjective Be-
liefs in Election Outcomes
Voters willing to consider a tactical vote face a key problem: they have to
identify the constituencies where switching from a sincere vote to a tactical
vote is desirable and those where it is not necessary or even counterproduc-
tive. Hence, voters’ information and beliefs about election outcomes play a
key role. Typically, tactical votes should be concentrated in constituencies
identified by the voters as marginal where the effect of a tactical vote for a
better placed party is most likely to have an impact.
This fact underlies our empirical strategy. The set of constituencies which
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are marginal in one general election is not necessarily the same in the subse-
quent election. Between two elections, the national variations in popularity
of the two main parties affect their winning chances in each constituency.
When the governing party suffers from low popularity, previously safe con-
stituencies are in danger of falling to the opposition. This is indeed the
situation which the Labour party faced in 2010. After 13 years in govern-
ment, Labour suffered from a drop in popularity with an expected swing in
favor of the Conservative party of around 8%.
When a national swing changes a ‘safe’ into a ‘marginal’ seat, one should
see stronger tactical voting patterns there relative to the previous general
elections. By changing the set of constituencies which are marginal from
one election to the other, a national swing entails an exogenous variation in
“marginality” which we use to identify tactical voting patterns. This also
implies that incentives to tactical voting are exogenously varied between dif-
ferent elections and different constituencies and hence can be used to identify
tactical voting patterns. This change in incentives helps to alleviate concerns
that we only identify changes in tactical voting from one election to the other.
We should observe that new marginal seats exhibit stronger patterns of
tactical voting than in previous elections, with third party voters partly opt-
ing for their second best option. We use nonparametric local polynomial
regression to plot the change in vote shares between 2005 and 2010 as a
function of the 2005 Labour/ Conservative (Liberal Democratic/ Conserva-
tive respectively) vote share difference. Moreover, there may be several ways
for voters to form beliefs about which constituencies are marginal or not.
Our nonparametric approach allows us to examine which ones are considered
to be marginals and which ones not by voters. This information can then be
used to test for several layers of sophistication of voters when forming beliefs
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about the likely results of the election in their constituency.
4.3.2 The Different Types of Voter Sophistication
A voter willing to know whether his or her constituency is a marginal one
faces a non trivial problem. There are several ways for voters to form a belief
about the marginality of their own constituency. We consider four different
ways, which can intuitively be understood as nested information sets – from
the smallest set to the largest.
First of all, tactical voters could be naively backward–looking and sim-
ply form their beliefs based on the previous election outcome. In this case,
tactical voting would be worthwhile in constituencies that have been closely
contested in 2005. Although this might seem naive initially, the voting guides
published by the Mirror and the Independent were constructed exactly in this
way.
Second, a more sophisticated technique would include some forward–
looking information and add to the previous electoral results a forecast of
the national vote swing. Such an approach would require the inclusion of na-
tional opinion polls to make a forecast. Whilst this technique is quite coarse,
it was at the core of the very popular “swingometers” on which media and
parties extensively relied during the campaign to forecast the makeup of the
next parliament. For this reason, we can suspect that many voters who are
interested in a tactical ballot relied on a uniform swing assumption to form
their expectations of the local results. Indeed in Section 4.3.3 we present con-
vincing empirical support that voters use the uniform swing prediction and
not the backward–looking approach to inform themselves about the potential
closeness of the electoral race in their corresponding constituency.
Third, an even more elaborated voter could add more local information
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to form expectations about election results in her constituency. Specific
recent relevant political events in a constituency, such as a scandal affecting
the reelection of the incumbent MP and so on are of course relevant pieces
of information. To consider these very well informed voters, we use data
from betting markets. There is clear evidence that betting markets are very
well able to aggregate available information, see Arrow et al. (2008) and
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) for instance. This is so because well informed
market participants have more incentives to bet and therefore will have an
impact on the odds. During the campaign, bookmaker offered odds for all the
major parties in each constituency. These odds aggregate all available (local)
information in addition to the national forecasts. We will use these odds as a
proxy for a well–informed forecast by a sophisticated voter. Betting is quite
popular in the UK and it seems reasonable to assume that a sophisticated
voter could use betting odds to form expectations about the likely result in
a constituency.
Fourth, one could consider the unlikely possibility that voters had per-
fect information – or, alternatively, that they had perfect expectations (Hicks,
1939), such that they were able to anticipate ex–ante which constituencies
would end up being the closest in the final results. We examine this consid-
eration in Section 4.3.6. Maybe not surprisingly, this assumption does not
seem to be a realistic one.
4.3.3 Backward–looking Approach and Uniform Swing
Prediction
It seems reasonable to assume that voters might use a uniform swing model
to form expectations about the closeness of the race in their constituency. As
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Results and Polls Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats Others
Share Swing Share Swing Share Swing Share Swing
2005 Results 33.2% – 36.1% – 22.6% – 8.0% –
Average Prediction 36.3% 3.1% 28% −8.1% 27% 4.4% 8.7% 0.7%
2010 Results 36.1% 2.9% 29.0% −7.1% 23% 0.4% 11.9% 3.9%
Table 4.1: Actual election results and predictions averaged for three different
opinion poll companies (Polls of Polls, ComRes and ICM), published on the
Election Day.
mentioned before, it is assumed that changes in party vote shares will occur
homogeneously across the country. Although this might not be completely
realistic, it seems at least to be a simple and effective way to predict the
results. Backward–looking voters can be seen as using a specific case of the
uniform swing where the expected swing is zero. The seats with close results
in the previous elections are then the one considered as marginals in the
current election.
Most of the discussions about tactical voting were aimed at Labour and
Liberal Democrat voters aiming to vote against the Conservatives. We
therefore restrict our analysis to constituencies where either the Labour
or the Liberal Democrats were the main opponents of the Conservatives
– Labour/Conservative and Liberal Democrats/Conservatives seats. In or-
der to study the marginal seats, we select all seats where the corresponding
main two parties are expected to be close according to the opinion polls
before the election. We also eliminated seats which could be considered as
three-way marginals, where the third party was quite close from the sec-
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ond party.10 We are left with 255 Labour/Conservatives and 126 Liberal
Democrats/Conservatives constituencies. Table 4.1 displays the changes in
party vote shares that could be deduced from the last opinion polls before
election day.
Since there was a change in constituencies between 2005 and 2010, we
use the notional results of 2005 of the new constituencies, which were esti-
mated for the Press Association, BBC, ITN and Sky News by Rallings and
Thrasher (2007). All media used these results during the campaign in order
to quantify the evolution of political forces in the UK. Those notional results
estimated the shares the different parties would have obtained in 2005 in
each constituency given the new 2010 boundaries.11
Our approach to identify tactical voting relies on estimating nonpara-
metrically the change in vote shares between 2005 and 2010 for the three
parties for each constituency as a function of the 2005 difference in Labour–
Conservative vote shares (Liberal Democrat–Conservative respectively). This
will allow us to study the relation between the (expected) tightness of the
race and tactical voting behavior as well as to examine which information
voters used to form their expectations. We use local linear regressions and a
bandwidth selected by cross validation (Stone, 1974) to estimate this relation-
ship. Figure 4.1 displays these estimations with additional 95% confidence
intervals for each party.
There are two variants of the uniform swing assumption. The first one
expects marginal constituencies to be those where the Labour party won
with a 11.2-point margin in 2005 (from Table 4.1, the sum of the loss for the
Conservatives and the gain from the Labour is: 3.1 − (−8.1) = 11.2). The
10Details on the selection of constituencies are provided in the appendix.
11We describe in the appendix how these notional results are built.
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second method is even more straightforward. Voters living in a constituency
where the race is between Labour and Conservatives may be concerned with
a swing from Labour to Conservatives only, that is they look purely at the
swing between those two parties regardless of the change in the shares of
other parties. Therefore voters may apply a symmetrical uniform swing to
the two parties. They would then expect Labour to lose 8.1 points and the
Conservatives to exactly gain this amount, and, therefore, tight races where
the Labour won by a 16.2-points margin in 2005. We added vertical lines at
these values in the left panel of Figure 4.1. Strikingly, the extrema of these
curves for Labour and Liberal Democrats are located exactly between the
two lines, that is where expectations based on the uniform swing assumption
predicted a tight race.
For both panels in Figure 4.1 the change in the share of Conservatives does
not seem to depend on the tightness of the electoral race, no matter how tight
the race is expected to be. Instead the Conservatives gained around 4− 5%
irrespective of the 2005 vote share difference relative to the other parties.
On the other hand, for the Labour party and Liberal Democrats there are
clear indications that the changes in voting shares strongly depend on the
tightness of the electoral race as predicted by the uniform swing assumption.
There is a significant change around 10−15 percentage points in favor of the
Labor party at the costs of the liberal parties (left panel).
On the other hand Liberal Democrats seem to profit in constituencies
where they and the Conservatives have been close in 2005 (right panel). A
uniform swing assumption based on the polls would have predicted a tight
race in constituencies where the Conservatives had won by a 1.3-points mar-
gin (4.4 − 3.1) in 2005. And in fact, there seem to be some indications
here that voters switched strategically to the Liberals in these constituen-
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Figure 4.1: Change in vote shares in the Labour vs Conservatives (left) and
Liberal vs Conservatives seats (right), depending on the Labour/Liberal-
Conservative 2005 vote share difference. Local linear regression, bandwidth
selected by cross validation.
cies. However, there is no sign that those who voted for Labour in the
previous election voted tactically to support the Liberal democrats in these
seats, but instead the surplus may come from voters who otherwise would
not have voted. A possible explanation is that voters in these constituen-
cies did not get the same amount of information as in Labour/ Conservative
districts, for example due to smaller media coverage. As a result, whilst
Liberal voters had plenty of opportunities to form expectations about the
marginality of their seat using the uniform swing model, Labour voters in
Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats may have had much less opportunity
to find out in the media whether there was a close race expected in their
seat. A higher degree of uncertainty about the status of their seats may have
induced Labour voters to keep voting sincerely.
These results suggest two things. First, the symmetric evolution of the
changes in vote shares of the Labour and the Liberal Democratic party and
the fact that the vote share of the Conservatives seems to be unaffected by
the expected closeness of the race provides strong evidence for the existence
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of tactical voting. Second, the fact that this pattern appears for constituen-
cies predicted to be marginal by a uniform swing method suggests that voters
were sophisticated enough to do more than just naively use the shares from
the last general election as such. They were forward looking, incorporating
predictions on changes in vote shares to form their expectations. This may
not appear as a big surprise, but we should remember that both The Mir-
ror and The Independent published voting guides that relied on such static
expectations. Both these voting guides selected seats where the Labour had
won by a margin from 0 to 8% in 2005.12 Given that the uniform swing
predicted in the media was around 8%, voting guides should have focused
on seats where the Labour margin was around 8% at the last election. In
practice, many of these voting guides included seats with close results in 2005
and where the results were very unlikely to end up being close in 2010.
4.3.4 The Impact of Newspaper Voting Guides
The results presented before suggest that the media outlets seem to have
failed to identify the constituencies where tactical voting would have been
most effective. For example, out of the 52 Labour/Conservatives constituen-
cies where The Mirror guide recommended that Liberal Democratic partisans
should vote for the Labour party, only five ended up to be won by the Labour
party. Our analysis above points in the same direction: it suggests that vot-
ing guides were probably not driving the voting decision. In the case of the
marginal Labour/Conservatives seats, we are able to examine the effect of
the voting guides published by The Mirror and The Independent in more
detail. This is so because these guides relied on the 2005 differences in vote
12Only those seats where Labour won in the 2005 election by this margin are interesting
because it was predicted that Labour will lose votes in 2010 relative to 2005.
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shares, but did not recommend to vote tactically in exactly the same seats
as the uniform swing assumption suggested to do. The newspaper guides
included constituencies where Labour won by a margin of zero to eight per-
centage points in 2005 and hence typically failed the predict accurately the
close constituencies.
If there was any effect of the voting guide, one should observe a differ-
ence between the constituencies that were included and those which were
not included. To test this, we look at the guide published by The Mirror, a
newspaper which has a large distribution (1.2 million copies in 2010). Be-
sides that, the guide was very similar to the ones from The Independent or
Compass.
Figure 4.2 shows the box plot of the results in the seats included in The
Mirror ’s guide versus those just left out. The constituencies included had
Labour winning by a margin of 4 to 8 percentage points in 2005, while those
not included had the Labour winning by a margin of 8 to 12. There is no
indication of any effect of the guide on this subsample of seats. Labour does
not perform better in the seats included in the guide, and Liberal Democrats
do not perform worse in these seats either. This same result is observed
for The Independent voting guides (The Guardian provided an online voting
guide, which is not available anymore). This suggests that voting guides had
no significant effect on the electoral results.13
The absence of an effect may be due to a failure to reach a large number
of voters. In spite of large circulation numbers, the cumulated figures of
circulation for all the voting guides (1.6 million copies in 2010) are still small
relative to the size of the electorate. Another possible explanation is that
13This is in line with the study by Lanoue and Bowler (1992), who found that the media
did not seem to have a significant influence on tactical voting in 1983 and 1987.
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Figure 4.2: The absence of an effect of the Mirror ’s voting guide. Re-
sults in Labour/Conservatives marginals included in the Mirror guide versus
marginals not included in the Mirror guide. The guide does not statisti-
cally significantly influence the vote share of the Labour party or the Liberal
Democrats.
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the readers of these guides are not significantly influenced by them because
they form their expectations in a more sophisticated way.
4.3.5 Bookmakers’ Predictions
There is a substantial amount of evidence that shows that bookmakers typ-
ically give very accurate estimates of the probabilities for certain future
events14 and in particular of election results (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004).
Bookmakers will try to incorporate all available knowledge, like for example
the relative strength of local candidates, a local political scandal (which might
have been particularly relevant given the large number of MPs involved in
the expenses scandal in 2010) and so on. In that sense, bookmakers’ predic-
tions should be much better on average than the national swing prediction,
which is entirely ignorant of local characteristics.
We collected odds for each constituency from the Ladbrokes website pre-
ceding the elections, around the 30th of April. Out of the 243 Labour/
Conservatives constituencies for which bookies’ data are available, 219 win-
ners have been correctly predicted (slightly overestimating the performance
of the Conservatives: 22 of these mistakes consisted of incorrectly announc-
ing a Conservatives victory). In comparison, over the same 243 seats, static
anticipations gave only 161 correct winners, and forecasts based on the uni-
form swing assumption (translating the shares of all parties) predicted 212
winners correctly. Bookmakers have, therefore, clearly provided the best-
forecast predictions among the different techniques we have considered. A
voter considering to vote tactically could easily use bookmakers’ odds to de-
termine marginal seats. These are the constituencies where two candidates
14See Ali (1979), Pope and Peel (1989), Franck, Verbeek, and Nuesch (2010), Wolfers
and Zitzewitz (2004) and Arrow et al. (2008).
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Figure 4.3: Change in share in the Labour vs Conservatives seats (left) and
Liberal Democrats vs Conservatives seats (right), depending on the winning
probability of Labour given by bookies. Local linear regression, bandwidth
selected by cross validation.
are close to a 50% chance of winning.
We employ the same method as before and plot the changes in vote shares
between 2005 and 2010 as a function of the tightness of the race defined by
the winning probabilities implied by the odds. If voters react tactically to the
marginality of a constituency, we should observe an increase in the Labour’s
vote share peaking at 50%.
The left panel of Figure 4.3 displays the corresponding results for Labour/
Conservative constituencies. The Conservatives’ change in vote share is here
again independent of the winning probability as defined by bookmakers odds.
Strikingly, we do observe an increase in the change in Labour’s and a decrease
in the Liberal Democrats vote share around the 50% limit. However, the peak
and dip are much less pronounced than using the uniform swing predictions in
Section 4.3.3. Bookmakers predictions are however highly correlated with the
uniform national swing predicted by the polls and hence the results might
be partly confounded. Interestingly, there is no such peak for the Liberal
Democratic votes in Liberal Democrats/Conservatives seats (right panel),
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which seems to support the conclusions from Section 4.3.3. All in all, this
seems again to provide some indications for the presence of tactical voting,
but it also suggests that voters mainly used the uniform swing predictions
to determine marginal constituencies. Again it is mainly the Labour party
that profits from tactical voting behavior and not so much the Liberals.
4.3.6 Perfect Predictions: Using the 2010 Results
Finally, another possibility is that voters form perfect expectations and cor-
rectly predict which seats will be the closest. Using the same method as
before, it is possible to look at changes in vote shares as a function of the
2010 differences between Labour and Conservatives (Lib-Dem/Conservatives
respectively). This is problematic in the sense that seats that happened to
experience a positive shock on Labour (or Lib-Dems respectively) votes will
mechanically tend to be higher in the 2010 results. As a consequence, the
fitted curve of the changes in share for Labour should tend to increase, while
the curves from the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats will tend to
decrease. Nevertheless, this exercise can still be informative since we are able
to check for peaks or dips in the estimated curves, which would be an indica-
tion for tactical voting and for the fact that people might do extremely well
in predicting election results. The left panel of Figure 4.4 shows that there
are clearly no signs for such a behavior in the data. The right panel – the
Liberal Democrats/Conservatives constituencies – exhibits some minor vari-
ations in close seats, but it is actually the reverse from what tactical voting
would suggest, with the Conservatives experiencing a peak relative to 2005
results in precisely those seats that ended up being close in 2010. Overall, it
is clear that voters do not seem to be characterized by perfect expectations,
a result that seems reasonable after all.
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Figure 4.4: Changes in the share in Labour vs. Conservatives seats
(left) and Liberal vs. Conservatives seats (right), depending on the
Labour/Liberal/Conservative 2010 vote share difference. Local linear re-
gression, bandwidth selected by cross validation.
4.4 Strategic Campaign Spending
We attributed the increase in votes for the Labour party in close constituen-
cies (as predicted by the uniform swing model) to tactical voting. However,
party spending that is targeted towards close constituencies might be an-
other causal mechanism that is able to explain the observed patterns. In
that case the data would simply reflect increased (financial) effort by the
two dominating parties. Although previous studies have found only limited
evidence for tactical voting to be induced by party spending (Galbraith and
Nicol, 1989; Johnston, Pattie, MacAllister, Rossiter, Dorling, and Tunstall,
1997; Fisher, 2001), we examine this potential mechanism here more closely.
Rather than explaining the observed pattern with party spending, research
on that matter has suggested that party spending interacts with tactical vot-
ing behavior, helping to trigger or to moderate it (Fieldhouse, Pattie, and
Johnston, 1996; Pattie and Johnston, 2010).
We investigate here whether party spending followed the same patterns
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as the variations in the parties’ shares. We employ detailed data from the
British Electoral Commission summarizing party spending data at the con-
stituency level. Figure 4.5 displays total party spending during the campaign
for a period from January 1 to May 6 2010 of Conservatives, Labour and
Liberal Democrats in the marginal Labour/Conservatives seats as function
of the 2005–2010 vote share difference between Labour and Conservatives
in the top left panel. The same graphs are depicted in the top right panel
whereas campaign spending is restricted to the short term period (starting
on April the 13th). The two vertical lines indicate the interval in which
a uniform swing prediction identified the marginal constituencies to be lo-
cated. The two bottom panels of Figure 4.5 display campaign spending and
bookmakers winning probabilities.
Spending of both, Labour Party and Conservatives, peaks in districts
where Conservatives gained around 5% to 10% in the 2010 elections and
hence does not exactly fit a uniform swing model. Thus spending is also not
maximal between 10% and 15% where we observe tactical voting.
The lower panels in Figure 4.5 also clearly show that both parties did not
opted for spending strategies that coincide with the bookmakers predictions,
as their total spending peaked for seats where the winning probability for
Labour was only estimated at 33% on average. Restricting the sample to
the short campaign (lower right panel) tends to make the distribution of
spending even uniform across constituencies.
Overall, the data suggest that political parties tried to target marginal
seats, but did so somewhat imperfectly (if we define marginals using a uni-
form national swing or bookies’ odds). In addition, the data does not support
the idea that voters simply “follow the money” of the political parties. No-
ticeably, there is no peak for the Conservative vote share in the seats where
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Figure 4.5: Total party spending (left–hand side panels) and spending during
the short campaign (right–hand side panels) of Conservatives, Labour and
Liberal Democrats in the Labour/Conservatives constituencies, depending
on the Labour/Conservatives 2005 vote share difference (top panels), and
the winning probability of Labour given by bookmakers (bottom panels).
Local linear regression, bandwidth selected by cross validation.
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their spending peaks. Overall, the Conservative gains seem to be quite in-
sensitive to the amount of money spent for campaigning.15 This absence of
effect could either mean that Conservatives’ spending had no effect or that
it was balanced by Labour’s spending, resulting in a wasteful ‘arms race’.
This does not necessarily mean that party spending does not matter for
tactical voting. Conceptually, the line between the effect of party spending
and tactical voting is a subtle one. First, even if campaign spending is unable
to change voters’ preferences it can play an important role in signaling the
closeness of the race to the voters in their constituencies. A large pecuniary
effort by a party in one constituency could transmit the information that
there is close race expected, and thus that tactical voting might considered
to be worthwhile. In this situation, investments by the Conservative party
could even be counterproductive. Second, a party could use its budget to
run a political campaign targeted at promoting tactical voting.
4.5 Controlling for Third Parties’ Distance
from Contention
Conventional wisdom (but also some empirical studies, see for example Cain
(1978)) suggests that tactical voting is highest in seats that are closely con-
tested. In contrast to that, Myatt (2007) in a recent study puts another
argument forward. He argues that once the distance from contention of
the third party is controlled for, tactical voting should be largest in seats
where the leading party has the greatest advantage against the runner-up
(see Proposition 6 in Myatt (2007)). Myatt’s arguments is that is not the
15This is in line with recent conjectures that the Conservatives are less effective in
campaigning, see Pattie and Johnston (2010) for example.
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marginality per se that is relevant for tactical voting and that it is necessary
to control for the role of the distance from contention of the third party.
Assuming for instance a constituency where Conservatives are expected to
gain 30% of the votes and Labour 28%, tactical voting behaviour of Liberal-
Demoratic partisans will differ depending on whether the Liberal Democrats
can expect to gather 10% or 27% of the electoral votes.
As a third contribution, this paper tests the interesting and somewhat
counterintuitive prediction of Myatt’s (2007) model regarding the impor-
tance of tactical voting in marginal constituencies.16 Until now, we simply
restricted our sample to constituencies where the third party was sufficiently
behind relative to the second party in order to avoid these problems.17 We
estimate a general additive model (Breiman and Friedman, 1985) to control
non-parametrically for both the closeness of the race and for the distance
from contention. The vote share vP2010 of a party P in 2010 is specified as the
sum of two non-linear and unknown functions, m1 and m2, of the tightness
of the race, t, and the distance from contention of the third party in 2005, c:
vP2010 = m1(t2005) +m2(c2005) + ε , (4.1)
where ε is a random error term.
Figure 4.6 displays the results for the Labour/Conservatives constituen-
cies. Visual inspection of the graph indicates that the results are in line
with those from Section 4.3. Tactical voting still appears to be prevalent
in marginal seats, even after controlling for distance from contention. Be-
16Using a logit model to control for distance from contention of the third party, Fisher
(2000) analyzes survey data from the British Election study and found some support for
Myatt’s prediction for the years 1983 and 1987, but not for 1992 and 1997.
17Please consult the Appendix for more details on the sample selection.
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Figure 4.6: Additive model estimation. Change in vote shares as a function
of Labor/Conservative vote share differences after controlling for distance
from contention.
yond the marginals, tactical voting seems to be lower in seats dominated
by the Conservatives. This result contradicts the predictions of the model
that tactical voting should increase with the winning margin of the Conser-
vatives. Relative to Fisher’s (2000) estimations, our estimation strategy has
the advantage that it imposes only minimal identifying assumptions on the
data generating process (separable additivity). Hence, our results support
the commonly held view that tactical voting is likely to be maximal in seats
that are tightly contested. In fact, it is also stronger in marginals that are
defined with a uniform swing model.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
We contribute to the literature on tactical voting in four different ways. First
of all, we propose a novel simple empirical strategy to identify tactical vot-
ing. This method is based on the visual inspection of the nonparametrically
estimated relationship between the change in vote shares between two elec-
tions and the difference in vote shares between the two major contesters in
a certain district. We see our method as useful and flexible addition to the
existing methods. As such, this approach is of general importance and appli-
cable in all similar situations. It also avoids the disadvantages of the previous
methods. Applying this approach to the 2010 British general election, we find
that tactical voting was likely playing a significant role. Moreover, it seems
that mainly those voters who voted for the Liberals in the preceding elections
are prone to tactical voting, but not so much those who voted for the Labour
party beforehand.
Secondly, this paper sheds some light on how voters form their expecta-
tions about election outcomes. Our method allows us to compare different
information acquisition approaches. We find that voters seem to calculate
expected closeness of seats mainly using a uniform swing model and not so
much from newspaper voting guides. Our results therefore suggest a “partly
sophisticated rational” voter (as opposed to a “sophisticated rational” voter
who would rather follow bookies predictions or even perfect forecasts and
opposed to a naive voter who is purely backward–looking).
Thirdly, we add to the literature on campaign spending by political par-
ties. We have shown that parties try to target marginal constituency with
their campaign spending, but are far from effective in doing so. We also pre-
sented some evidence that the Conservative party is particularly inefficient
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in the use of its money. In general voters do not seem to be overly influenced
by campaigning effort of the parties.
Last but not least, we empirically test a prediction of the theory of tacti-
cal voting as our approach allow us to test and reject the claim that strategic
voting should be higher in constituencies where the Conservatives have the
highest vote edge once distance from contention is controlled for. We es-
timated a general additive model that explicitly controls for this distance.
This supports our findings from the sections before – we still find that tactical
voting seems to be most likely at close races.
Finally, what can our results bring to the debate on the electoral reform
in Britain? Whilst the Gibbard- Satterthwaite theorem states that there
cannot be a strategy–proof voting system, it is hard in practice to compare
how different systems would fare in regards to that matter. The propor-
tion of voters choosing to vote strategically depends on the distribution of
preferences and the relative positions of the candidates in the political space.
Empirical comparative research on alternative voting (AV) and First-
past-the-post (FPTP) is relatively limited. Although tactical voting is gen-
erally associated with FPTP systems, it is well known that tactical voting is
also possible with AV (Niemi, 1984). However, Bartholdi and Orlin (1991)
find that the class of single transferable vote (STV) voting rules, to which AV
belongs, should be more resistant to tactical voting as they are characterized
by a higher degree of complexity for those voters looking for a tactical vote
option. As it happens, in Australia, that uses the alternative vote system,
the proportion of tactical voting has been estimated to be much smaller than
in Britain (Gschwend, 2004).
In relation to this debate, our results seem to indicate that voters (or
at least some of them) are sophisticated, but that they primarily use rather
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coarse information sets (like the uniform swing mode) to make predictions.
As an argument in favor of AV is made on the ground of its complexity,
the degree of sophistication of the electorate matters. With a “somewhat
sophisticated” electorate, for which we find some empirical evidence here,
FPTP may be easy enough for people to use public information to define
a tactical voting strategy. Under the AV system, such voters may find it
too hard to come up with the right tactical voting strategy. In that sense,
our results suggest that AV could reduce the proportion of tactical voting
by putting such an option out of reach for most voters. Nevertheless, much




from the European Agricultural
Reform
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Abstract1
This paper develops a method to estimate information rents –
the difference between the actual compensation and the true will-
ingness to accept – of losers of a reform who receive a monetary
compensation. Our method explicitly accounts for survey respon-
dents’ reluctance to reveal a willingness to accept which is smaller
than the actual compensation. We apply our approach to the case
of the 2005 European agricultural reform using uniquely gathered
survey data from farmers in Lower Saxony, Germany. We find
empirical indications for strategic misreporting. Correcting for
these effects with a structural model, we find that information
rents are in the order of up to 15 per cent of total compensa-
tion paid. Moreover, we show that the reform could not have
been implemented distinctly cheaper by conditioning compensa-
tion schemes on observable factors.
1This is co-authored work with Hans Peter Gru¨ner.
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5.1 Introduction
Reforms creating huge welfare gains may fail when they face substantial
opposition of special interest groups (see for example Boeri, Bo¨rsch-Supan,
and Tabellini (2002), Drazen (1996), Saint-Paul (2000), Rodrik (1996) and
Rodrik (1993)). In principle, it should be possible to compensate losers of
such reforms if the gains of the winners are large enough. However, losses are
often distributed unevenly and they may also be private information. In this
case, information rents – the difference between the actual compensation and
the true willingness to accept (WTA) – of reform–losers are an obstacle to
any compensation. If the information rents are large enough, compensating
enough reform losers may turn out to be too costly and hence even welfare
enhancing reforms may fail.2 In this paper we estimate information rents that
arise when policy makers are not informed about how individuals expect to
be affected by a reform. For this purpose, we develop a method to estimate
political information rents of losers of a reform, which explicitly accounts for
the reluctance of reform winners to reveal their willingness to accept.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we derive a method to
estimate the distribution of political information rents based on survey data
related to the 2005 European agricultural reform. During this reform the
European agricultural subsidies were shifted away from payments bounded
to quantities produced to flat payments. This reform was efficiency enhanc-
ing in the sense that prices for agricultural products are now closer to their
distortion–free market price. In order to estimate the aggregate size of infor-
2A different reason for the failure of reforms has been studied by Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991). In their paper individual uncertainty about reform outcomes potentially consti-
tutes an obstacle to successful reform implementation. The role of information rents in
labor market reforms has been theoretically studied by Gru¨ner (2002).
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mation rents we collected unique survey data from more than 300 farmers in
Lower-Saxony, Germany. The main problem that one is facing in this context
is that winners’ and losers’ response rates may differ in the sense that reform
profiteers are more reluctant to reveal their willingness to accept than losers.
In fact the survey data we collected exhibits exactly this characteristic. We
show how one can tackle this problem: we ask people about their willingness
to accept in a two step procedure. First, we ask a yes-no question about
whether the respondent belongs to the group of reform losers or winners -
where non-responses do not seem to be a matter of concern – and, in a sec-
ond question, we ask for the exact amount in monetary units. Based on this
information, we then develop a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate
the distribution of the willingness to accept that explicitly takes this into ac-
count. This estimator is derived from a utility function which assumes that
people dislike both, lying and harming their fellow farmers by stating a low
WTA. Then, we structurally estimate this model and make inference about
the empirical distribution of losses and gains. Applying this method to the
survey data we gathered, we show that substantial information rents of up
to 15 per cent of total compensation have been paid to European farmers
during the 2005 agricultural reform. We also find some empirical support for
strategic misreporting, which we account for in our estimations.
Second, we study whether it would have been theoretically possible to
implement the reform in a less expensive way by conditioning compensation
packages on observable or unobservable characteristics of farmers and their
farms. We find that it is unlikely that public expenses could have been
reduced substantially by conditioning compensation packages on observable
characteristics ex-ante.
Our paper points out that the European Union has been successful in
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compensating its farmers for the 2005 agricultural reform. This is why we
believe that this reform may serve as the blueprint for other reforms in the
future. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides some theoretical
background, Section 5.3 describes the agricultural reform of 2005 in more
detail, depicts how the survey was practically implemented and presents the
data we collected in more detail. In Section 5.4 political information rents
are structurally estimated using a simple survey response model. Section 5.5
presents some robustness checks including nonparametric methods where we
show that our estimates do not critically depend on the assumptions made
in the Section before. Section 5.6 demonstrates to what extent verifiable
information could have been used to reduce the information rents based on
the European agricultural reform and Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Background
Estimating the distribution of information rents is useful because this dis-
tribution is key in determining whether it is possible to compensate enough
reform losers. Consider for example the case where a government knows that
a specific reform creates gains of 1.2 billion euros and losses of only 1 bil-
lion euros for a specific interest group with 1000 members. Assume that the
government could use the entire gains to uniformly compensate those who
lose from the reform. Moreover, assume that, say, 60 percent of the members
of this interest group have to be satisfied in order to get enough support
for the reform. The average loss of an interest group member is 1 million
euros. However, paying 1 million euros to each member may not always be
successful. If the distribution of losses is such that 60 percent of the interest
group members lose 1.25 million euros while the others only lose 625.000
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euros then it is impossible to buy the support of all interest group members
with a uniform payment.
More generally, consider the case where a fraction β of the – politically
organized – losers of a reform have to be compensated in order to get the
approval of their interest group. Moreover, assume that there is a maximum
amount G which is available for the compensation of each reform loser. Call
F (θ) the known cumulative distribution function of the losses θ. In order to
buy the support of a fraction β of the reform losers, all reform losers have
to be given the amount x satisfying β ≤ F (x). In this case, all individuals
with a smaller willingness to accept, θ < x, get a rent r = x− θ. Figure 5.1
describes a case where the amount G is insufficient to fully compensate the
fraction β = 0.6 of reform-losers even though the average aggregate losses θ¯
are smaller than G. Hence, a compensation becomes too expensive when the
information rents are high. If instead F (θ) is skewed such as in Figure 5.2, a
compensation is theoretically still possible. This illustrates the importance
of knowing the distribution of losses when a certain policy issue shall be
implemented.
The possibility to compensate reform losers can be evaluated more eas-
ily in the special case where a simple majority of reform-losers has to be
compensated. This case is relevant when reform losers are organized in an
interest group and use majority voting to settle their internal conflicts. A
reform increases the overall surplus if the aggregate gains G exceed the aver-
age loss of reform losers, θ¯. In the case where a simple majority is required,
a reform is politically feasible if the median of the distribution of types is
not smaller than its mean. If the distribution of types is symmetric, this
condition is always fulfilled. Therefore, empirical support for symmetry of
the distribution of losses implies that an efficiency enhancing reform should
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Figure 5.1: Example of a reform that is going to fail if 60% of the reform
losers need to be compensated.
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Figure 5.2: Example of a reform that is going to be successfully implemented
if 60% need to be compensated.
5.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 183
always be politically feasible.
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5.3 The Reform
5.3.1 The EU Agricultural Reform of 2005
The European agricultural reform of 2005 seems to be a textbook example
of a political innovation that most economists would consider to be efficiency
enhancing. This is of interest in its own, but is also particularly relevant in
our context since it gives us a unique setting to study ex–post an efficiency
enhancing reform that was successfully implemented. As mentioned before,
the reform included a renunciation of subsidies bounded to quantities in favor
of flat payments by area. This Section explains the reform in more detail.
The “Luxembourger Decrees” or “Mid-term Review”, that entered into
force at the first of January 2005, were the last decree of a series of market
orientated reforms, starting with the MacSharry reform in 1992. The re-
form was conducted within the “Common Agricultural Policy” (CAP) of the
European Union, which is the European agricultural policy system. In the
30 years before 1992 the CAP was characterized by direct interventions in
markets of agricultural products, for example through buy outs, intervention
prices and export subsidies. This practice created high excess supply and
costs for European tax payers.
Although the share of agricultural subsidies at the total budget of the Eu-
ropean Union has steadily fallen in the last two decades from about 60% to
slightly more than 40%, the agricultural spending is with approximately 55
billion euros per annum still by far the largest position in the European Union
budget.3 The key aspect of the reform was the replacement of output- and
quantity-oriented agricultural subsidies by a flat premium, paid per hectare
3See for example the homepage of the European Commission at
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/graphs .
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cultivated. From an efficiency point of view this is a desirable adjustment
of agricultural politics since the incentives to overproduction are minimized
and prices of agricultural products will be closer to their distortion-free equi-
librium level.
There are minor differences in the way the post-reform subsidies (that is
the flat payments) are calculated on the national level in different member
states. In general there are two main approaches, the “farm model”4 in which
the premium from 2013 onwards depends on farm specific characteristics
evaluated in the reference period 2000 to 2002 and can as a consequence
slightly vary from farm to farm. The second one is the so–called regional
model where the payments from 2013 onwards only vary across regions (in
case of Germany, the“Regional Model”). The latter model is implemented
in Germany.5 In the case of Lower-Saxony we know that the flat premium
amounts to 352 euros per hectare and year from 2013 on.6
The “Mid-term Review” reform consists of three cornerstones. The first
is “Decoupling”, which means that all agricultural direct payments and pay-
ments for livestock and area and so on are from 2013 onwards subsumed in
one common flat subsidy. The amount paid in Lower–Saxony as of 2013 is
as mentioned above 352 euros per year and hectare cultivated and is thus
independent of the quantity produced.7 The decoupling became effective at
4In the case of Germany, this model is called “Betriebsmodell”.
5For more information, see the official Journal of the German Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (2006), Rohwer (2010) and Henning and
Nord (2004).
6See the official note of the German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Con-
sumer Protection: “Regionale Zielwerte im Rahmen der Betriebspra¨mienregelung”, Bun-
desministerium fu¨r Erna¨hrung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz, February 2010.”
7As mentioned before, this premium can vary slightly from state to state, but will not
be distinctly different from 352.
186 CHAPTER 5. POLITICAL INFORMATION RENTS
the first of January 2005, but it is not until 2013 when the system is fully
reorganized. During that period the total amount of subsidies a farm has
received per hectare in 2004 is linearly adjusted to the target level of 352
euros per hectare in 2013, with yearly changing adjustment factors.8
The second cornerstone is “Cross-compliance”. It implies that payments
are bounded to the compliance with ecological, animal–welfare and quality
regulations. Moreover, the entire area under cultivation needs to be main-
tained in a “good ecological and agricultural condition”.
The third major change in the European agricultural policy, called “Mod-
ulation and Degression”, denotes the shift of payments from the first pillar
(which supports production and market measures) to the second pillar (which
is concerned with rural development and ecology). Modulation also encom-
passes the deduction of overall payments by five per cent until 2007.
Although the change in policies does not involve a significant reduction
in the European Agricultural budget (except the five per cent deduction
mentioned above), the reform can be considered as social efficiency enhancing
in the sense that flat payments do not create market distortions and thus
it should theoretically be possible to redistribute the surplus in a Pareto
improving way. The payments of 352 euros as of 2013 can be thought of as
a compensation to the farmers to break their opposition against the reform.
As mentioned before, the reform entered into force at the beginning of 2005,
but it will take until 2013 to complete the process. This implies that the
adjustment process was on-going while we collected the survey data and
thus recall of relevant information was as well as in any way possible. This
8The payment is a linear combination of the 2004 and the 2013 payment, with weights
wt on the 2004 value equal to 1 between 2005 and 2009 and w2010 = 0.9, w2011 = 0.7,
w2012 = 0.4 and w2013 = 0. See Henning and Nord (2004) for more details.
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gives us an almost ideal setting to study the willingness to pay and the value
of private information in reform processes.
5.3.2 The Survey
In order to study this reform in more detail, we conducted a comprehensive
survey among farmers starting in October 2011 to February 2012 in Lower
Saxony, the second largest state in Germany as measured by area. We not
only asked farmers directly for their willingness to accept (WTA) the reform,
the core of the survey, but also asked a battery of demographic and socio-
economic questions and technical and financial data of their farm.9 For data
privacy reasons we had to ensure the anonymity of the participants and thus,
sometimes had to summarize answers in categories (especially for precarious
questions such as those for subsidies and the size of the area cultivated). The
aim of the survey was first of all to elicit individual’s WTA and secondly, to
retrieve factors that could potentially impact on it. For example, we asked for
the number of children that are potentially willing to take over the farm and
we asked whether the farm is in family possession and if so, for how long. We
conjectured beforehand that these factors might influence the farmers WTA
in one way or another.
The questionnaire was divided into three larger sections. In the first part
we asked people about their attitudes towards and experiences with agricul-
tural subsidies, but also about the amount of subsidies they received in 2011.
We asked them how farmers judge the impact of the 2005 reform for them-
selves but also for all other farmers. The two key questions in the survey are
question six where we ask whether they are personally better or worse off
9An English version of the questionnaire can be found in the appendix, the original
German version is available upon request.
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after the reform of 2005 (a yes – no question) and – question seven or eight
– by how much in monetary terms. The “winner or loser” question is an im-
portant building block when we estimate the distribution of losses, since this
question was answered by virtually everybody (as opposed to the question
where we asked for the concrete WTA). Section 5.4 describes the method in
more detail. In the second part of the survey, we gathered detailed informa-
tion on the farm from an agricultural and technical perspective. For example
we asked how large the area is the farmer tills, what products exactly the
farms produced and in which order of importance (in terms of revenue), the
number of employees, whether and for how long the farm is family property,
the quality of the soil and how many children the farmers has who would
be willing to take over the farm later. The last part was about personal
and demographic factors such as age, sex, education, religion and political
attitudes. All in all the questionnaire included 34 questions.
All questions were closely coordinated with the “Landwirtschaftskammer
Niedersachsen“ (LWK), which is the official agency of farmers in Lower Sax-
ony and is commissioned with the assistance and support of its members in
legal and administrative issues in its jurisdiction. It supervises more than
50, 000 farmers in Lower Saxony. Membership in the corresponding LWK is
compulsory for all farmers in Germany. The LWK was also delivering up the
questionnaires to the farmers.
Concretely, the survey was conducted as follows. We sent the question-
naire to the central department of the LWK in Hannover, Lower Saxony.
From there it was spread randomly to its subbranches, where consultants of
the LWK were asked to take the survey with them once they were about to
visit one or more farms. A consultant visits the clients on a regular basis to
help them with general organizational and administrative tasks (for exam-
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ple bookkeeping, tax declaration and subsidy claims). The survey was then
handed to the farmer. It is important to note that the order in which con-
sultants visit their clients is random and thus completely independent from
any factor that could potentially influence our results. That means, consul-
tants do not follow any particular order or procedure when they visit the
farmers and they are also not called by the farmers. We made sure that the
questionnaire was answered independently by the respondent and that the
consultant as well as the LWK in Lower Saxony were well aware that for data
privacy reasons they were legally not allowed to influence or even look at the
answers given. However, it was in principal possible for the respondent to ask
the consultant for any required information. This might have been helpful
for the respondent when he or she faced problems to recall dates since the
consultant’s main task is to assist the farmer with the bookkeeping and tax
filing and he or she is thus an expert for any kind of financial and other data
concerning the farm. We received the questionnaires in sealed envelopes from
the LWK between December 2011 and March 2012. The farmers had also
the option to directly send the questionnaires to the University of Mannheim.
However, only one farmer has chosen to do so.
5.3.3 Some Descriptive Statistics
On balance we sent out 500 questionnaires and received 368 completed ques-
tionnaires back, which yields an overall response rate of almost 75 per cent.
This high rate can be explained by the personal relation between the consul-
tant and the farmer, which is typically characterized by mutual trust (how-
ever, it was made clear to the consultants that anonymity has to be cautiously
respected.). As mentioned before we asked two questions on their WTA. One
where the respondents simply state they were better or worse off after the re-
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form and one where we actually requested precise information on their WTA,
the key question of the survey. We dropped those who did not answer the
WTA questions at all and (in a few cases only) those who gave inconsistent
answers between the two,10 which leaves us with 315 observations out of the
368 responses we initially received.
The exact phrasing of the “winner or loser” question was: “Is the com-
pensation of 352 Euro per annum and hectare you are going to receive in 2013
sufficient to make you at least as well off as you would have been under con-
tinuation of the old subsidy-system of 2004?”. In the follow-up question we
then asked the respondents how large the compensation in 2013 would have
to be per hectare and annum for them to be exactly break even compared to
2004, the year right before the reform was put into force.
Empirically, we find that judging from the yes – no question the share of
reform winners is virtually as large as the share of reform losers (159 versus
156 respondents or 50.5 per cent versus 49.5 per cent). 235 participants
answered the WTA question consistently. The mean of this answer is 408,
the standard deviation is 117, the minimum zero and the maximum is 1000
(not adjusting for the asymmetric non-responses). The average age of the
respondents was 43 years. 93 per cent of the respondents were male and 70
per cent protestants.
One problem that we expected beforehand was that respondents who
profited from the reform are reluctant to reveal their exact WTA. And indeed,
this is also what we find when analyzing the data: response rates are highly
10Combined with the information that in 2013 all farmers in Lower Saxony are going to
receive a flat payment of 352 Euro per hectare and year, this leaves us also the opportunity
to spot inconsistent answers. A reform winner needs to declare a WTA lower or equal than
352 and vice versa.
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Figure 5.3: Histogram of Willingness to Accept. The vertical line is at 352,
the value which divides reform losers and winners. N = 235.
asymmetrical in the sense that almost 40 per cent of the reform winners but
less than 12 per cent of the loser do not reveal their WTA. In fact all other
question have a distinctly lower non-response rate. Even the thorny question
on the amount of subsidies a farmer currently receives has a substantially
lower non-response rate of only 3.5 per cent. From this cursory look at
the data, it seems obvious that there is a systematic bias in the willingness
to elicit ones WTA, which cannot be ignored in the further analysis. We
will tackle this problem in Section 5.4 by a weighted maximum likelihood
approach. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display the empirical distribution of the WTAs.
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Figure 5.4: Local linear estimation of the cumulative distribution of the
individual WTA. Number of individuals is normalized to 100. The horizontal
line is at 352 Euro. N = 235.
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5.4 Structural Estimation of a Survey Response
Model
5.4.1 Estimation
In this section, we estimate the size of information rents in the case of the
2005 European agricultural reform. Their magnitude is determined by the
distribution of losses and the size of the compensation paid. As outlined
before, information rents can be a major obstacle in implementing economic
reforms and hence play a crucial role for economic policy and social welfare.
Our estimation of the distribution of losses faces two possible problems.
One is strategic non-response: farmers may choose not to respond to question
eight (required compensation) because they understand that a low value of
the WTA may be used as an argument for the reduction of the subsidy in
the future. In fact this is also in line with our empirical observation: While
reform profiteers are somewhat reluctant to reveal their WTA, this does not
seem to be a concern for the reform losers. In fact around 40 per cent of
the reform winners and only slightly more than 10 per cent of the reform
losers do not respond to the question asking for their WTA. We presume
that there would be similar problems in comparable situations, which is why
we think our approach is not only applicable in our case, but is also of general
importance in economic policy analysis.
A second problem that we are facing might be strategic misreporting.
Farmers who have admitted to be reform winners in their response to question
six may report a value of their WTA in question eight that is too high.
This might be the case because farmers may not want to harm their fellow
farmers. This effect is likely to play a role empirically given the double peak
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distribution of responses in Figure 5.3 where one peak is located slightly to
the left of 352 euros.
Our empirical model takes care of both kinds of strategic behavior. The
key in our approach to tackle both problems is the winner–loser question,
a “yes or no”question, to which 315 farmers responded. Based on this and
the precise answers on the WTA (which still 235 respondents replied to),
we develop a novel likelihood based approach to structurally identify the
distribution of losses during the reform process.11
To be more precise, let θ denote the WTA which is private information
to every agent. We model survey response behavior as a process with two
stages. First nature draws θ from a distribution F (θ) with the corresponding
density f(θ) for every agent. We know that there exists a certain cut-off c
which divides reform profiteers and losers (c = 352 in our case). Hence we
know that respondents facing θ > c are reform losers and those with θ < c
belong to the profiteers. We permit the response rates to differ above and
below c and assume that farmers in the second step give a numerical answer
to question seven or eight with probability p if θ < c and with probability p
if θ > c. We assume that p and p are exogenously given.
Finally, we permit that agents who reveal being a reform winner in ques-
tion six understand that by reporting a value far below 352 euros in question
eight, may create a public bad for farmers in general because readers of the
survey may reconsider the size of the compensation in the future. This is
11In general, even after correcting for strategic mis- and non-reporting, there might
be concerns regarding the objectivity of survey responses when subjects know that these
information will be used for policy-making. While some caution is still necessary, it seems
that in our case these concerns are mitigated as the questionnaire was implemented ex–
post. Hence, it seems likely that participants assumed that their answers are not used to
make political decisions.
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why the respondent may be tempted to increase the reported WTA. Based on
these considerations, the likelihood-based estimation procedure we propose
is motivated by the following quadratic loss function:12
U(yi, θi) = −α(yi − θi)2 − (1− α)δ(θi)(yi − c)2 , (5.1)
where yi denotes the stated WTA and the value 1− α ∈ [0, 1] measures the
importance of the misreporting effect. The dummy variable δ(θi) is one if and
only if θi < c. This quadratic utility function is standard in the literature.
It punishes both deviations from the true value as well from the “anchor” c.
Maximization of (5.1) yields yi as a convex combination of the cut–off c
and the true θi
αyi + (1− α)δ(θi)yi = αθi + (1− α)δ(θi)c (5.2)
⇔ yi = αθi + (1− α)δ(θi)c
α + (1− α)δ (5.3)
which implies
yi =
 αθi + (1− α)c if θi ≤ cθi if θi > c. (5.4)
That is the actual compensation c = 352 euros may attract respondents
different depending on which side of the break-even point they are. This also
seems to be empirically reasonable given the differing clustering of observa-
tions on both sides of c in the dataset we observe, see Figure 5.3.
12Under the assumption of additive separability of both arguments of U(y − θ, y − c),
a quadratic utility function can viewed as a second–order Taylor series approximation to
any general utility function with ∂U(y−θ,y−c)∂(y−θ) =
∂U(y−θ,y−c)
∂(y−c) = 0.
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For now we assume that θi is normally distributed, that is we use f =









)2 . We will later on relax this assumption and test
for robustness towards different parametric functional form specifications,
see Section 5.5. Since the normal distribution has two parameters we end up
with five parameters µ , σ, α, p and p that fully describe our model.
Empirically p ∈ {p, p} can be consistently estimated using sample aver-
ages. That is we can get estimates of p by computing the share of winners
who answer questions seven or eight compared to all winners and p by the
share of losers who answer questions seven or eight compared to the num-
ber of all losers. We use these estimates as inverse probability weights and
estimate the model using weighted maximum likelihood.
Normality and the identifying assumption that the probability to answer
questions seven or eight is uncorrelated to the precise amount of θi itself
after conditioning on whether c > θi or c < θi, alone will yield consistent
estimates of the parameter that are of primary interest, µ and σ (if there is
no misreporting effect).
In accordance with equation (5.4), we allow the WTA we observe, y, to
be a linear combination of the true WTA, θ, and the cut–off c. Since we
assume at this stage that θi ∼ N(µ, σ2) it is clear from equation (5.4) that
yi ∼
 N((1− α)c+ αµ, α2σ2) if θ ≤ cN(µ, σ2) if θ > c. (5.5)
conditional on proper weighting with the inverse response rates.
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5.4.2 The Size of Information Rents
When we estimate the model in equation (5.5) as explained above using a
normality assumption, we find that
θ ∼ N(µˆ = 373, σˆ = 148) . (5.6)
Hence, the estimated mean is only slightly higher than the compensation
c = 352.
We now infer the size of the information rents as follows. We know in our
case that the amount of compensation paid to each agent was c = 352. The




Φ(θ |µ = 373, σ = 148)dθ (5.7)
since, in the finite case, the sum of information rents is equal to
∑N
i=1 c− θi,
∀θi < c. See Figure 5.5 for a stylized representation of the information rents,
the total compensation paid and the distribution of θ.
We express all magnitudes in percent of total compensation paid with the
mass of agents normalized to one, that is all numbers are in percentage of
352. The size of the information rent paid is then given by the relative share
of the shaded area under the curve relative to the one times 352 quadrangle,
illustrated in Figure 5.5. Our estimates indicate that approximately 14 per
cent of the total compensation paid are information rents, meaning that the
European agricultural budget could have theoretically been reduced by this
amount in a world without private information in which individual specific
compensations xi would be feasible. Interestingly we also estimate α ≈ 12 ,
which is clearly statistically different from one (at the one per cent level) –
the case where there is no strategic misreporting. Table 5.1 summarizes all
parameter estimates in addition to the information rent estimate.







Figure 5.5: Stylized graph where the size of information rents is given by the
shaded area under the distribution.











Table 5.1: ML model parameter estimates of distribution of θ, based on a
normality assumption. α is statistically significant different from one. Stan-
dard errors are given brackets below. The overall sample size is 315.
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5.5 Assessing the Robustness Using Different
Estimation Methods
We check the robustness of this information rent estimate using two different
approaches. First, we use two different distributional assumptions for the
distribution of θ, F (θ) to re-estimate the model from above without the
potential misreporting effect. Moreover, we also implement a nonparametric
weighting approach to get estimates that are independent of any parametric
assumptions.
First, we estimate the distribution using a gamma distribution, which is











is the complete gamma function. The gamma distribution also has the feature
that a random variable distributed according to (5.8) cannot take on values
below zero, which is also what we empirically observe.13
Here and in the nonparametric approach we are not concerned with
the identification of potential misreporting effects. Instead these robustness
checks can be considered to deliver a lower bound on information rents paid.
This is so because in the presence of misreporting effects of reform losers
(and we indeed found some empirical support for this before), the WTA we
observe will be closer to c than the true θ (for θ < c). Hence the surface
under the curve will tend to be smaller than under the MLE approach using
the normality assumption employed before that accounts for this behavior.
The information rents are again given by the relative size of the area under
13However, note that theoretically, the WTA could well be negative.
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the estimated curve of losses compared to the overall compensation paid, as
depicted in Figure 5.5. Using a gamma distribution we estimate information
rents in order of slightly more than six per cent.
As a second robustness test, we also use a normal distributional assump-
tion without accounting for potential misreporting here as well) and find
rents in the order of eight per cent. These results and the corresponding
parameter estimates (µ and σ for the normal distribution and the shape and
the location parameter for the gamma distribution) are depicted in Table
5.2.
Thirdly, we estimate the distribution of θi nonparametrically to be able
to work without any sort of functional form assumption. We use local linear
polynomial regression to estimate a more flexible regression of the form
y = m(x) + ε , (5.9)
where m(.) is an unknown function and ε is a disturbance term. Using local
polynomial regression, m(.) is approximated by a polynomial of order p. The
















where h is the bandwidth, K(.) is a kernel function and β is the parameter
vector. The curve estimate at x0 is then given by the estimated intercept β0
(since at x0, xi = x0). Practically, we construct the left-hand side variable
by matching to every observation a number n = 1, 2, .., N in increasing order




constitutes the right-hand side variable.
Additionally we also use the information contained in p and p – the rel-
ative response rates of reform profiteers and disadvantaged respectively (see
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Section 5.4) – and use them again as weights. This basically means that the
nonparametrically estimated curve is scaled up by 1
p
to the left of the cut-off
c and by 1
p
to the right. Under similar identifying assumptions as before,
namely that the probability to reveal θ only depends on whether θ > c or
θ < c, we are able to estimate the distribution of losses consistently.14 Then,
as shown before, the integral under the estimated curve determines the size
of the rent.
In general it would be possible to estimate the density nonparametrically
via simple kernel density estimators. However since we employ a weighting
approach, in principle the density needs to be estimated separately to the
left and to the right around the cut-off c. In these settings kernel estimators
are known to be badly biased at the boundaries. Since local polynomial
regressions are free of boundary bias (Fan and Gijbels, 1992) this is our
preferred approach. We use an Epanechnikov kernel, K(u) = 3
4
(1−u2)1[|u|≤1]
and an order one polynomial.15 We try different bandwidths between 50
and 100 euros, which seem to be large enough to be able to smooth over
the relatively large gaps between the observations at the extremes but not
too large to overly increase the bias. We find a nonparametrically estimated
information rent of approximately ten per cent. This is very much in line with
those parametric estimates that do not account for potential misreporting
and about four percentage points smaller than the estimates derived from
the strategic misreporting model. The results are summarized in Table 5.2.
To sum up, we find estimates of the relative size of information rents
in Lower Saxony between approximately 6 and 15 per cent with a tendency
14And excluding any misreporting or similar effects.
15The Epanechnikov is optimal and odd order polynomials outperform even ones, see
Fan and Gijbels (1996)










Table 5.2: Information Rent estimates using other distributional assump-
tions plus the nonparametric estimate, which do not exploit the misreporting
model. p = 0.61 and p = 0.88 are used as inverse weights in all cases. All
information rent estimates are expressed as a fraction of total compensation
paid.
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towards 15, which seem to be robust towards different estimation procedures.
It seems ex-ante unclear whether we can extrapolate from farmers in Lower
Saxony to the European farmers in general. However, the evidence in Section
5.6 implies that the individual WTA is not driven by any of the variables
that we asked for in our survey. Hence, extrapolating our results may not be
far–fetched. If we approximate the European agricultural budget of 2013 by
57 billion euros, and if we extrapolate our estimates to the entire union then
this would imply that roughly six billion euros per annum are information
rents.
5.6 Estimating the Value of Information
In the 2005 agricultural reform compensation payments are not conditioned
on other factors that may be of importance for explaining farmer’s WTA.
In principle, it may be possible to reduce information rents by tailoring the
compensation payments to any additional observable and verifiable factor
that is statistically significant in explaining the compensation required. In
this section, we try to estimate the value of information about the farmers
from a policy maker’s point of view. To this end we exploit the control
variables retrieved in our survey to test their explanatory power for farmer’s
revealed WTAs.
Empirically, to examine the explanatory power of the control variables,
we estimate OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
of the form
yi = β0 + x
′
iβ + εi, i = 1, 2, ..., N (5.11)
where the dependent variable y is the stated WTA (measured in euros) and
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x is a vector of control variables taken from the survey.16
Our estimates yield a some interesting results (which are displayed in
Table 5.3). First, we find that there is almost no significant relation between
the WTA and demographic controls such as age, gender, education, religious
affiliation, number of children and political attitudes (therefore the results are
not depicted here). Practically it would be anyway fairly hard to condition
compensation payments on these factors, mainly because of data privacy
and legal reasons. Also the total number of employees and the number of
relatives working on the farm turns out to be irrelevant for the size of the
WTA, as well as the dummy indicating whether the farm is specialized on
organic cultivation and the average quality of the soil. Moreover, the size of
the farm, both in 2004 and in 2011, and the growth rate of the area for the
same period appear to be unrelated to the amount of compensation required.
Second, we find that some factors that are potentially observable are able
to explain a certain part of the WTA. In particular, we estimate a significant
and positive coefficient on the dummy indicating beef and fowl farmers, which
we define as farmers whose main product has been either cows or fowl in
2004. This implies that both groups of farmers face a higher likelihood of
belonging to the losers of the reform and would potentially demand higher
compensations.17 However, the point estimates are quite small and hence
16We also ran the same regressions with θ, the ‘true’ WTA calculated from the estimates
in the section before, as a dependent variable. The conclusions were in general very similar
to those reported below. In general, it turns out that demographic and technical variables
are not significantly related to θ. On the other hand beef and fowl farmers are more
likely to be among the reform losers and the best predictor for θ is whether a respondent
perceives the reform as positive for farmers in general. When we estimate the same models
as in Table 5.3, we find that the coefficients and standard errors are very similar.
17This is consistent with what professionals from the LWK told us beforehand: the
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subsidies 0.55∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Reform good −30.10∗∗∗ −35.92∗∗∗ −36.46∗∗∗ −34.46∗∗∗ −29.08∗∗∗
for all farmers (9.79) (11.32) (10.93) (10.92) (10.24)
Time farm is in −8.60∗ −4.49 −10.40∗∗
family possession (4.76) (5.31) 4.94
Cow farmer 0.49∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)




N 230 218 218 218 215
R2 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.25
Table 5.3: Estimating the value of information. Ordinary least squares with
willingness to accept as dependent variable (measured in euros). Robust
standard errors in parentheses below, a constant is included in all cases. *,**
& *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and the 1% level respectively.
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economically not very relevant.
Moreover, the level of subsidies per hectare and year in 2011 turns out to
be robust in practically all specifications, which is not surprising given the
fact that the levels of subsidies between 2005 and 2012 are a linear combi-
nation of the 2004 and the 2013 level. Also, the time the farm is in family
possession seems to play a role in determining the WTA. The longer it is
in family hand, the lower ceteris paribus the WTA. Interestingly, we find
the largest point estimate in our regression on the dummy of the question
whether the farmer perceives the reform to be beneficial for farmers in gen-
eral - a factor that is not directly observable. One possible explanation is
that farmers seem have a positive opinion on the reform in general when he
or she is personally better off. Table 5.3 displays the regressions with the
WTA as the left-hand side variable where we find the highest R2.
To sum up, the overall explanatory power of the models estimated is
quite small and the R2 is never higher than 25 per cent. Moreover, the point
estimates are too small to play economically a significant role and the models
do not seem to be robust towards different specifications. We conclude that
it is hard to reduce information rents that need to be paid by conditioning on
personal and technical characteristics, at least in case of the 2005 agricultural
reform.
5.7 Conclusion
This paper presents the first attempt to estimate political information rents
in a reform process empirically. In principle, high rents resulting from pri-
vate information about the distribution of losses may be an impediment to
reform seems to disadvantage large beef and fowl farms.
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successful reform implementation. We find that rents in our example are
approximately in the range from 6 to 15 per cent of total compensation paid,
but most likely closer to 15 then to 6 per cent. To evaluate the economic
significance of this, two things need be considered. First of all, it might well
be that approval rates need to be higher than 50 per cent. In that case, the
magnitude of rents increases rapidly since the slope of the distribution seems
to be steepest around the mean, at least in the case of the reform consid-
ered in this paper. Secondly, the agricultural budget of the European Union
is, with approximately 55 billion euros per annum, enormous. Hence, every
percentage point rent translates into a large amount of public spending that
could potentially be saved.
As a second contribution, we showed using a novel survey dataset that
it would have been hard to implement the European Union agricultural re-
form cheaper using observable factors to condition compensation packages
on. This is a negative result from the perspective of a policy maker who
wants to reduce the cost of a reform. However, it also implies that the cur-
rent reform was almost efficiently implemented if we assume that 50 per cent
of the farmers needed to be compensated.
The method we use is suited to be applied in similar situations to estimate
the distribution of losses and thereby circumvent problems with asymmetric
non-responses in survey data. For future research in related situations, we
suggest to always include a yes–no question regarding the acceptance of the
planned compensation to be able to test for the overall reliability of the
precise WTA answers.
In general, an obstacle to the implementation of compensation packages
might be that individual’s incentives to strategically manipulate the WTA
answers are potentially increasing once it is known that the answers are going
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to be used for policy making. Moreover, in the practical implementation of
any group specific survey it is necessary to access the corresponding individ-
uals. In order to so, one most likely needs the support of relevant interest
groups. In our case it has proven quite difficult to find the support amongst
these groups. This might be an impediment to the practical design of com-
pensation packages in the future. This is why it would be very useful to
design questionnaires which make it more difficult to strategically misreport
a willingness to accept. Progress in this direction may be helpful to design
more successful political reform packages.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
This thesis put forward four empirical studies in the political economy of vot-
ing, elections and reforms. All studies are connected in two ways. First, all of
them constitute empirical contributions to the literature on voting. Second,
all chapters are inspired by the credibility revolution in applied economics.
That is, to a lesser extent all studies presented here also seek to add to the
empirical methodology used in political economy and political science.
The first study “Political Selection and the Relative Age Effect” pro-
vided empirical evidence on the existence of a relative age effect among US
politicians. Additionally, some potential policy implications of this selection
process were investigated by providing evidence that this process does not
seem to impact the quality of the candidates elected. While this information
is at least not bad news, an enhanced understanding of the causes and con-
sequences of this relative age effect in the political arena - but also in other
areas - is in my opinion necessary. While I discussed some theoretical chan-
nels through which relative age might help to win an office (more leadership
experience, increased presentation skills and so on) more thorough studies of
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these channels would be interesting. For example, it would be interesting to
study if and how this effect changes over time, but also whether it is present
among candidates that barely lost the election. In general, I think more at-
tention to this effect and its consequences is desirable. In the Chapter 2, I
put forward the argument that previous studies failed to find an effect for
broader adult populations because it only matters for other high competition
environments (like politics or professional sports) where even small advan-
tages can make a difference. For other ‘normal’ labor markets this effect
seems irrelevant. Thus, I also think it is likely to find such an effect in other
high competition environments which would make another interesting topic
to study.1
There seems to be a general demand for policy intervention concerning the
relative age effect as most people probably regard different chances of success
(may it be success in school, in sports or other professional outcomes in later
life) based on the date of birth as ‘unfair’. However, in general, scholars
found it difficult to give policy recommendations regarding this birthdate
effect despite the most basic suggestion to raise awareness especially among
school teachers. This is so because there seems to be an obvious need for
cut-off dates in order to determine whether a child is eligible for school or
not. Sykes, Bell, and Rodeiro (2009) for instance write that:
“ [...] we do not advance recommendations in respect of remedies.
We believe that work on remedies is not yet sufficiently advanced;
substantial, urgent work is required on the means of devising
adequate approaches.”
They however continue to suggest some areas that might deserve further
1As mentioned in the specific literature review, there is sizeable evidence for this effect
in professional sports, but other evidence is largely missing.
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attention like
“[...] specific balance in respect of curriculum elements devoted
to cognitive, emotional and social development; the training re-
quirements of teaching and support staff; curriculum frameworks;
inspection foci; pupil grouping strategy; management of differen-
tiation; and the articulation between early years units and com-
pulsory schooling.”
Certainly, increasing mindfulness among (especially primary) school teach-
ers might be a reasonable thing to counteract the consequences from relative
age. This could also include special training for teachers to learn how to dis-
tinguish differences in maturity from performance. Another possible policy
would be to encourage governments to increase compulsory school entry age
of children by one year which has been shown to moderate birthdate effects
(Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). Alternatively a less stringent handling of cut-off
dates might be an appropriate tool. In this way parents who are probably
better able to judge the maturity of their child, would get a higher margin
of discretion. Arguably this is just speculation as research seems to be miss-
ing here. Grenet (2009) suggests to age-normalize test scores, admittedly a
rather unorthodox measure to tackle this problem which also seems unlikely
to get a political majority.
I also strongly believe that the empirical approach presented in this chap-
ter is in the spirit of the credibility revolution in economics and that it is
a significant improvement relative to previous studies. The data on a daily
base allows me to use different econometric tools that yield more credible
estimates. With the empirical design used here it is possible to convincingly
exclude competing explanations such as seasonal variations of births, aca-
demic redshirting or endogenous sorting of births. I moreover argue that it
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is important to account for school time-varying cut-off dates as otherwise it
is unclear what exactly tests for a relative age effect are measuring. The
Sawtooth test seems well suited to be applied in other settings with small
sample sizes where the break height ought to be estimated, for example in
seasonal data. In my opinion, the nonparametric procedure is even preferable
with a larger number of observations; say more than 200 or so. This allows
for estimation free of any parametric functional form assumption, hence it
is arguably more suited than the (linear) OLS procedures commonly used in
the relative age effect literature.
In “Exit polls, Turnout, and Bandwagon Voting: Evidence from a Nat-
ural Experiment” I provided (what I believe is) compelling evidence that
knowledge of exit poll information changes voter behavior. It not only de-
creases turnout but also gives rise to a bandwagon effect - at least some
people seem to have preferences ‘to be on the winner side’. Through the rise
of the internet these issues will become even more important in the future as
it is getting easier and easier to gain information about election polls. Hence
the knowledge of exit poll information will most likely increase on average
in the voting population and the associated effects (for example bandwagon
voting) will magnify. Even though the French law officially prohibits any
exit poll information before the 8pm forecast, the internet makes it easy for
French citizens get polling information from Swiss or Belgian newspapers for
instance way before 8pm. This problem is not specific to France, but common
to most other Western democracies. An appeal from the German national
election administrator Roderich Egeler prior to the German national elec-
tions in September 2013 illustrates these concerns. In the letter sent around
to all eligible political parties he is quoted saying
“In my function as national election administrator, I would like to
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sensitize you with regard to the upcoming national election to the
danger and consequences for the voting behavior of the electorate
and the distribution of advance information via websites (e.g.
Twitter).”2
He made clear to all parties that dissemination of exit poll information
before 6pm on election day is illegal and that there is a penalty of 75,000 euros
for any infringement. As not only the above quote illustrates, these concerns
are widespread among voters as well as the legislature and are certainly
present in other democratic countries apart from Germany as well. Moreover,
a decrease in turnout is generally perceived to be worrisome as a high rate of
political participation is widely considered as a legitimation for democratic
institutions.3 The bandwagon effect might look even more severe at first
sight, because this effect might be seen as ‘distorting’ the election result or
as preventing voters from expressing their true preferences. Hence sequential
voting is seen as undesirable by many laymen.
Nonetheless, the implications for the societal welfare are theoretically as
well as empirically surprisingly hard to identify. As discussed in the introduc-
tion of this thesis, a natural starting point to conduct a welfare analysis is to
view elections as a way to aggregate information dispersed in the population.
In this context, one might argue that it is natural to assume that sequential
voting mechanisms are more informationally efficient than simultaneous ones
as in the former late voters can infer signals about the correct state of the
2Translated from an article from the 19th of September 2013 in “Spiegel
Online”, the online representation of Germany’s largest weekly magazine
www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswahlleiter-droht-twitter-plauderern-mit-
bussgeld-a-923293.html.
3This argument might be less relevant under direct democracy.
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world (the candidate’s quality or the correct policy for example) from earlier
voters. A theoretical analysis was put forward by Dekel and Piccione (2000)
who study symmetric binary common-value elections (that is elections with
identical preferences in the voting population). Their goal is to compare the
relative efficiency of simultaneous voting versus sequential voting rules at
aggregating information. Interestingly, they find that the set of equilibria in
the simultaneous voting game are a subset of those from the sequential game.
This result has at least two important consequences for policy conclusions.
On the upside, it implies that the positive information aggregation proper-
ties of elections (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997) can be carried over to
sequential voting mechanisms. Second, this result “[..] undermines the abil-
ity to conduct meaningful welfare comparisons between alternative voting
mechanisms (Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey, 2007, p.411).”
Their finding however is not robust to the introduction of small voting
costs. Battaglini (2005) for example shows that the set of equilibria is differ-
ent in both games after the introduction of positive costs of voting. Once they
are considered another facet is added to the problem since voting costs are
certainly relevant for welfare considerations: if turnout is lower, voting costs
are also lower, increasing societal welfare ceteris paribus. Hence, if the can-
didate’s quality is partly unobserved or there are costs of voting, sequential
voting might actually increase efficiency of elections. The most comprehen-
sive and relevant study of this question to this day is probably Battaglini,
Morton, and Palfrey (2007). They compare the informational (the ability to
aggregate information) and economic efficiency (which voting rule maximizes
expected utility?) of sequential versus simultaneous voting mechanisms. To
this end they introduce voting costs in a common-value model which they
also experimentally study. They find a trade-off between equity and effi-
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ciency in the sense that sequential voting is inequitable but more efficient
than simultaneous voting. In the experiment, voters are treated asymmetri-
cally under the sequential mechanism since early voters seem to have an over
proportional influence on the election result and later voters bear a smaller
share of the voting costs as they are more likely not to turn out.
What do these studies tell us about the potential policy implications of
the French natural experiment studied in the third chapter? Most of all, it
could imply that there is no clear ‘better’ when discussing voting mechanisms
and hence there are also no clear welfare evaluations. Instead, it implies that
societies in fact need to decide over a trade-off between equity and efficiency.
What is more, while all these papers mentioned here all illustrate interesting
facets of the problem, there is nevertheless the issue that they are exclusively
studying the common value case. However, in practice it is likely that voters
have divergent preferences, creating new questions when evaluating different
voting mechanisms.
While I think these results are important and interesting, a useful avenue
for future research would be to investigate the ‘external validity’ of these
results, that is whether the estimated effects are specific to France or whether
they apply to other countries as well, especially to the well-known “West
Coast effect” in the United States. Obviously, this endeavour is aggravated
by the difficulties encountered to find a credible research design. While I
do not see any reasons why the general mechanics should be fundamentally
different in other democratic countries, one obviously has to be cautious when
making claims apart from those relating to France. In fact, this concern of
generalizability, or external validity, of (natural) experiments is at the core
of the critique put forward by ‘structuralists’, see Keane (2010a) and Keane
(2010b) for instance.
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Moreover, I think it would be worthwhile to study why exactly some
people exhibit preferences to vote for the likely winner. The study presented
in this thesis remains silent on the reasons for this bandwagon effect. It could
be that voters gain direct additional utility from being on the winner side. It
could also be that late voters infer from earlier votes the (partly unobserved)
quality of the candidates and hence sometimes change their mind when early
voters signal unexpected high quality of a given candidate through their
votes. All in all, this specific question remains unexplored but the finding
that people have preferences to be ‘on the winner side’ even if this is against
their initial preferences could have important implications for other areas
in behavioral economics if this effect turns out to be robust across other
domains, for example in tournaments, contests or auctions.
The fourth Chapter “Tactical Voting and Voter’s Sophistication in British
Elections” presented a new method to identify tactical voting patterns. This
method directly relied on balloting results and not on survey data like most
other work in this area before. It reveals an interesting patterns of tactical
voting between liberals on Labour supporters. It has also been shown that the
Conservative party does not seem to be subject to tactical voting in any way.
In my opinion this approach makes a useful contribution to the literature
and gives interesting insights into the landscape of British political parties
and the structure of tactical voting in the UK. Nevertheless, it has also been
made clear that all empirical studies have advantages and disadvantages and
hence it appears to be prudent to not only rely on one approach but use a
combination of different methods. Clearly, further research in tactical voting
behaviour is needed to investigate this topic. For example relatively little
is known which characteristics of an election and, more general, of a voting
system make tactical voting more likely. To study these kind of questions we
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need robust methods to identify strategic voting patterns which are arguably
in the early stages of developments.
In “Measuring Political Information Rents: Evidence from the European
Agricultural Reform”, I presented a case study of the successfully imple-
mented European Reform of the agricultural subsidy system. I estimated
the size of information rents to be between 10 and 15 percentage points of
the total compensation paid. This estimate highlights the fact that while in
the case studied here, private knowledge about gains and losses was not an
impediment to the successful reform implementation, private information cer-
tainly significantly increased overall government expenditure (theoretically,
the ‘compensation’ paid could have been some billions of euros cheaper than
without private information if a simple majority of farmers is needed). While
I tried to correct for some drawbacks that generally come along with survey
data (in this case asymmetric nonresponse rates and incentives to strategi-
cally exaggerate numerical answers), it seems likely that other problems still
exist and are likely to increase when the survey is conducted not ex-post but
ex-ante. I judge it to be highly important to study in more detail if and how
people strategically manipulate survey responses.4 This knowledge would aid
informing decision makers about policy issues. For example, the finding in
4There are other problems that go along with survey data which I have not discussed
here in more detail. For instance a large literature, especially in environmental economics,
has emerged that deals with the willingness to pay - willingness to accept gap, see for
instance Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze (1987); Hanemann (1991); Shogren, Shin, Hayes,
and Kliebenstein (1994); Nape, Frykblom, Harrison, and Lesley (2003); Zeiler and Plott
(2004). Another issue that arises when using survey data is that of a hypothetical bias
(Champ and Bishop, 2001; List, 2001; Murphy, Allen, Stevens, and Weatherhead, 2005;
Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008). I am nevertheless convinced that the survey analyzed in
this thesis provides valuable lessons, both theoretically as well as practically.
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this chapter indicates that there is some strategic misreporting by respon-
dents, a finding which raises questions about the validity of survey studies
in general. The willingness to accept (WTA) is an extremely important tool
in public policy analysis with a wide range of applications. It typically plays
an important role in policy issues and in efficiently resolving allocation prob-
lems, for example in environmental policy or public economics. That is, if
the distribution of WTAs would be known for a given policy issue, it would
be almost trivial to design optimal policies, for example it would be easy
to answer questions how to optimally allocate an indivisible good. Hence
it would be crucial to develop an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit
WTAs. Admittedly, it seems hard to imagine such a mechanism, if not im-
possible. Nevertheless, I think the work presented in this thesis is at least a
small step towards remedying potential flaws.
Another take away from this chapter is that individual’s distribution of
losses has been neglected when studying failure of reforms. To me it seems
that a key characteristic of many areas where a desired (at least from the
view point of many economists) reform does not take place is that a mi-
nority suffers relatively large losses and the gains are small and distributed
among the broad population. Hence the minority has strong incentives to
lobby against the reform whereas the majority does not have the same in-
ducements to lobby for it. A reliable estimate of the distribution of gains and
losses would help to design compensation packages in order to buy political
support cheaper. I consider the deepening and the further development of
the ideas presented in this chapter of crucial importance for the successful
implementation of public policies.
I conclude by emphasizing again the need for credible empirical research
designs to answers questions in political economy. Social science naturally
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suffers from a lack of randomized data. Hence I argue that we should make
use of the whole toolkit available to economists, from survey data, to natural-
and laboratory experiments and from reduced form to structural economet-
rics. It is my opinion that economists as well political scientists have not yet
exploited all possibilities in empirical research. My hope is that this thesis
may serve as a small step towards this goal and inspire future work in this
area.
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Appendix
8.1 Appendix Section 2
8.1.1 Optimal Binsize Choices
In the following, I illustrate in more detail, how I derived the Asymptotic
Mean Integrated Squared Error (A-MISE) optimal binsize. This section
closely follows Ha¨rdle (1991). The A-MISE basically tries to balance the
trade-off between the bias and the variance inherent in the optimal binsize
problem. Formally, the Mean Integrated Squared Error (MISE) of a his-







where {yi}ni=1 ∼ f(y) is an i.i.d. sample, b is the binsize and fˆb denotes
the histogram that aims at estimating f(y). Intuitively, the MISE optimal
binsize minimizes the expected squared distance between the true density
function and the histogram. It is straightforward to show that this amounts
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to gauge a variance – bias trade-off. Using a Taylor expansion for the integral

















is obtained, where ||f ′ ||2 denotes the Euclidian norm of f ′ . Since the latter
two terms are per assumption asymptotically zero, they can be ignored in
further analysis. The Asymptotic-MISE optimal binsize b∗ then results from








In general, this expression is of limited practical use since f
′
(y) is un-
known. However, proceeding on the assumption that my model estimated in
section 2.4.2 is a sufficiently good approximation of the true density, I am
able to use the fact ||f ′(y)||2 ≈ 0.4 (and ||f ′(y)||2 ≈ 0.6 for the robustness
section).1 Then, empirically the binsize estimator turns out to be b∗ ≈ 0.44.
This will admittedly result in a rather oversmoothed histogram. Neverthe-
less, this intuitively makes sense since I am dealing with a distribution that is
likely to have a very similar slope over the whole support. McCrary generally
starts from a more bell-shaped distribution, in which case the slope changes
distinctively over the support. However, he also stresses the irrelevance of
the first step binsize choice for the asymptotic normal approximation of his
estimator and this is, in fact, also what I find empirically. I am aware of the
fact that strictly speaking the optimal binsize from A-MISE minimization is
1If the uniform distribution was the true data generating process, in fact ||f ′(y)||22
would be equal to zero and thus the A-MISE optimal binsize would be infinity, which
amounts to choosing a one-bin histogram.
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not necessarily optimal in my framework. This is so because the A-MISE is a
“global criterion”, whereas I am especially interested in the boundary points.
This argument is analogue to Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) argument
for the optimal bandwidth in a regression discontinuity design. Nevertheless,
this binsize choice serves in my case simply as benchmark to start with.
8.1.2 Bandwidth Estimator for the two-step RDD Es-
timator
On a methodological level, although with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2009) paper there is now a data-driven regression discontinuity design band-
width estimator readily available for practical use, there is a more subtle,
unresolved issue with the parameter choices in my framework. Particularly,
the two steps in the McCrary procedure are interrelated in a way that is
not captured by the combination of the A-MISE optimal binsize, b∗, in the
first step and by the IK bandwidth, h∗, for the second step local polynomial
regression. To see this, assume that given an optimal pair of parameters
(b∗, h∗), b∗ is decreased. Then the histogram variance will increase and the
bias will decrease. The overall expected Mean Squared Error, which is just
the sum of the two, will increase. However, the second step expected Mean
Squared error will decrease in expected terms since there are now more ob-
servations to perform the actual jump point estimation. A similar argument
holds true when b∗ is increased. Thus the two parameters are connected in a
way that has not been accounted for yet in the literature. A starting point
could be to introduce an objective function that consists of the histogram
(the first step) plus the local polynomial Mean Squared error (the second
step):
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MSEMcCrary(b, h) = MSEHistogram(b) +MSERDD(h) , (8.4)
and then to maximize over b and h. Nevertheless, this point might be
more of theoretical interest, since my estimates turned out to be fairly robust
to different parameter values.
8.2 Appendix Section 4
8.2.1 Redistricting and Notional Results
As mentioned before, between the 2005 and the 2010 elections some con-
stituencies were subject to redistricting. To adjust for this fact, I employ the
widely used notional results by Rallings and Thrasher (2007). The notional
election result is an estimate how the previous result would have looked like
given the new constituency boundaries. Nevertheless, those estimates are
not perfect since they neglect tactical voting. In the following I am going to
briefly describe how these results are calculated.
Constituencies are composed of electoral wards, which were almost never
cut during the change of boundaries. Hence, notional results could in theory
be computed by re-assorting electoral wards. However, in British general
elections, results are not available on the ward– but only on the constituency–
level. This is a direct consequence of how the ballot papers are counted. The
electoral commission enforces a system in which all ballot boxes are first
gathered in a central place in every constituency and are then mixed before
they are counted.
Notional results are therefore calculated with the help of election results
available on a ward level, primarily local authority elections. Basically, the
8.2. APPENDIX SECTION 4 255
number of votes obtained by party P in the new constituency C ′ is calculated
as the sum of votes for P at the local elections in all the wards that form
the 2005 constituency C. The vote share of each party at the 2005 national
election is then divided by the sum of the local election votes in C. This
fraction F is used as a multiplier for each C and P and applied to the
party’s vote in each ward that constituted C to obtain a notional 2005 general
election result in that specific ward. All votes in the wards making up the
new constituency C ′ boundaries are then summed to get the result for the
corresponding constituency. In a few cases manual adjustments have been
made.
8.2.2 Selection of the Sample of Constituencies
As previously mentioned, I restrict the study to Labour/ Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats/ Conservatives marginal seats. In order to study the
former for instance, I consider only the constituencies where Labour and
Conservatives arrived first and second (or second and first respectively) in
2005. I then drop all seats where those two parties are not expected to
remain the two dominating ones in 2010. I combine the previous result
with the national swing to obtain these expectations. That is, given the
2005 election result in a constituency where Labour and Conservatives came
first and second, I drop those constituencies where a national vote swing
would predict that at least one of the two parties will not be first or runner–
up. I are left with 255 Labour/ Conservative constituencies. I compile the
Liberal Democrats/ Conservatives marginals accordingly, but since Labour
was expected to lose ground and Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to gain
votes, I am not dropping any constituencies here. That is, with expectations
based on a national vote swing, I will never see a constituency where Liberals
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and Conservatives have been first and second respectively in 2005 but are
not predicted to be first and second in 2010. As a result, I keep 126 Liberal
Democrats/ Conservatives marginal constituencies. Hence, I use information
from 381 out of 650 constituencies in total.
8.3 Appendix Section 5
8.3.1 Questionnaire
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I. Subsidies 
 
1. Did your farm frequently change its product range due to the modification  of the subsidy system before the 2005 reform? 
 
     Very often  frequently less frequently  never 
 
 
2. In hindsight, would you say that the reform in 2005 had a rather positive or negative impact on your personal situation?  
 
     rather positive rather negative  neutral 
 
 
3. In hindsight, would you say that the reform in 2005 had a rather positive or negative impact on farmers in Germany as 
a whole? 
 
     rather positive rather negative   neutral 
 
 
4. Before the implementation of the reform, have you been a reform supporter or an opponent? 
 
     supporter  opponent  neutral 
 
 
5. The reform inludes the discontinuation of quantitative subsidies in many agricultural subsectors. At the same time 
subsidies are now conditioned on the size of the farm land that is tilled. Was your farm affected by these changes? 
 
     yes   no 
 
 
6. Is the compensation of 352 Euros per annum and hectare that you are going to receive in 2013 sufficient to make you at 
least as well-off as you would have been under continuation of the old subsidy system of 2004?  
 
     Yes (please continue with question 8)           No (please continue with question 7) 
 
 
7. If the compensation of 352 Euros per annum and hectare you are going to receive in 2013 is not sufficient to make you at 
least as well-off as you would have been under continuation of the old subsidy system of 2004, what payment per hectare 
and year would have maintained you your financial and economic situation?  
 
____________________€  (continue with question 9) 
 
 
8. If the compensation of 352 Euros per annum and hectare you are going to receive in 2013 is sufficient to make you at 
least as well-off as you would have been under continuation of the old subsidy system of 2004, what payment per hectare 





9. How high are the subsidies your farm received on average per hectare and year in 2011? 
 
     less than 100 €                                between 100 and 150 €                           150 - 200 € 
      200 – 250 €                                     250 – 300 €                                              300 – 350 € 
      350 – 400 €                                     400 – 450 €                                              450 – 500 €                    more than 500 € 
 
 
10. Do you think that the existing system of the agricultural subsidies will remain unchanged for the next five years? 
     yes                             no                     don’t know. 
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II. Farm 
11. Was the farm family-owned in 2004? 
 
     yes   no 
 
 
12. Is the farm currently family-owned? 
     yes   no 
 
 
13. If so, for how long has the farm been family-owned? 
 
      less than 10 years         11-20 years            21-30 years          31-40 years           41-50 years        more than 50 years 
 
 
14. If you have children, did one of your children take over the farm? 
 
     yes   (continue with question 14) no   (continue with question 15 ).   
 
 
15.  Did one of your children take over the farm before or after 2005? 
 
     before 2005                                                 2005 or later.   (continue with question 16). 
 
 
16.  Do you expect that one of your children takes over the farm? 
 
      yes                                                           no. 
 
 
17. How many family members as well as relatives (besides yourself) worked on the farm in the years 2004 and 2011 on 
average? 
 
_________________members in 2004 and  _____________ members in 2011. 
 
18. How large was the area your farm tilled in 2004 and in 2011? 
 
2004: 
      less than 2 hectares                               2-10                                 10-30                            30-50                
      50-75                     75-100                     100-200                            200-500                       more than 500 hectares?    
2011: 
      less than 2 hectares                              2-10                                 10-30                            30-50                
      50-75                     75-100                     100-200                            200-500                       more than 500 hectares?    
 
 
19. Were you the sole proprietor of the farm in 2004? 
 
     yes   no 
 
 
20. Are you currently the sole proprietor of the farm? 
 
     yes   no 
 
 
21. How many workers did you employ in 2004 and in 2011 on average? 
 
2004: 
      less than 5          5-10             11-20            21-50           51-100          101-250        251-500        more than 500?  
2011: 
      less than 5            5-10                11-20              21-50             51-100            101-250        251-500        more than 500?   
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22. Which of the following agricultural products are generally speaking on your farm rather important and which are rather 
unimportant?  
 
Crops:                    very important          important             rather unimportant       unimportant 
Root crops:            very important          important             rather unimportant       unimportant 
Pigs:                       very important          important             rather unimportant       unimportant 
Cow:                      very important          important             rather unimportant       unimportant 
Poultry:                  very important         important              rather unimportant      unimportant 
Beef cattle:            very important          important             rather unimportant       unimportant 
Sheep/ goat:          very important          important             rather unimportant        unimportant 




23. How high was the proportion of revenue of the following agricutural products in 2004 and 2011 in per cent of total 
revenues? 
 
Product  2004  2011 
Crops   
- 
 
Root crops    
Pigs    
Cows    
Poultry    
Beef cattle    
Sheep/Goat    
Others    




24. Was your farm until 2004 exclusively specialized in products from controlled biological cultivation? 
 
     yes   no 
 
 
25. Is your farm today still specialized in products from controlled biological cultivation? 
 
     yes   no 
 
 
26. How high was the indicator for the quality of the soil for your farm in 2004? [„landwirtschaftliche Vergleichszahl“] 
 
      Up to 20   21-40   41-60                    61-80                    more than 80     
 
 





     Male    female  
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30. What is your highest educational achievement? 
 
     „Hauptschulabschluss“      „Mittlere Reife“ „Abitur“ University degree  no graduation 
 
 
31. Religious Affiliation? 
 
     protestant        catholic               other                                          no affiliations  ?     
 
 
32. Did you also gather some other practical experience outside the agricultural sector until 2005 (at least six months)? 
 
     yes  no 
 
 
28. On a scale from 1 (left) to 5 (right), how would you rank your political views?           
 
     1              2                     3                  4                      5                                         no answer 
 
 
28. How would you evaluate your knowledge about the details of the reform on a scale from 1 (no knowledge) to 5 (very 
well informed) before the implementation? 








Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
